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Regulating Data Giants: Between Competition Law and Data Protection Law

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New Developments in Competition Law and Economics

Part of the book series: Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship ((EALELS,volume 7))

Abstract

In recent years, advancements in digital technologies have brought many advantages for consumers and citizens. At the same time, consumers share vast and increasing amounts of personal data in the digital era. As concerns regarding privacy increase, so do the number of businesses whose business model revolves around personal data. Many of these businesses are platforms, which due to the inherent network effects often have considerable market power. The combination of powerful and data-rich platforms has gained the attention of competition authorities. Big Data played a central role in various recent competition law cases, such as the Facebook/Whatsapp merger, the DoubleClick/Google merger and the Bundeskartellamt’s abuse of dominance probe into Facebook. This paper critically assesses to what extent competition law can address the concerns in digital markets. It argues that, while privacy concerns may be particularly pervasive in relation to firms with market power, the solution for privacy concerns is likely to lie in data protection law rather than competition law. In cases where, instead, market power based on data is the reason for concern, competition authorities may be better apt to intervene.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Varian (2010). See also Acquisti et al. (2016), p. 14.

  2. 2.

    Costa-Cabral and Lynskey (2017), p. 12.

  3. 3.

    OECD (2015), p. 143 ff.

  4. 4.

    Vezzoso (2016), p. 1.

  5. 5.

    Colangelo and Maggiolino (2017), p. 363, referring to Evans (2013).

  6. 6.

    Google/DoubleClick (Case COMP/M.4731) Commission decision C(2008) 927 [2008] OJ C184/10 (‘Google/DoubleClick’).

  7. 7.

    Facebook/WhatsApp (Case COMP/M.7217) Commission Decision C (2014)7239 [2014] OJ C417/4 (‘Facebook/WhatsApp’).

  8. 8.

    Microsoft/LinkedIn (Case COMP/M.8124) Commission Decision C(2016) 8404 [2016] OJ C388/4 (‘Microsoft/LinkedIn’).

  9. 9.

    Regulation 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46, O.J. 2016, L 119/1.

  10. 10.

    See e.g. Kuschewsky and Geradin (2014), Colangelo and Maggiolino (2017) and Costa-Cabral and Lynskey (2017).

  11. 11.

    Stucke and Grunes (2015).

  12. 12.

    Balto and Lane (2016).

  13. 13.

    Pitruzzella (2017), p. 78.

  14. 14.

    Case C-238/05 Asnef-Equifax, [2006] ECR I-11125 (“Asnef-Equifax”), para 63.

  15. 15.

    Google/DoubleClick, paras 359 and 366.

  16. 16.

    Asnef-Equifax, para 368.

  17. 17.

    Harbour (2007).

  18. 18.

    Facebook/WhatsApp.

  19. 19.

    Facebook/WhatsApp, paras. 70–71 and para 102.

  20. 20.

    Ribeiro (2016).

  21. 21.

    WhatsApp Legal Information, WhatsApp Privacy Policy.

  22. 22.

    European Commission Press release “Commission fines Facebook €110 million for providing misleading information about WhatsApp takeover”.

  23. 23.

    Facebook/WhatsApp, para 164.

  24. 24.

    Miller (2016), p. 7.

  25. 25.

    European Commission Press Release “Mergers: Commission approves acquisition of LinkedIn by Microsoft, subject to conditions”.

  26. 26.

    Microsoft/LinkedIn, para 324.

  27. 27.

    Microsoft/LinkedIn, para 350.

  28. 28.

    Colangelo and Maggiolino (2017), p. 365.

  29. 29.

    Microsoft/LinkedIn, para 177.

  30. 30.

    Microsoft/LinkedIn, para 178.

  31. 31.

    Colangelo and Maggiolino (2017), p. 366.

  32. 32.

    Bundeskartellamt, Press Release, ‘Bundeskartellamt initiates proceeding against Facebook on suspicion of having abused its market power by infringing data protection rules’.

  33. 33.

    Bundeskartellamt, Press Release (March 2016).

  34. 34.

    Davilla (2017), p. 381.

  35. 35.

    CNIL statement (2017).

  36. 36.

    Belgische Privacycommissie v. Facebook Inc, 16 February 2018.

  37. 37.

    Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens statement (2017).

  38. 38.

    Kerber (2017), p. 858.

  39. 39.

    Europe Economics (2016), p. 2.

  40. 40.

    Evans (2013).

  41. 41.

    Senftleben et al. (2016).

  42. 42.

    Bourreau et al. (2017), p. 29; Stucke and Grunes (2015).

  43. 43.

    Rubinfeld and Gal (2017), p. 340.

  44. 44.

    See e.g. Sokol and Comerford (2016), referring to Competition Commissioner Vestager and FTC Chairwoman Ramirez.

  45. 45.

    Graef (2016).

  46. 46.

    Balto and Lane (2016), p. 2.

  47. 47.

    Kuneva (2009), Speech of former Consumer Commissioner Kuneva at the Roundtable on Online Data Collection.

  48. 48.

    Schepp and Wambach (2016), p. 121.

  49. 49.

    Miller (2016), p. 5.

  50. 50.

    Davilla (2017), p. 373. See also Nelson (2016).

  51. 51.

    Balto and Lane (2016), p. 6; Sokol and Comerford (2016).

  52. 52.

    Shapiro and Varian (1999).

  53. 53.

    Sokol and Comerford (2016).

  54. 54.

    Miller (2016), p. 5.

  55. 55.

    Harbour (2007).

  56. 56.

    Rubinfeld and Gal (2017), p. 351.

  57. 57.

    Ibid.

  58. 58.

    20140457: Google, Inc.; Nest Labs Inc., 2014.

  59. 59.

    Chiou and Tucker (2014).

  60. 60.

    Cecere et al. (2017), p. 2.

  61. 61.

    See Stigler (1980) and Posner (1981).

  62. 62.

    Cecere et al. (2017), p. 1.

  63. 63.

    Westin (1967).

  64. 64.

    Schoeman (1992).

  65. 65.

    Acquisti et al. (2016), p. 8.

  66. 66.

    Larouche et al. (2016), p. 18.

  67. 67.

    Cecere et al. (2017), p. 2.

  68. 68.

    Kerber (2017), p. 858.

  69. 69.

    Acquisti et al. (2016), p. 28.

  70. 70.

    Valentino-Devries et al. (2012) and Mikians et al. (2012, 2013).

  71. 71.

    Anderson and Simester (2010).

  72. 72.

    Larouche et al. (2016), pp. 19–20.

  73. 73.

    Lambrecht and Tucker (2013).

  74. 74.

    Larouche et al. (2016), p. 20.

  75. 75.

    Acquisti et al. (2016), p. 23.

  76. 76.

    Acquisti et al. (2012).

  77. 77.

    Varian (2010).

  78. 78.

    Larouche et al. (2016), p. 17.

  79. 79.

    Anand and Shachar (2009).

  80. 80.

    Stone (2010).

  81. 81.

    Larouche et al. (2016), p. 21.

  82. 82.

    Acquisti et al. (2016), p. 25; Larouche et al. (2016), p. 20.

  83. 83.

    Kerber (2017), p. 857.

  84. 84.

    Farrell (2012), pp. 251–252.

  85. 85.

    Larouche et al. (2016), p. 21.

  86. 86.

    Larouche et al. (2016), p. 18.

  87. 87.

    Acquisti et al. (2016), p. 23.

  88. 88.

    Acquisti et al. (2016), p. 7.

  89. 89.

    Lane et al. (2014) and Acquisti et al. (2016), p. 36.

  90. 90.

    Cecere et al. (2017), p. 3.

  91. 91.

    Kerber (2017), p. 858.

  92. 92.

    Acquisti (2012), p. 229.

  93. 93.

    Cecere et al. (2017), p. 3.

  94. 94.

    Hirshleifer (1980), Stigler (1980) and Posner (1981).

  95. 95.

    Varian (1997).

  96. 96.

    E.g. Fudenberg and Tirole (1998) and Villas-Boas (1999). See further Cecere et al. (2017), p. 3.

  97. 97.

    Acquisti et al. (2016), p. 6.

  98. 98.

    Berthold and Boehme (2010).

  99. 99.

    Cecere et al. (2017), p. 2.

  100. 100.

    Odlyzko (2003) and Acquisti et al. (2016), p. 12.

  101. 101.

    Acquisti et al. (2016), p. 5.

  102. 102.

    Cecere et al. (2017), p. 3.

  103. 103.

    Acquisti et al. (2016), p. 14, referring to Rainie et al. (2013).

  104. 104.

    Acquisti et al. (2016), p. 39.

  105. 105.

    See Acquisti et al. (2016), p. 39 ff. for an overview.

  106. 106.

    Cecere et al. (2017), p. 4. See also Nissenbaum (2004).

  107. 107.

    Acquisti et al. (2016), p. 42.

  108. 108.

    Solove (2002).

  109. 109.

    Rubin and Lenard (2001).

  110. 110.

    Acquisti et al. (2016), p. 42.

  111. 111.

    Larouche et al. (2016), p. 19.

  112. 112.

    E.g. Directive 95/46, Art. 2.

  113. 113.

    GDPR, Preamble paras 9–15.

  114. 114.

    Article 4(1) GDPR.

  115. 115.

    See further Graef (2016), p. 8.

  116. 116.

    Article 15 GDPR.

  117. 117.

    Article 17 GDPR.

  118. 118.

    Article 20 GDPR.

  119. 119.

    Article 83, paragraph 5 GDPR.

  120. 120.

    Article 83, paragraph 4 GDPR.

  121. 121.

    Stucke and Grunes (2015).

  122. 122.

    Balto and Lane (2016), p. 9. See also Bhattacharya and Buiten (2018).

  123. 123.

    Balto and Lane (2016), p. 7.

  124. 124.

    International Competition Network (2007), pp. 6–21.

  125. 125.

    Bhattacharya and Buiten (2018).

  126. 126.

    US Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission (2010), Horizontal Merger Guidelines, p. 2.

  127. 127.

    Horizontal Merger Guidelines.

  128. 128.

    OECD (2016).

  129. 129.

    Colangelo and Maggiolino (2017), p. 364.

  130. 130.

    Ohlhausen and Okuliar (2015), p. 32.

  131. 131.

    Costa Cabral and Lynskey (2017), p. 18.

  132. 132.

    Costa Cabral and Lynskey (2017), p. 18.

  133. 133.

    Ohlhausen and Okuliar (2015), p. 32.

  134. 134.

    Sokol and Comerford (2016), p. 10.

  135. 135.

    Ohlhausen and Okuliar (2015), p. 121.

  136. 136.

    Stucke and Grunes (2016).

  137. 137.

    Harbour and Koslov (2010), p. 794. See further Colangelo and Maggiolino (2017), p. 366.

  138. 138.

    Tucker (2015).

  139. 139.

    Kimmel and Kestenbaum (2014), p. 53.

  140. 140.

    Rubinfeld and Gal (2017), p. 360.

  141. 141.

    Ibid., p. 361.

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Acknowledgement

Funding by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) through CRC TR 224 is gratefully acknowledged.

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  1. Department of Law, University of Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany

    Miriam C. Buiten

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  1. Faculty of Law, University of Lucerne, Lucerne, Switzerland

    Klaus Mathis

  2. The School of Law, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN, USA

    Avishalom Tor

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Buiten, M.C. (2019). Regulating Data Giants: Between Competition Law and Data Protection Law. In: Mathis, K., Tor, A. (eds) New Developments in Competition Law and Economics. Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship, vol 7. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11611-8_13

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