Abstract
The potential and factual use of pharmacological neuro-enhancement in the educational system has raised pedagogical, political, juridical, and ethical controversies. In this paper, I will address some of the systematic theoretical questions that permeate these debates. Since advocates of the educational use of neuro-enhancement often do not theoretically clarify what they mean by “education,” I am first going to analyze different conceptions of education (e.g., value-based vs. technological conceptions) to develop a more complex theoretical picture of the “educational status” of neuro-enhancement (Sect. 9.2). Second, I am going to discuss two central problems of an ethics of the educational use of pharmacological neuro-enhancement (Sect. 9.3). Beginning with an analysis of the limits of consent-based and autonomy-oriented forms of justification of cognitive neuro-enhancement in education (Sect. 9.3.1), I am going to provide a theoretical reconstruction of (potential) ethical implications of the use of pharmacological neuro-enhancement for central educational categories and practices (achievement, responsibility, and authenticity) (Sect. 9.3.2). My major argumentative aim is to clarify and question fallible empirical and conceptual assumptions that are used to frame rationales for and against the introduction of neuro-enhancement in the domain of education.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
This orientation is one structural core element of paternalist rationales that are used as justificatory frames for regulations in different societal domains: e.g., the educational system (Giesinger 2007), the health care system (Nys 2008), and a variety of other fields (Sunstein 2016). Kalle Grill has distinguished four core elements which are characteristic of most conceptions of paternalism:
“1. An interference condition which delimits the kind of action that may be paternalistic, most often excluding nonintrusive actions such as greeting someone in the street (when this is not a sign to fellow paternalists to capture the person and force her to be more prudent)
2. A consent condition which limits paternalistic actions to such actions as have not been consented to—excluding actions that are performed in response to explicit consent, and possibly also tacit and inferred consent
3. A benevolence condition which limits paternalistic actions to such actions as are motivated, and perhaps also justified, by the good of the person(s) interfered with
Very often, there is also:
4. A superiority condition which restricts paternalism to such actions as are performed by an agent who considers herself in some way superior to the person(s) interfered with” (Grill 2012: 4f).
- 2.
This position, criticized by Luhmann and Schorr (1982), is part of the argumentative toolbox of the old German tradition of “Geisteswissenschaftliche Pädagogik” (“Geisteswissenschaft” is the German translation of “moral science” (Mill)). The position is also adopted by contemporary philosophers of education who criticize technological ambitions currently influential in educational science (e.g., Biesta 2010). Both claims (technology deficit/technology verdict) are subject of an ongoing discussion in the humanities (cf. Tenorth 2002).
- 3.
“(…) I contend that the normativity of education is not ethical or moral but has to be understood as an educational normativity because teachers who engage with their students in an ethical way do not automatically act in a way that is educationally significant” (Biesta 2015: 674).
- 4.
In his insightful discussion of problems concerning the use of NE in the context of university education, Danaher (2016) divides human activities in two general types—practice-oriented activities (practices which are combined with particular performances and which are associated with internal goods) and goal-directed activities (practices which are associated with particular kinds of outcomes and external goods). A man rollerblading up a sprint track of 100 m would certainly reach the end of the track but subvert the practical sense and the internal goods of this practice-oriented activity. Danaher argues that the potential subversion of internal goods associated with educational practices may provide good reasons for regulatory interventions targeting the use of NE in the field of university education (ibid.: 570).
- 5.
Of course allegedly clear-cut dichotomies between “traditional education” and NE understood as “popping pills” are misplaced. NE might form a part of very different educational methods and arrangements that may have a different intensity and scope.
- 6.
Since there is considerable disagreement in the academic debate concerning the moral status of children and childhood and concerning constitutive elements of what it means to be a child, I use the notion of children in a broad sense, referring to all persons under the age of 18 (cf. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child). Thus, the scope of my argument is limited to this age group.
- 7.
It should be noted that my arguments against consent-based justifications of NE could also be applied to the case of the justification of education. I am generally skeptical concerning consent-based justifications because I believe that education cannot be justified without reference to perfectionist conceptions of well-being and the good life. My arguments against consent-based justifications of NE are based on the (debatable) premise that—given the lack of evidence concerning alleged beneficial long-term effects of NE—the justificatory burden should be much higher in the case of NE compared to the case of an established social practice like education.
- 8.
The title “Adderall for All: A Defence of Pediatric Neuro-enhancement” Flanigan adopted for her paper sounds like a slogan for an advertising campaign to promote the access to these stimulants as “not only permissible” but sometimes as “morally praiseworthy” (Flanigan 2013: 326). According to Flanigan’s approach, NE promises to deliver ready-made remedies against failing schools, failing parents, failing children. Her recommendations ignore the (certainly relevant) current lack of evidence about efficacy and safety of NE and instead accentuate the dangers of limits on access to nonmedical stimulant use: “Critics of pediatric neuro-enhancement have emphasized the dangers of providing medication to healthy children but overlooked the dangers of denying healthy patients a legitimate path to access for neuro-enhancement” (ibid.: 333).
- 9.
Postulates of “ethical and epistemic abstinence” or “liberal neutrality” concerning value judgments about particular conceptions of the good usually ignore that fundamental decisions about values are already embedded in the structure and order of liberal societies (Jaeggi 2014: 40).
- 10.
There is a lot of controversy about valid statistical data concerning the current extent as well as past and future trends of the usage of NE among teenagers, children, and students (cf. Flanigan 2013; Danaher 2016). Quednow (2010) gives a short critical review of currently available forms of NE and of the empirical evidence provided by studies about the use of neuro-enhancers in modern societies since the last century.
- 11.
It should be noted that since the ethical debate about NE is primarily hypothetical, also the following reflections are (necessarily) primarily hypothetical.
- 12.
Quednow (2010) criticizes these assumptions. These “pharmacological and epidemiological premises are unrealistic” (ibid.: 153). “(T)here is no genuine cognitive enhancer available to date” (p. 154). Therefore, a lot of the present ethical discussion is based on “dubious assumptions” about new technologies “before they are fully developed. At least this one time, ethics could be ahead of technology. However, do we really need a debate on a technology that will probably never materialize” (p. 155f)?
References
Bellmann J (2010) Selektion. In: Kade J et al (eds) Pädagogisches Wissen. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, pp 51–58
Bellmann J (2014) The changing field of educational studies and the task of theorizing education. In: Biesta G, Allan J, Edwards R (eds) Making a difference in theory. The theory question in education and the education question in theory. Routledge, London, New York, pp 65–81
Benner D (1987) Allgemeine Pädagogik. Juventa, Weinheim, München
Betzler M (2009) Macht uns die Veränderung unserer selbst autonom? Philos Natur 46:167–212
Biedermann F (2010) Argumente für und wider das Cognitive Enhancement. Ethik in der Medizin 22:3117–3329
Biesta G (2010) Why ‘what works’ still won’t work: from evidence-based education to value-based education. Stud Philos Educ 29:491–503
Biesta G (2013) On the idea of educational theory. In: Irby B et al (eds) The handbook of educational theories. Information Age Publishing, Charlotte, pp 5–16
Biesta G (2015) Teaching, teacher education, and the humanities: reconsidering education as Geisteswissenschaft. Educ Theory 65:665–679
Birnbacher D (2006) Natürlichkeit. De Gruyter, Berlin
Birnbacher D (2016) Neuro-enhancement. Inform Philos 1:18–33
Bourdieu P, Passeron JC (1971) Die Illusion der Chancengleichheit. Untersuchungen zur Soziologie des Bildungswesens am Beispiel Frankreichs. Klett, Stuttgart
Brighouse H (2003) How should children be heard? Ariz Law Rev 45:691–711
Brighouse H (2007) Channel one, the anti-commercial principle, and the discontinuous ethos. In: Curren R (ed) Philosophy of education. An anthology. Blackwell, Malden, pp 208–220
Buchanan A (2011) Cognitive enhancement and education. Theory Res Educ 9:145–162
Cuypers S, Haji I (2007) Authentic education and moral responsibility. J Appl Philos 24:78–94
Danaher J (2016) Should we use commitment contracts to regulate student use of cognitive enhancing drugs? Bioethics 30:568–578
Drerup J (2015) Autonomy, perfectionism and the justification of education. Stud Philos Educ 34:63–87
Drerup J (2016) (Re-)konstruktion praxisinhärenter Normen. Zur Eigenstruktur pädagogischer Rechtfertigungsverhältnisse. Z Pädagog 62:531–550
Drerup J, Dessauer AV (2016) Von kleinen Stubsern und großen Schubsern. Politik und Ethik des Libertären Paternalismus auf dem Prüfstand. Z Prakt Philos 3:347–436
Flanigan J (2013) Adderall for all: a defense of pediatric neuroenhancement. HEC Forum 25:325–344
Gesang B (2009) Moderates und radikales Enhancement—die sozialen Folgen. In: Schöne-Seiffert B et al (eds) Neuro-enhancement. Ethik vor neuen Herausforderungen. Mentis, Paderborn, pp 221–246
Gheaus A (2015) The intrinsic goods of childhood and the just society. In: Bagattini A, Macleod C (eds) The nature of children’s well-being. Springer, Dordrecht, pp 35–52
Giesinger J (2007) Autonomie und Verletzlichkeit. Transcript, Bielefeld
Giesinger J (2011) Erziehung zur Authentizität—ein Paradox? http://www.erziehungsphilosophie.ch/publikationen/Giesinger_Authentizit%C3%A4t_Vortrag-M%C3%BCnchen.pdf. Accessed 21 Nov 2011
Giesinger J (2017) Kinder und Erwachsene. In: Drerup J, Schickhardt C (eds) Kinderethik. Aktuelle Perspektiven—Klassische Problemvorgaben. Münster, Münster, pp 21–32
Graf W, Nagel S, Epstein L, Miller G, Larriviere D (2013) Pediatric neuroenhancement: ethical, legal, social, and neurodevelopmental implications. Neurology 80:1251–1260
Grill K (2012) Paternalism. http://kallegrill.se/texts/Paternalism%20preprint.pdf. Accessed 28 May 2013
Honneth A (2015) Kindheit. Unstimmigkeiten unserer liberalen Vorstellungswelt. In: Betzler M, Bleisch B (eds) Familiäre Pflichten. Suhrkamp, Berlin, pp 147–174
Jaeggi R (2014) Kritik von Lebensformen. Suhrkamp, Berlin
Lenk C (2009) Kognitives Enhancement und das ‘Argument des offenen Lebensweges’. In: Schöne-Seiffert B (ed) Neuro enhancement. Ethik vor neuen Herausforderungen. Mentis, Paderborn, pp 93–106
Lepp N, Roth M, Vogel K (eds) (1999) Der neue Mensch. Obsessionen des 20. Jahrhunderts. Cantz, Stuttgart
Liebsch K (2009) Zwischen Enhancement und Stigmatisierung: Medikalisierung kindlichen Verhaltens als (neue) Umgangsform mit sozialer Selektion und Exklusion. Diskurs. Kindheits- und Jugendforschung 4:499–511
Luhmann N (1973) Zweckbegriff und Systemrationalität. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M.
Luhmann N, Schorr KE (1982) Das Technologiedefizit der Erziehung und die Pädagogik. In: Luhmann N, Schorr KE (eds) Zwischen Technologie und Selbstreferenz. Fragen an die Pädagogik. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M., pp 11–40
Mayer R, Thompson C (2013) Inszenierung und Optimierung des Selbst. Eine Einführung. In: Mayer R, Thompson C (eds) Inszenierung und Optimierung des Selbst. Springer, Wiesbaden, pp 7–28
Nagel S (2010) Too much of a good thing? Enhancement and the burden of self-determination. Neuroethics 3:109–119
Nagel S, Stephan A (2009) Was bedeutet Neuro-Enhancement? Potentiale, Konsequenzen, ethische Dimensionen. In: Schöne-Seiffert B (ed) Neuro-enhancement. Ethik vor neuen Herausforderungen. Mentis, Paderborn, pp 19–48
Nys T (2008) Paternalism in public health care. Public Health Ethics 1:64–72
Oelkers J (2011) Eros und Herrschaft. Die dunklen Seiten der Reformpädagogik. Beltz, Weinheim, Basel
Prange K (2005) Die Zeigestruktur der Erziehung. Grundriss der Operativen Pädagogik. Ferdinand Schöningh, Paderborn
Quante M (2010) Being identical by being (treated as) responsible. http://www.unimuenster.de/imperia/md/content/kfgnormenbegruendung/intern/publikationen/quante/09_quante_-_being_identical_by_being_responsible.pdf. Accessed 11 Oct 2011
Quednow B (2010) Ethics of neuroenhancement. A phantom debate. BioSocieties 5:153–146
Raz J (1988) The morality of freedom. Clarendon Press, Oxford
Reichenbach R (2002) Menschliche Untiefen: Ein Votum für exoterische Pädagogiken. In: Reichenbach R, Oser F (eds) Die Psychologisierung der Pädagogik. Übel, Notwendigkeit oder Fehldiagnose. Juventa, München, Weinheim, pp 173–189
Sandel M (2008) Plädoyer gegen die Perfektion. Ethik im Zeitalter der genetischen Technik. Berlin University Press, Berlin
Schaber P (2017) Lässt sich Paternalismus gegenüber Kindern rechtfertigen. In: Drerup J, Schickhardt C (eds) Kinderethik. Aktuelle Perspektiven—Klassische Problemvorgaben. Mentis, Münster, pp 33–48
Schäfer A (2015) Selbstbestimmte Leistungssteigerung—Die Diskussion um das pharmazeutische Neuro-enhancement. In: Schäfer A, Thompson C (eds) Leistung. Schöningh, Paderborn, pp 151–180
Schäfer A, Thompson C (2015) Leistung. Eine Einleitung. In: Schäfer A, Thompson C (eds) Leistung. Schöningh, Paderborn, pp 7–35
Schinkel A (2010) Compulsory autonomy-promoting education. Educ Theory 60:97–116
Schöne-Seifert B (2009) Neuro-enhancement: Zündstoff für tiefgehende Kontroversen. In: Schöne-Seifert B et al (eds) Neuro-enhancement. Ethik vor neuen Herausforderungen. Mentis, Paderborn, pp 347–363
Schöne-Seiffert B, Stroop B (2015) Enhancement. https://www.uni-muenster.de/imperia/md/content/kfg-normenbegruendung/intern/publikationen/schoene-seifert/71_sch__ne-seifert.stroop_-_enhancement.pdf. Accessed 6 Aug 2015
Schramme T (ed) (2012) Krankheitstheorien. Suhrkamp, Berlin
Suhr K (2016) Der medizinisch nicht indizierte Eingriff zur kognitiven Leistungssteigerung aus rechtlicher Sicht. Springer, Berlin
Sunstein C (2016) The ethics of influence. Government in the age of behavioral science. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Taylor C (2016) The language animal. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, London
Tenorth HE (2002) Apologie einer paradoxen Technologie—über Status und Funktion von “Pädagogik”. In: Böhm W (ed) Pädagogik—Wozu und für wen? Cotta, Stuttgart, pp 70–99
Terhart E (2006) Gehirnforschung, Unterricht, Lernen—erziehungswissenschaftliche Rückfragen. In: Bellmann J, Ruhloff J (eds) Perspektiven Allgemeiner Pädagogik. Dietrich Benner zum 65. Geburtstag. Beltz, Weinheim, pp 75–88
Zohny H (2015) The myth of cognitive enhancement. Neuroethics 8:257–269
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2019 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Drerup, J. (2019). Education and the Ethics of Neuro-enhancement. In: Nagel, S. (eds) Shaping Children. Advances in Neuroethics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-10677-5_9
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-10677-5_9
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-10676-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-10677-5
eBook Packages: MedicineMedicine (R0)