An Adaptive Trust Model for Achieving Emergent Cooperation in Ad Hoc Networks

  • Diego A. VegaEmail author
  • Juan P. Ospina
  • Julian F. Latorre
  • Jorge E. Ortiz
Part of the Studies in Computational Intelligence book series (SCI, volume 815)


Cooperation is a fundamental part of both the Next Generation Networks (NGNs) and the expected applications of Industry 4.0. In such systems, there is no centralized control, and the system components require self-organize themselves to capturing, processing and analyzing real-world information with the purpose of delivering useful data to the final user. In this article, we aim to explore the cooperation mechanisms that could be used in the next generation of communication systems to produce collective behaviors that allow the member of the system join efforts to achieve individual and collective goals in environments without a centralized controller. We used socially inspired computing to introduced an adaptive trust model based on a theoretical analysis of cooperation through game theory and genetic algorithms. The results show the cooperation process can adapt itself even in environments with dynamic populations, selfish agents and communication failures.


Self-organization Ad hoc networks Trust Cooperation Socially inspired computing 


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Diego A. Vega
    • 1
    Email author
  • Juan P. Ospina
    • 1
  • Julian F. Latorre
    • 1
  • Jorge E. Ortiz
    • 1
  1. 1.National University of Colombia, Research Group TLÖNBogotáColombia

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