Abstract
A constant question hanging over governments involved in internal conflicts is whether/when to negotiate with the rebels, generally termed terrorists. Frequently, the rebels seek negotiations , if only to set the terms of takeover, but the government is faced with the classic dilemma: negotiation may bring an end to the conflict but it legitimizes the rebel movement and acknowledges the movement’s role as spokesman for a part of the government’s population. But governments frequently, if not inevitably, evolve in their views of the rebels as a negotiating partner. Once the conflict has moved from a political to a violent stage, they label the rebels as terrorists and refuse to negotiate, but as the conflict progresses further they tend to change their classification about the whole rebel movement or part of it. The interesting subject of inquiry, then, is reasons behind a government’s decision to negotiate with its terrorists and the impact of that decision (i.e. the effectiveness of that reasoning) on them. When does the government that previously saw its rebels as illegitimate perpetrators of violence now decide to negotiate with soma or all of them, and with what effect?
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Notes
- 1.
I William Zartman and Tanya Alfredson, “Negotiating with Terrorists and the Tactical Question,” in Rafael Reuveny and William R Thompson, ed., Coping with Terrorism. State University of New York Press 2010, 247–283. Reprinted with Permission.
- 2.
A quick count indicates that 21 of the 26 cases of negotiation in civil wars between 1900 and 1989 (including negotiated surrender and unstable negotiations ) in Stephen J Stedman, Peacemaking in Civil War (Lynne Rienner 1991), pp. 6–7, were instances where governments negotiated with former terrorists.
- 3.
I William Zartman, ed, Negotiating with Terrorists, special issue of International Negotiation VIII 3 (2003).
- 4.
Stephen J Stedman, “The Spoiler Problem,” in Paul Stern and Daniel Druckman, eds, International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War (National Academies 2001).
- 5.
I William Zartman, Elusive Peace: Negotiations to End Civil Wars (Brookings 1995).
- 6.
See an instance noted earlier, in Zartman, “Revolution and Development,” fn 13, in this volume.
- 7.
The new cabinet was as follows: MRND (9), MDR (4), PL (3), PSD (3), PDC (1). [Prunier (1995) p. 145]. It is still unclear whether its creation was a technique to distract the multiparty movement by playing into multiparty-ism, a 2-track policy on the part of Habyarimana, or an authentic rift between MRND extremists and Habyarimana? For details, see Prunier (1995) pp. 128–129, 161; Bruce Jones (2001), 63.
- 8.
Prunier (1995) p. 161.
- 9.
Note: the CDR/MRND? Also issued a formal rejection of the 19 February 1991 Dar-es-Salaam cease-fire agreement between the GoR and the RPF.
- 10.
August 22 of 1992. Note: the CDR would shortly denounce those responsible for the arrests of MRND(D) members involved in the killings as traitors. See Prunier (1995) pp. 162–164.
- 11.
Andersen, Regine. “How Multilateral Development Assistance Triggered the Conflict in Rwanda .” Third World Quarterly 21.3 (2000, June) <Electronic version>. p. 4.
- 12.
Stettenheim, Joel. “The Arusha Accords and the Failure of International Intervention in Rwanda .” In Words Over War: Mediation and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly Conflict . Greenberg, Melanie C., John H. Barton, and Margaret E. McGuinness, eds. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999.
- 13.
Hilsum, Lindsey. “Settling Scores.” Africa Report May/June 1994: 13.
- 14.
Jones, Bruce (2001) p. 81.
- 15.
Jones, Bruce (2001) p. 80–83.
- 16.
See 9 January 1993. “Joint Communiqué issued at the End of the Third Round of the Political Negotiations on Power-Sharing between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front, held in Arusha, From 24 November 1992 to 9 January 1993”. Arusha, Tanzania.
- 17.
Jones, Bruce (2001) p. 81–82.
- 18.
Prunier (1995) p. 154. (does this mean they got seats in government in late 1993?)
- 19.
Stettenheim (1999) and Jones (“Roots, Resolutions and Reaction” 10) deal as an RPF “victors deal”.
- 20.
Prunier (1995) p. 168.
- 21.
Stettenheim, Joel. “The Arusha Accords and the Failure of International Intervention in Rwanda .” In Words Over War: Mediation and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly Conflict . Greenberg, Melanie C., John H. Barton, and Margaret E. McGuinness, eds. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999.
- 22.
Jones, Bruce (2001) p. 80.
- 23.
The MDR would later split over the refusal by Faustin Twagiramungu (MDR) to step down. See Prunier (1995) p. 113.
- 24.
Note: Another example: Stettenheim (p. 231) says the June 24, 1993 agreement signed (on division of military ) by Ngulinzira was rejected by Habyarimana and Ngulinzira was recalled but Ngulinzira refused and the negotiations continued. Jones (p. 81) said N took the agreement back to Haby who rejected it and sent N back to Arusha were a final deal was worked out (even more in favor of the RPF).
- 25.
Moreover, any sincere effort to participate would also have been fruitless without a concerted program to ‘sell’ the decision to cooperate to the CDR’s own membership.
- 26.
I William Zartman, Cowardly Lions: Missed Opportunities to Prevent Deadly Conflict and State Collapse .
- 27.
Walters, Fortna.
- 28.
Between 1996 and 1998 the KLA claimed responsibility for no more than a dozen deaths.
- 29.
March 14, 1998, ‘The Kosovo Cauldron’ The Economist, U.S. edition pp. 53–54.
- 30.
Note: At Milosevic’s insistence, Rugova dropped his demand that foreign intermediaries be present as a condition for the talks. Though this concession left Rugova somewhat diminished in the eyes of both the LDK and the KLA, in practical terms the deal was somewhat of a compromise position for both leaders who agreed that while he would not be allowed in the discussion room, U.S. envoy Chris Hill would be standing by throughout the meeting in the room next door. The KLA had joined the LDK in its request for foreign mediation to the conflict and therefore cannot be said to have maintained an ideological resistance to compromise even at this stage.
- 31.
Frontline: War in Europe. Interview with Richard Holbrooke. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews.
- 32.
Judah, Tim. Kosovo : War and Revenge. New Haven Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000. (p. 157).
- 33.
Hedges, Chris. “Kosovo ’s Next Masters?” Foreign Affairs 78.3 (1999): p. 29. These sentiments were echoed by three KLA fundraisers: Bardhyl Mahmuti, Jashar Shalihu and Bilall Sherifi, in an interview given in Jonathan Landay, “Inside a Rebellion: Banking on War” Christian Science Monitor, April 15, 1998 p. 1.
- 34.
August 18, 1998. “Politician laments failure to unite Kosovo Albanians”. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. [Source: ‘Bajku’, Pristina, in Albanian 14 August 1998].
- 35.
August 17, 1998 “Ethnic Albanian official says atmosphere still not conducive to talks’. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. [Source: Radio Montenegro, Podgorica, in Serbo-Croat 1330 GMT 15 August 1998].
- 36.
August 17, 1998. “Ethnic Albanian official says atmosphere still not conducive to talks’. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. [Source: Radio Montenegro, Podgorica, in Serbo-Croat 1330 GMT 15 August 1998].
- 37.
August 17, 1998. “No peace talks until Belgrade stops offensive, say Kosovo leaders”. Deutsche Presse-Agentur. BC Cycle 15:58 Central European Time.
- 38.
August 17, 1998. “No peace talks until Belgrade stops offensive, say Kosovo leaders”. Deutsche Presse-Agentur. BC Cycle 15:58 Central European Time. August 18, 1998. “Politician laments failure to unite Kosovo Albanians”. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. [Source: ‘Bajku’, Pristina, in Albanian 14 August 1998].
- 39.
October 17, 1998. “Kosovo Liberation Army wants a voice in peace talks.” Cable News Network (CNN). Saturday 7:00 PM ET. Note: the KLA also offered to provide the unarmed verification teams protection from the Serbs.
- 40.
DoD News Briefing: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense. Presented by Captain Mike Doubleday, DASD (PA). October 29, 1998, 1:30 p.m.
- 41.
Daalder, Ivo H., and Michael E. O’Hanlon. Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo . Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000 p. 58.
- 42.
O’Connor, Mike. “Kosovo Rebels Gain Ground under NATO Threat,” The New York Times, December 4, 1998, p. A3.
- 43.
Interviews with participants. DoD News Briefing: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense. Presented by Captain Mike Doubleday, DASD (PA). October 29, 1998, 1:30 p.m.
- 44.
DoD News Briefing: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense. Presented by Captain Mike Doubleday, DASD (PA). October 29, 1998, 1:30 p.m.
- 45.
Daalder, Ivo H., and Michael E. O’Hanlon. Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo . Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000 pp. 57–58.
- 46.
Kurt Schork, “Province of Doom”, The New Republic, February 22, 1999. p. 22.
- 47.
Daalder, Ivo H., and Michael E. O’Hanlon. Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo . Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000 p. 65.
- 48.
Daalder, Ivo H., and Michael E. O’Hanlon. Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo . Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000. pp. 73–74
- 49.
We are grateful for the research assistance of Ben Rempell, “Shooting the Passengers: Changes in Power and Formula in the Macedonian Ohrid Negotiations ,” (SAIS, 14 May 2004) and Christopher Hattayer, “The Ohrid Framework Negotiations ,” (SAIS, 2 July 2004) in preparing this case.
- 50.
Or in Albanian UCK, the same initials as the Kosovo Liberation Army in Kosovo .
- 51.
Quotes from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Balkan Report 5, no. 84 (18 Dec 2001); Timothy Garton Ash, “Is There a Good Terrorist?” New York Review of Books (29 Nov 2001); and Robert Hislope, “Between a bad Peace and a good War,” Ethnic and Racial Studies XXVI 1:133 (Jan. 2003). Even the International Crisis Group wrote, “The PDP should trying to get a seat at the table for the NLA,” The Macedonian Question: Reform or Rebellion, Balkans Report 109 (5 April 2001), 16.
- 52.
ICG, Macedonia : The Last Chance for Peace, Balkans Report 113, (20 June 2001), 8, 14.
- 53.
Rempell; Hattayer; Iso Ruso, “From Army to Party ,” Beyond Ohrid, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 2003, 29–30.
- 54.
ICG, Macedonia : Still Sliding, Balkans Briefing Paper, 27 July 2001, 4, 5, 7.
- 55.
ICG, Macedonia : War on Hold, Briefing Paper, 15 Aug 2001 2–3.
- 56.
Abu Mazen (M. Abbas), Corbin p. 25.
- 57.
Markovsky p. 14.
- 58.
Corbin 26. Abu Mazen (M. Abbas) also reports that the PLO established contact with Ariel Sharon and was in the process of opening up a secret channel when Sharon severed the link after rumors of a connection began to circulate in the press (Abu Mazen). Similarly Corbin (p. 19) recounts prior efforts by Norway to put Arafat and Israel in direct contact in April 1983 through a meeting between Palestinian moderate Dr. Issam Sartawi and members of the Israeli Labor party , that ended when Sartawi was assassinated by the extremists (Abu Nidal’s group). In 1987 Norway embarked on a bridge-building program that included funding Palestinian medical and humanitarian projects and a study by Larsen.
- 59.
M?
- 60.
Corbin p. 15.
- 61.
Markovsky p. 8.
- 62.
Corbin p. 79.
- 63.
Savir, p. 5.
- 64.
Savir, p. 4.
- 65.
May 1989 address by Secretary of State James Baker to the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee in Markovsky, p. 10.
- 66.
Markovsky, p. 84.
- 67.
Corbin, p. 19.
- 68.
Corbin p. 54.
- 69.
Singer in an interview with Markovsky, p. 53.
- 70.
Markovsky pp. 53–54.
- 71.
Corbin, p. 76. Also Abu Ala complied (on instruction from Tunis) with Savir’s request to unlink the question of Jerusalem from the West Bank and Gaza (Corbin, p. 83).
- 72.
Corbin, p. 36.
- 73.
Corbin, p. 148.
- 74.
Markovsky, p. 91.
- 75.
Savir p. 5, Corbin p. 17, 54, 156; Markovsky p. 64.
- 76.
Rabin in an Interview with Markovsky October 1993, Markovsky p. 115.
- 77.
Markovsky p. 75.
- 78.
Markovsky p. 57.
- 79.
I William Zartman, “Beyond the Hurting Stalemate,” in Paul Stern and Daniel Druckman, Conflict Resolution in the Post Cold War Era (National Academies Press 2000).
- 80.
Dean G Pruitt, ed., The Oslo Negotiations , special issue of International Negotiation, II 2 (1997).
- 81.
I William Zartman, “Analyzing Intractibility,” in Chester Crocker, P\Ren Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall, eds, Grasping the Nettle (Washington: USIP, 2005); I William Zartman, “Process Explanations,” in G O Faure and Franz Cede, eds., Explaining Negotiation Failures (Laxenburg: IIASA, 2006).
- 82.
Kydd & Walter 2002 and Bueno de Mesquita 2004 to the contrary,
- 83.
We are grateful for the research assistance of Ben Rempell, “Shooting the Passengers: Changes in Power and Formula in the Macedonian Ohrid Negotiations ,” (SAIS, 14 May 2004) and Christopher Hattayer, “The Ohrid Framework Negotiations ,” (SAIS, 2 July 2004) in preparing this case.
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Zartman, I.W., Alfredson, T. (2019). Negotiating with Terrorists and the Tactical Question. In: I William Zartman: A Pioneer in Conflict Management and Area Studies. Pioneers in Arts, Humanities, Science, Engineering, Practice, vol 23. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-06079-4_11
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