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Globalisation and Irregular Migration: Does Deterrence Work?

Part of the International Political Economy Series book series (IPES)

Abstract

While the changes and pressures brought about by globalisation greatly incentivise out-migration, including in its irregular forms, policy responses to unauthorised entries have often focused on measures based on deterrence. Indeed, deterrence has a notable appeal for policymakers, due to its ease of applicability in both explaining irregular migration and providing a solution to it. But can it be effective in curbing migratory flows? In this chapter, I propose a research framework to address this question and provide insight into whether, in the cases characterised by luck of success, the reasons for such results lie in the inadequate application of deterrence principles or in other, more structural, problems. To do so, I link the international political economy discussion of migration governance with the criminological understanding of deterrence. In particular, I analyse the key elements on which deterrence strategies rest, emphasising the role of legal and social costs and perceptions, and then identify four pitfalls that are likely to backfire on the effectiveness of measures. These include communication and unconscious biases, the political dimension, the lack of positive incentives, and the availability of alternatives.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For a discussion of the effects of globalisation on migration, see Talani (2015).

  2. 2.

    IOM (2017).

  3. 3.

    In 2016, 11,009 Nigerian women arrived to Italy by sea (UNHCR 2016) and IOM estimates 80% of them to be victims of trafficking (IOM Italy 2017, p. 9).

  4. 4.

    Amnesty International (2017).

  5. 5.

    UNHCR (2017).

  6. 6.

    Di Nicola and Musumeci (2014, p. 40).

  7. 7.

    Frontex (2017b).

  8. 8.

    Cf. Pratt et al. (2008, p. 367).

  9. 9.

    Briskman (2008, p. 128).

  10. 10.

    Ryo (2013, p. 576).

  11. 11.

    Frontex (2017a), ‘Western African Route’. For an analysis of Spanish policies, see Godenau and López-Sala (2016) and López-Sala (2015).

  12. 12.

    Frontex ARA (2016, p. 17).

  13. 13.

    Angeli et al. (2014).

  14. 14.

    Italian Parliament, Law 92/2008 (2008).

  15. 15.

    EUNAVFOR MED operation SOPHIA, for more information: https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/eunavfor-med/36/about-eunavfor-med-operation-sophia_en.

  16. 16.

    For transnationalist accounts, see Sassen (1996), Mittelman (2000), Dicken (2011), Castles (2004a, b), León and Overbeek (2015), Talani (2010, 2015). For realist accounts, see Weiner (1985, 1995, 1996), Borjas (1989), Teitelbaum (2002), Freeman (1995, 1998), Freeman and Kessler (2008). For neoliberal institutionalist accounts, see Hollifield (1998, 2004), Geddes (2003), Geddes and Korneev (2015).

  17. 17.

    It should be stressed that the use of criminological literature is not aimed at supporting the classification of irregular migration as a crime but simply takes advantage of the well-established basis of research that the field possesses.

  18. 18.

    Weiner (1985, 1995, 1996), Borjas (1989), Teitelbaum (2002), Freeman (1995, 1998), Freeman and Kessler (2008).

  19. 19.

    Hollifield (1998, 2004), Geddes (2003), Geddes and Korneev (2015).

  20. 20.

    Sassen (1996), Mittelman (2000), Dicken (2011), León and Overbeek (2015), Castles (2004a, b), Talani (2010, 2015).

  21. 21.

    Borjas (1989), Weiner (1995, p. 134), Teitelbaum (2002).

  22. 22.

    Freeman (1998), Weiner (1996).

  23. 23.

    Weiner (1996, pp. 184–5).

  24. 24.

    Weiner (1995, pp. 34, 205–7; 1996, p. 184).

  25. 25.

    Teitelbaum (2002, pp. 165–6).

  26. 26.

    Teitelbaum (2002, pp. 160, 166), Weiner (1996, p. 185).

  27. 27.

    Samers (2015, p. 377).

  28. 28.

    Meyers (2000, p. 1265).

  29. 29.

    Meyers (2000, p. 1265).

  30. 30.

    Talani (2015, p. 21).

  31. 31.

    Talani (2015, p. 21).

  32. 32.

    Freeman (1998, pp. 89, 103).

  33. 33.

    Freeman and Kessler (2008, pp. 671–2).

  34. 34.

    Talani (2015, p. 23).

  35. 35.

    Samers (2015, p. 375).

  36. 36.

    Hollifield (1998).

  37. 37.

    Hollifield (1998, p. 606).

  38. 38.

    Hollifield (2004, p. 886).

  39. 39.

    Hollifield (1998, pp. 619–20; 2004).

  40. 40.

    Hollifield (1998, p. 598; 2004, p. 903).

  41. 41.

    Geddes (2003, pp. 20, 196).

  42. 42.

    Hollifield (1998, p. 619).

  43. 43.

    Talani (2015, p. 24).

  44. 44.

    Talani (2015, p. 23).

  45. 45.

    Hollifield (1998, p. 615).

  46. 46.

    Hollifield (1998, p. 626).

  47. 47.

    Dicken (2011), Mittelman (2000), Sassen (1996), Léon and Overbeek (2015), Talani (2010, 2015), Castles (2004a, b).

  48. 48.

    Dicken (2011, pp. 6–8).

  49. 49.

    Dicken (2011, p. 6), also Léon and Overbeek (2015, p. 39).

  50. 50.

    Sassen (1996), Sassen, in Talani (2015, pp. 27–8).

  51. 51.

    Talani (2015, pp. 30, 39), see also Roccu and Talani, this volume.

  52. 52.

    Talani (2015, pp. 31, 39).

  53. 53.

    Mittelman (2000, pp. 58, 62, 63).

  54. 54.

    Sassen (1996), Léon and Overbeek (2015).

  55. 55.

    Sassen (1996). See also Mittelman (2000, p. 73).

  56. 56.

    Léon and Overbeek (2015, p. 40), Talani (2015, p. 30), Mittelman (2000, pp. 58, 68).

  57. 57.

    Mittelman (2000, p. 65).

  58. 58.

    Talani (2010, pp. 30, 40), Léon and Overbeek (2015, pp. 45, 50).

  59. 59.

    Hollifield (1998, p. 610).

  60. 60.

    Tapinos (2000, p. 291).

  61. 61.

    Hollifield (1998, p. 609).

  62. 62.

    Czaika and de Haas (2013).

  63. 63.

    Dicken (2011, p. 171).

  64. 64.

    Oxford English Dictionary (2016).

  65. 65.

    von Hirsch et al. (1999, pp. 3–4).

  66. 66.

    von Hirsch et al. (1999, pp. 3–4).

  67. 67.

    Zimring and Hawkins (1973, p. 91).

  68. 68.

    Bentham, cited in Andenaes (1968), and Beccaria, cited in Onwudiwe et al. (2005, p. 235).

  69. 69.

    Akers (1990, p. 654), Nagin (2013, p. 9).

  70. 70.

    Andenaes (1968, p. 79).

  71. 71.

    Zimring and Hawkins (1973, p. 91).

  72. 72.

    Based on von Hirsch et al. (1999).

  73. 73.

    Freedman (2004, p. 104).

  74. 74.

    Hassan (2000, p. 185).

  75. 75.

    Andenaes (1968, p. 78).

  76. 76.

    Hassan (2000, p. 185).

  77. 77.

    Beccaria (1973) [1764].

  78. 78.

    Robinson and Darley (2004, p. 193).

  79. 79.

    Nagin (2013, p. 10).

  80. 80.

    Beccaria (1973) [1764].

  81. 81.

    Nagin (2013).

  82. 82.

    See Nagin (2013) and von Hirsch et al. (1999, p. 6).

  83. 83.

    See, for example, Nagin (2013) and von Hirsch et al. (1999).

  84. 84.

    Nagin (2013, p. 39).

  85. 85.

    Nagin (1998, p. 21).

  86. 86.

    von Hirsch et al. (1999).

  87. 87.

    Nagin (2013, p. 20).

  88. 88.

    Godenau and López-Sala (2016, p. 4).

  89. 89.

    Godenau and López-Sala (2016, p. 4).

  90. 90.

    Carling and Hernández-Carretero (2008, p. 56).

  91. 91.

    Carling and Hernández-Carretero (2008, p. 56).

  92. 92.

    Carling and Hernández-Carretero (2011, pp. 47–8).

  93. 93.

    See Fargues and Bonfanti (2014, p. 13).

  94. 94.

    Cornelius and Salehyan (2007).

  95. 95.

    Kox (2011).

  96. 96.

    Kox (2011, pp. 89–95).

  97. 97.

    Talani (2018).

  98. 98.

    Bhagwati (2003).

  99. 99.

    Boswell (2011, p. 18).

  100. 100.

    Loughran et al. (2016, p. 107).

  101. 101.

    Akers (1990, p. 661).

  102. 102.

    Bohmer and Lebow (2015).

  103. 103.

    Ibid. While Bohmer and Lebow draw from deterrence in the field of international relations, the principles they highlight are remarkably similar to those outlined for criminology, and useful to highlight.

  104. 104.

    This has given birth to a literature denominated ‘perceptual deterrence’, developed since the 1970s, which has found vast consensus. Source: von Hirsch et al. (1999, p. 33).

  105. 105.

    Decker, Wright, and Logie (1993, p. 135), cited in Jacobs (2010, p. 418).

  106. 106.

    Stafford and Warr (1993, p. 130), Pogarsky et al. (2004, p. 364).

  107. 107.

    Stafford and Warr (1993, p. 130).

  108. 108.

    Robinson and Darley (2004, p. 184).

  109. 109.

    Nagin (2013, p. 60).

  110. 110.

    Thielemann (2011, p. 7), Richardson (2010).

  111. 111.

    Godenau and López-Sala (2016, p. 4).

  112. 112.

    Nagin (2013).

  113. 113.

    Zimring and Hawkins (1973).

  114. 114.

    Nagin (2013).

  115. 115.

    Zimring and Hawkins (1973, p. 191).

  116. 116.

    Akers (1990, p. 675).

  117. 117.

    Zimring and Hawkins (1973, p. 119).

  118. 118.

    Becker (1963, pp. 31–2).

  119. 119.

    Nagin (1998, p. 20).

  120. 120.

    Becker (1963, p. 15).

  121. 121.

    Becker (1963, p. 14).

  122. 122.

    Becker (1963).

  123. 123.

    Becker (1963, p. 2).

  124. 124.

    von Hirsch et al. (1999, p. 40).

  125. 125.

    Nagin (2013).

  126. 126.

    Becker (1963, pp. 33–34).

  127. 127.

    Becker (1963, p. 34).

  128. 128.

    Becker (1963, p. 35).

  129. 129.

    Wellford (1975).

  130. 130.

    John Muncie, in McLaughlin and Muncie (2001, p. 160).

  131. 131.

    Carling and Hernández-Carretero (2008).

  132. 132.

    Ryo (2015).

  133. 133.

    Ryo (2015).

  134. 134.

    Hassan (2000).

  135. 135.

    Malmberg (2004, pp. 13–15).

  136. 136.

    Stumpf (2006, p. 412).

  137. 137.

    Reyneri (2003), cited in Talani (2010, p. 194).

  138. 138.

    Becker (1963, p. 35).

  139. 139.

    Talani (2010, p. 186).

  140. 140.

    Reyneri (2003, p. 134).

  141. 141.

    Zimring and Hawkins (1973, p. 142), Robinson and Darley (2004, p. 175), Nagin (2013, p. 7).

  142. 142.

    Zimring and Hawkins (1973, pp. 142, 147).

  143. 143.

    Zimring and Hawkins (1973, p. 157).

  144. 144.

    Robinson and Darley (2004, pp. 176–7).

  145. 145.

    Thielemann (2003).

  146. 146.

    See Richardson (2010, p. 11).

  147. 147.

    Thielemann (2011, p. 7), Richardson (2010).

  148. 148.

    Richardson (2010), Carling and Hernández-Carretero (2008, p. 8), Talani (2010, p. 193).

  149. 149.

    Richardson (2010, p. 12).

  150. 150.

    See, for example, Kingsley (2015b).

  151. 151.

    Kingsley (2015a), Bohmer and Lebow (2015).

  152. 152.

    Richardson (2010, p. 8).

  153. 153.

    Pogarsky et al. (2004, p. 346), Nagin (2013, p. 61).

  154. 154.

    Nagin (2013, p. 61).

  155. 155.

    Lebow (2007, pp. 72–5), Stein (2009, p. 63).

  156. 156.

    Carling and Hernández-Carretero (2008).

  157. 157.

    Carling and Hernández-Carretero (2008, p. 11).

  158. 158.

    Carling and Hernández-Carretero (2008, pp. 9–10).

  159. 159.

    Freedman (2004, pp. 47–52).

  160. 160.

    Freedman (2004, pp. 47–52).

  161. 161.

    Freedman (2004, p. 50).

  162. 162.

    Freedman (2004, p. 51).

  163. 163.

    Freedman (2004).

  164. 164.

    Massey et al. (1998, p. 288) (emphasis in original), cited in de Haas (2006), Hollifield (2004, p. 903), Weiner (1995, p. 198), Cornelius and Tsuda (2004, p. 42).

  165. 165.

    Freedman (2004, p. 51).

  166. 166.

    Weiner (1985, pp. 447–8).

  167. 167.

    Weiner (1985, p. 447).

  168. 168.

    Freedman (2004, p. 49).

  169. 169.

    Loughran et al. (2016, p. 90).

  170. 170.

    Akers (1990, p. 660).

  171. 171.

    Akers (1990).

  172. 172.

    Loughran et al. (2016, p. 107).

  173. 173.

    Loughran et al. (2016, p. 91).

  174. 174.

    Wilson in McLaughlin and Muncie (2013, p. 355).

  175. 175.

    Oxford English Dictionary (2016).

  176. 176.

    Cornelius and Salehyan (2007).

  177. 177.

    Holzer et al. (2000, p. 1205).

  178. 178.

    Martin and Taylor (2001).

  179. 179.

    Castles (2004b, p. 2).

  180. 180.

    See, for example, Borjas (1989), Böhning (1994), Weiner (1995, pp. 212–3), de Haas (2011), Castles et al. (2003).

  181. 181.

    Neumayer (2004, pp. 164–5).

  182. 182.

    Boswell (2003, p. 30).

  183. 183.

    Castles (2004a, p. 209).

  184. 184.

    Zimring and Hawkins (1973, p. 135).

  185. 185.

    Levitt (1998, p. 361).

  186. 186.

    de Haas (2011, p. 27).

  187. 187.

    Fargues and Bonfanti (2014, p. 5).

  188. 188.

    de Haas (2015).

  189. 189.

    de Haas (2011, p. 27), Bhagwati (2003, p. 99).

  190. 190.

    Boswell (2003, p. 36).

  191. 191.

    Cf. Nagin (1998, p. 19).

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Rosina, M. (2019). Globalisation and Irregular Migration: Does Deterrence Work?. In: Talani, L., Roccu, R. (eds) The Dark Side of Globalisation. International Political Economy Series. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05117-4_4

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