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Remedies

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The Economic Consequences of the Peace
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Abstract

It is difficult to maintain true perspective in large affairs. I have criticised the work of Paris, and have depicted in sombre colours the condition and the prospects of Europe.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The figures for the United Kingdom are as follows:

    Monthly average

    Net imports ÂŁ1000

    Exports ÂŁ1000

    Excess of imports ÂŁ1000

    1913

    54,930

    43,770

    11,160

    1914

    50,097

    35,893

    14,204

    January–March 1919

    109,578

    49,122

    60,456

    April–June 1919

    111,403

    62,463

    48,940

    July–September 1919

    135,927

    68,863

    67,064

    But this excess is by no means so serious as it looks; for with the present high freight-earnings of the mercantile marine the various “invisible” exports of the United Kingdom are probably even higher than they were before the war, and may average at least £45,000,000 monthly.

  2. 2.

    President Wilson was mistaken in suggesting that the supervision of Reparation payments has been entrusted to the League of Nations. As I pointed out in Chapter 6, whereas the League is invoked in regard to most of the continuing economic and territorial provisions of the Treaty, this is not the case as regards Reparation, over the problems and modifications of which the Reparation Commission is supreme without appeal of any kind to the League of Nations.

  3. 3.

    These Articles, which provide safeguards against the outbreak of war between members of the League and also between members and nonmembers, are the solid achievement of the Covenant. These Articles make substantially less probable a war between organised Great Powers such as that of 1914. This alone should commend the League to all men.

  4. 4.

    It would be expedient so to define a “protectionist tariff” as to permit (a) the total prohibition of certain imports; (b) the imposition of sumptuary or revenue customs duties on commodities not produced at home; (c) the imposition of customs duties which did not exceed by more than five per cent a countervailing excise on similar commodities produced at home; (d) export duties. Further, special exceptions might be permitted by a majority vote of the countries entering the Union. Duties which had existed for five years prior to a country’s entering the Union might be allowed to disappear gradually by equal instalments spread over the five years subsequent to joining the Union.

  5. 5.

    The figures in this table are partly estimated, and are probably not completely accurate in detail; but they show the approximate figures with sufficient accuracy for the purposes of the present argument. The British figures are taken from the White Paper of October 23, 1919 (Omd. 377). In any actual settlement, adjustments would be required in connection with certain loans of gold and also in other respects, and I am concerned in what follows with the broad principle only. The sums advanced by the United States and France, which are in terms of dollars and francs respectively, have been converted at approximately par rates.

    The total excludes loans raised by the United Kingdom on the market in the United States, and loans raised by France on the market in the United Kingdom or the United States, or from the Bank of England.

  6. 6.

    The financial history of the six months from the end of the summer of 1916 up to the entry of the United States into the war in April 1917 remains to be written. Very few persons, outside the half-dozen officials of the British Treasury who lived in daily contact with the immense anxieties and impossible financial requirements of those days, can fully realise what steadfastness and courage were needed, and how entirely hopeless the task would soon have become without the assistance of the United States Treasury. The financial problems from April 1917 onwards were of an entirely different order from those of the preceding months.

  7. 7.

    Mr. Hoover was the only man who emerged from the ordeal of Paris with an enhanced reputation. This complex personality, with his habitual air of weary Titan (or, as others might put it, of exhausted prizefighter), his eyes steadily fixed on the true and essential facts of the European situation, imported into the Councils of Paris, when he took part in them, precisely that atmosphere of reality, knowledge, magnanimity, and disinterestedness which, if they had been found in other quarters also, would have given us the Good Peace.

  8. 8.

    Even after the United States came into the war the bulk of Russian expenditure in the United States, as well as the whole of that Government’s other foreign expenditure, had to be paid for by the British Treasury.

  9. 9.

    It is reported that the United States Treasury has agreed to fund (i.e. to add to the principal sum) the interest owing them on their loans to the Allied Governments during the next three years. I presume that the British Treasury is likely to follow suit. If the debts are to be paid ultimately, this piling up of the obligations at compound interest makes the position progressively worse. But the arrangement wisely offered by the United States Treasury provides a due interval for the calm consideration of the whole problem in the light of the after-war position as it will soon disclose itself.

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Keynes, J.M. (2019). Remedies. In: Cox, M. (eds) The Economic Consequences of the Peace. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04759-7_8

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