Abstract
The representation of Socratic principles is integrated within a larger literary plan, according to which four goals are served: (a) to finally prove Socrates’ interlocutors’ ignorance and, therefore, their kakia and not their aretē ; (b) the connection of aretē with sophia is shown to stand in contrast to traditional ethics. The close identification of these two attributes threatens to undo the identification of andreia with aretē , or the exclusive connection of the latter with physical goods ; (c) Plato criticises the ideological change of mind and inconsistency of Socrates ’ interlocutors; (d) the concept of sophia is introduced, which, now replacing phronēsis, on the one hand, transmits the element of knowledge, and, on the other hand, makes its connection with the whole of aretē evident. Wisdom, identified with aretē as a whole (sumpasa aretē), is the link between the parts of aretē .
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Notes
- 1.
This belief constitutes one of the so-called ‘Socratic paradoxes’. For Socrates’ espousal of it, cf. Cri. 47b, Ly. 210d, Prt. 350a–c, Phd. 75d, R. 504e–505a; X. Mem. 3.9.1–3, 4.6.11, and many more examples, more or less clearly. Cf. Tatham (1888, 80), Passaloglou (1983, 93, n. 318), Emlyn-Jones (1996, 105), Wieland (1996, 6, 7–8, 12). For an assessment contrary to my analysis, according to which Plato in the Laches rejects the Socratic identification of aretē with knowledge, particularly if one focuses on the refutation of the second definition given by Laches, see Devereux (1977, 129–141). Irwin (1977, 302, n. 59) (see also 128), in noting the fact that Laches’ second definition is inconsistent with the Socratic opinion, argues that endurance (karteria) plays no role in Socrates’ understanding of andreia (for the listing of the opinions of previous scholars and a discussion on the role of endurance in Laches’ speech, see Meister (1921, 13–23)). Gould (1987, 265–279), however, a few years later, attempts with his article to refute Devereux’s argument, proposing the view that Plato adjusts Laches’ definition to fit with the framework of Socratic intellectualism .
- 2.
Although many scholars have noticed the connection of the two terms phronēsis and sophia, with the point of reference of knowledge (e.g. Pohlenz 1913, 6; Ammendola 1928, 18; Friedländer 1964, 45; Schrastetter 1966, 40; Dieterle 1966, 102; Passaloglou 1983, 94), which correlates Laches’ and Nicias’ definitions, no one, as far as Ι know, has noted that this is performed following the course that Socrates gives to the philosophical discussion.
References
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Stefou, K. (2018). Invitation of Nicias to the Discussion (194b8–194e10). In: Socrates on the Life of Philosophical Inquiry. SpringerBriefs in Philosophy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04188-5_8
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