Abstract
In this final chapter I say something about what I take to be the broader implications and significance of aim-oriented empiricism: the urgent need to bring about a revolution in academic inquiry. The issues go back to the eighteenth century Enlightenment. The basic idea of the philosophes of the French Enlightenment especially, was that humanity can learn from scientific progress how to achieve social progress towards an enlightened world. Unfortunately, in seeking to implement this profoundly important idea, the philosophes made three disastrous intellectual blunders, and these blunders are still built into academia today. One of these blunders concerns science: the philosophes failed to construe science in aim-oriented empiricist terms. As a result of our failure to correct the three blunders we have inherited from the Enlightenment, academia as it exists today is damagingly irrational in a structural fashion when judged from the standpoint of helping us make progress towards a good, enlightened, civilized world. Academia devotes itself to the pursuit of knowledge and fails to give priority to the vital intellectual tasks of articulating our problems of living, including our grave global problems, and proposing and criticizing possible solutions – possible actions. It fails to give priority to the vital task of intelligently conducted public education about what our problems are, and what we need to do about them. We have betrayed the profound Enlightenment idea in failing to correct the blunders inherent in the version that has come down to us from the eighteenth century. As a result, humanity fails to learn how to resolve global conflicts and problems that, at present, threaten our future. I have published work on this issue for over 40 years but, despite the fact that my work has met with critical acclaim, it has been ignored by most philosophers. This neglect follows on from neglect of my crucial earlier work on the metaphysics of science. I conclude with an indication of the changes we need to make to academia as it exists today to create the kind of rigorous institutions of learning we so urgently need.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
As I have already remarked, wisdom is to be understood as the capacity, the active endeavour, and perhaps the desire, to realize what is of value, for oneself and others, wisdom in this sense including knowledge, technological know-how and understanding, but much more. Realize is to be interpreted to mean both “apprehend” or “experience” on the one hand, and “make real” or “create” on the other. Wisdom-inquiry does better justice to both aspects of inquiry, pure and applied, than knowledge-inquiry: see Maxwell (1984).
- 2.
See Maxwell (1984 or 2007a). See also Maxwell (1976a; 1980; 1991; 1992; 1994a; 2000a; 2001a, ch. 9; 2001c; 2002a; 2003; 2004a; 2005c, d; 2006b; 2007a, b; 2008; 2009a; 2010a, ch. 9; 2010c, d; 2011c; 2012a, b, c, d, e; 2013b; 2014a, b; 2015b; 2016b; 2017a, b, c, f; 2018b, c, d; 2019; forthcoming, ch. 7).
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
This assumption may be challenged. Does not academic inquiry seek knowledge for its own sake – it may be asked – whether it helps promote human welfare or not? Elsewhere, I have argued that the conception of inquiry I am arguing for, wisdom-inquiry, does better justice than knowledge-inquiry to both aspects of inquiry, pure and applied: see for example Maxwell (2007b, pp. 110–112). The basic aim of inquiry, according to wisdom-inquiry, is to help us realize what is of value in life, “realize” meaning both “apprehend” and “make real”. “Realize” thus accommodates both aspects of inquiry, “pure” research or “knowledge pursued for its own sake” on the one hand, and technological or “mission-oriented” research on the other – both, ideally, seeking to contribute to what is of value in human life. Wisdom-inquiry, like sight, is there to help us find our way around. And like sight, wisdom-inquiry is of value to us in two ways: for its intrinsic value, and for practical purposes. The first is almost more precious than the second.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
That science is of value culturally and practically (via technology and in other ways) is widely appreciated. That there is a third way in which science can be of value, namely methodologically, is much less appreciated. It is not so widely appreciated that we can learn from the progress-achieving methods of science how to make progress in other areas of human life where progress may be urgently needed. It is this third methodological use of science that I am concerned with here: see especially Maxwell (2016b).
- 9.
Steven Pinker recently published a book in which he argued that the Enlightenment programme, as originally conceived, has brought immense benefits to humanity, with almost no cost: see Pinker (2018). In his book Pinker is oblivious to the damaging defects of the traditional Enlightenment programme that I have highlighted in publication after publication during the last 40 years. He is entirely unaware of the damaging irrationality of the traditional Enlightenment, the need to transform academic inquiry if it is to help implement a genuinely rational and beneficial version of the Enlightenment idea. For a brief criticism of Pinker’s book, see Maxwell (2018b),
- 10.
Bereft of such public education, as at present, there is always the danger that democracies will become dysfunctional, as illustrated recently by Brexit in the UK and the election of President Trump in the USA.
- 11.
The basic aim of science is not truth per se; it is the far more problematic one of explanatory truth – truth presupposed to be explanatory, there thus being highly problematic metaphysical assumptions concerning the unity or comprehensibility of the universe inherent in the aims of science. But the aim of seeking explanatory truth is a special case of the more general aim of seeking valuable truth – truth of value in one way or another to humanity. This more general aim is, if anything, even more problematic. Furthermore, knowledge of valuable truth is sought so that it will be used by people, ideally to reduce suffering and enhance the value of human life. There are social, even political, aspects to the intellectual aims of science, if we are honest. All this means that science, in order to be rigorous, and in order to develop so as to be of maximum benefit to humanity, must include sustained discussion of this whole profoundly problematic domain of the aims of science, actual and possible, with its problematic metaphysical, value and political assumptions. Scientists can hardly decide for the rest of us what is of value, what the priorities of research ought to be, how science should be used; scientists and non-scientists need to cooperative in discussing these issues. All this can go on within the framework of wisdom-inquiry. It is hardly conceivable within the current framework of knowledge-inquiry: see Maxwell (1984, 2004a, 2014a) for further details.
- 12.
In speaking of “aims”, here and elsewhere, I have in mind the actual aims of our actions, whether we recognize them or not, not our declared aims, our official aims, or what we believe our aims to be.
- 13.
- 14.
See Maxwell (2010e).
References
Langley, C. (2005). Soldiers in the laboratory. Folkstone: Scientists for global responsibility.
Maxwell, N. (1976a). What’s wrong with science? Hayes: Bran’s Head Books, (2nd ed., 2009, Pentire Press, London).
Maxwell, N. (1976b). Towards a micro realistic version of quantum mechanics. Parts I and II, Foundations of Physics, 6, 275–292 and 661–676.
Maxwell, N. (1980). Science, reason, knowledge and wisdom: A critique of specialism. Inquiry, 23, 19–81.
Maxwell, N. (1984). From knowledge to wisdom: A revolution in the aims and methods of science. Oxford: Blackwell.
Maxwell, N. (1991). How can we build a better world? In J. Mittelstrass (Ed.), Einheit der Wissenschaften: Internationales Kolloquium der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, 25–27 June 1990 (pp. 388–427). Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter.
Maxwell, N. (1992). What kind of inquiry can best help us create a good world? Science, Technology and Human Values, 17(1992), 205–227.
Maxwell, N. (1994a). Towards a new enlightenment: What the task of creating civilization has to learn from the success of modern science. In R. Barnett (Ed.), Academic community: discourse or discord? (pp. 86–105). London: Jessica Kingsley.
Maxwell, N. (2000a). Can humanity learn to become civilized? The crisis of science without civilization. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 17(2000), 29–44.
Maxwell, N. (2001a). The human world in the physical universe: Consciousness, free will and evolution. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
Maxwell, N. (2001b). Evolution of sentience, consciousness and language viewed from a Darwinian and purposive perspective. http://philpapers.org/rec/MAXEOS (Maxwell, 2001a, pp. 162–201).
Maxwell, N. (2001c). Can humanity learn to create a better world? The crisis of science without wisdom, in The moral universe, Tom Bentley and Daniel Stedman Jones, London, Demos Collection 16, 2001, pp. 149–156.
Maxwell, N. (2002a). Is science neurotic? Metaphilosophy, 33(3), 259–299.
Maxwell, N. (2003, February). Science, knowledge, wisdom and the public good. Scientists for Global Responsibility Newsletter, 26, 7–9.
Maxwell, N. (2004a). Is science neurotic? London: Imperial College Press.
Maxwell, N. (2005c). Science versus realization of value, not determinism versus choice. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 12(1), 53–58.
Maxwell, N. (2005d). A revolution for science and the humanities: From knowledge to wisdom. Dialogue and Universalism, XV(1–2), 29–57.
Maxwell, N. (2006b). The enlightenment programme and Karl Popper. In I. Jarvie, K. Milford, & D. Miller (Eds.), Karl Popper: A centenary assessment. Volume 1: Life and times, values in a world of facts (pp. 177–190), chapter 11. London: Ashgate.
Maxwell, N. (2007a). From knowledge to wisdom: A revolution for science and the humanities. London: Pentire Press [2nd ed. of Maxwell (1984)].
Maxwell, N. (2007b). From knowledge to wisdom: The need for an academic revolution. London Review of Education, 5(2), 97–115.
Maxwell, N. (2008). Are philosophers responsible for global warming? Philosophy Now, 65, 12–13.
Maxwell, N. (2009a). How can life of value best flourish in the real world? In L. McHenry (Ed.), Science and the pursuit of wisdom: Studies in the philosophy of Nicholas Maxwell (pp. 1–56). Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Maxwell, N. (2009b). The metaphysics of science: An account of modern science in terms of principles, laws and theories (review of book by Craig Dilworth). International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 23(2), 228–232.
Maxwell, N. (2010a). Cutting god in half – And putting the pieces together again. London: Pentire Press.
Maxwell, N. (2010b). Reply to comments on science and the pursuit of wisdom. Philosophia, 38(4), 667–690.
Maxwell, N. (2010c). The urgent need for an academic revolution: The rational pursuit of wisdom. In C. Tandy (Ed.) Death and anti-death, volume 7: Nine hundred years after St. Anselm (1033–1109). Palto Alto: Ria University Press, ch. 7, pp. 211–38.
Maxwell, N. (2010d). Universities: From knowledge to wisdom. Scientists for Global Responsibility Newsletter, 38, 18–20.
Maxwell, N. (2010e). Wisdom mathematics. Friends of Wisdom Newsletter, 6, 1–6. http://www.knowledgetowisdom.org/Newsletter%206.pdf
Maxwell, N. (2011c). We need an academic revolution. Oxford Magazine, 309, 15–18.
Maxwell, N. (2012a). Arguing for wisdom in the university: An intellectual autobiography. Philosophia, 40(4), 663–704.
Maxwell, N. (2012b). Creating a better world: Towards the university of wisdom. In R. Barnett (Ed.), The future university: Ideas and possibilities (pp. 123–138). New York: Routledge.
Maxwell, N. (2012c). How universities can help humanity learn how to resolve the crises of our times – From knowledge to wisdom: The University College London experience. In G. Heam, T. Katlelle, & D. Rooney (Eds.), Handbook on the knowledge economy (Vol. 2, pp. 158–179). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Maxwell, N. (2012d). Our global problems and what we need to do about them. In C. Tandy & J. Lee (Eds.), Death and anti-death anthology, vol. 10: Ten years after John Rawls (1921–2002), Ch. 7 (pp. 131–174). Palo Alto: Ria University Press.
Maxwell, N. (2012e). The menace of science without civilization: From knowledge to wisdom, text of keynote lecture given in Warsaw 20 May 2011, published in Dialogue and Universalism, no. 3, 2012, pp. 39–63.
Maxwell, N. (2013b). Knowledge or wisdom? The Philosophers’ Magazine, issue 62, 3rd quarter 2013, 17–18.
Maxwell, N. (2014a). How universities can help create a wiser world: The urgent need for an academic revolution. Exeter: Imprint Academic.
Maxwell, N. (2014b). Global philosophy: What philosophy ought to be. Exeter: Imprint Academic.
Maxwell, N. (2015b). Can the world learn wisdom? Philosophy Now, June/July, pp 32–35.
Maxwell, N. (2016a). Popper’s paradoxical pursuit of natural philosophy. In J. Shearmur & G. Stokes (Eds.), The Cambridge companion to popper (pp. 170–207). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ch. 7.
Maxwell, N. (2016b). Can scientific method help us create a wiser world? In N. Dalal, A. Intezari, & M. Heitz (Eds.), Practical wisdom in the age of technology: Insights, issues and questions for a new millennium (pp. 147–161). London: Routledge, ch. 11.
Maxwell, N. (2017a). Understanding scientific progress. Saint Paul: Paragon House.
Maxwell, N. (2017b). In praise of natural philosophy: A revolution for thought and life. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Maxwell, N. (2017c). Karl Popper, science and enlightenment. London: UCL Press.
Maxwell, N. (2017f). Can universities save us from disaster? On the Horizon, 25(2), 115–130 http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/full/10.1108/OTH-04-2016-0019.
Maxwell, N. (2018b). We need progress in ideas about how to achieve progress. Metascience, 27, 347. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11016-018-0312-4.
Maxwell, N. (2018c). The scandal of the irrationality of academia, Philosophy and Theory in Higher Education, special issue on “The Anthropocene and Higher Education”, Autumn, 2018.
Maxwell, N. (2018d). Do we need an academic revolution to create a wiser world? In R. Barnett & M. A. Peters (Eds.), The idea of the university: Volume 2: Contemporary perspectives. New York: Peter Lang.
Maxwell, N. (2019, forthcoming). Our fundamental problem: A revolutionary approach to philosophy.
McHenry, L. (Ed.). (2009). Science and the pursuit of wisdom: Studies in the philosophy of Nicholas Maxwell. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Muller, F. A. (2008). In defence of constructive empiricism: Maxwell’s master argument and aberrant theories. Journal of General Philosophy of Science, 39, 131–156.
Pandit, G. L. (2010). How simple is it for science to acquire wisdom according to its choicest aims? Philosophia, 38(4), 649–666.
Pinker, S. (2018). Enlightenment NOW: The case for reason, science, humanism and progress. London: Allen Lane.
Smith, D. (2003). The atlas of war and peace. London: Earthscan.
Vicente, A. (2010). An enlightened revolt: On the philosophy of Nicholas Maxwell. Philosophia, 38(4), 631–648.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2018 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Maxwell, N. (2018). Chapter 5 Broader Implications: Academic Inquiry for a Wiser World. In: The Metaphysics of Science and Aim-Oriented Empiricism. Synthese Library, vol 403. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04143-4_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04143-4_5
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-04142-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-04143-4
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)