Abstract
In this chapter I discuss in detail 31 works on the metaphysics of science by 28 authors published between the years 2000 and 2017. Just one of these authors refers to my earlier work on the metaphysics of science in four footnotes but otherwise ignores most of what I have to say. The other 27 authors ignore my earlier work entirely. I show how this neglect has a detrimental impact on this body of work in the metaphysics of science, to a greater or lesser extent. I conclude by indicating the very fruitful implications the view of science I advocate, aim-oriented empiricism, has for research on the metaphysics of science.
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Notes
- 1.
See Kneller (1978, 80–7 and 90–1), Harris (1980), Longuet-Higgins (1984), Collingridge (1985), Richards (1985), Midgley (1986), Easlea (1986), Ravetz (1987), Hendry (1989), Koertge (1989), Chakravartty (1999), Smart (2000), Juhl (2000), McHenry (2000), Shanks (2000), Roush (2001), Bittner (2004), Muller (2004), Iredale (2005), McNiven (2005), Davidow (2006), Grebowicz (2006), Perovic (2007), Agassi (2008), MacIntyre (2009), Müürsepp (2014), Lorimer (2017), and Sakellariou (2018).
- 2.
- 3.
The 31works in question, listed roughly in the order in which they were consulted are as follows: Dilworth (2007), Bishop (2003), D. Ross, J. Ladyman, D. Spurrett and J. Collier in Ladyman et al. (2007), Chakravartty (2007, 2017), Maudlin(2007), Morganti (2013), S. Mumford, M. Tugby, J.T. Roberts, J. Woodward, A. Hüttemann, J. McKitrick, H. Beebee, E. Tobin, L.A. Paul and J. Wilson in Mumford and Tugby (2013), H. Kincaid, A. Chakravartty, P. Humphreys, A. Melnyk, D. Dennett, J. Ladyman and D. Ross, M. Wilson, M. Friedman and J. Ismael in Ross et al. (2013); Trout (2016). I briefly discussed Ellis (2001) and Bird (2007) at the beginning of Chap. 2, where I mentioned a further six authors. Additional works on the metaphysics of science, published between 2000 and 2017, that make no mention whatsoever of my earlier work on the subject, and show no signs of being influenced by AOE, that I have looked at but do not discuss in this book, include the following: Rescher (2000), Lowe (2006), Lange (2009), M. O’Rourke, M.H. Slater, A. Borhini, P. Godfrey-Smith, N. Latham, R. Sorensen, A.C. Varzi, M. Devitt, B. Nany, N.E. Williams, B. Glymour, N. G. Rheins, J. K. Crane, R. Sandler and K. Vihvelin in Campbell et al. (2011), S. Yudell, K. Brading, M. Strevens, C.K. Waters, K. Stanford, J. Saatsi and M. Thomas-Jones in Slater and Yudell (2017).
- 4.
- 5.
For a more detailed and carefully formulated version of this argument, see Maxwell (1993b).
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
This solution to the problem of formulating a viable version of scientific realism was put forward in Maxwell (1993a, p. 89). Subsequent discussion has, of course, ignored this solution!
- 9.
This argument for scientific realism and against instrumentalism (or constructive empiricism) is spelled out in detail in Maxwell (1993b). Once again, it has been ignored by subsequent discussion. Physics cannot, incidentally, ditch theory unity as a requirement for theory acceptability, for then physics would become drowned in an ocean of empirically successful “aberrant” theories.
- 10.
Maxwell (1993b).
- 11.
- 12.
- 13.
I might add that David Bohm’s version of quantum theory postulates definite objects too – although quite different from those of PQT.
- 14.
- 15.
If anything like PQT is true, basic physical entities, such as the photon, would be the biggest things in existence. A photon emitted 13 billion years ago and still not absorbed, would be over 26 billion light-years in diameter!
- 16.
It is possible that I have misunderstood Ladyman et al. here, and their problem is merely how there can be the “real patterns” of the special sciences, without these real patterns being such that they are not reducible to fundamental physics. If so, all that is required is a bit more knowledge of the basics of what goes on in physics. Real patterns “approximately derivable” in principle from fundamental physical theory are apparent everywhere: the crucial point to note is that these real patterns are approximate. (An “approximate derivation” is one which makes approximations along the way and thus arrives at a conclusion incompatible with the premise: see note 18.) Thus, the real pattern of Kepler’s laws can be “approximately derived” from Newtonian theory: if Newtonian theory is true, Kepler’s laws are only approximate (it is true that the planets move in accordance with Kepler’s laws approximately). Likewise, the real pattern of Newtonian theory can be “approximately derived” from general relativity: if the latter is true, Newtonian theory is only approximate (in certain conditions). And, we may presume, general relativity will be “approximately derivable” from the true theory of everything, general relativity only being approximate in certain conditions. See below for a clarification as to what an “approximate derivation” in physics is.
- 17.
In order to understand the nature and status of “real patterns”, such as the pattern of Kepler’s laws, what one needs is, not esoteric philosophy, but a bit of elementary knowledge of what goes on in physics. When physicists speak of a “derivation”, they are almost always referring to what I call an “approximate derivation” – one that results in an approximate “real pattern”: see note 18.
- 18.
- 19.
Russell (1951, p. 194).
- 20.
- 21.
There is also an extended discussion of dispositional realism but no reference to Maxwell (1968a), which may be said to have initiated the recent discussion of this view.
- 22.
- 23.
See for example Maxwell (1984, ch. 9, the title of which includes the words “From Science to Natural Philosophy”). See also Maxwell (2004a, pp. 47–51, which includes a section called “From Physics to Natural Philosophy”). Incidentally, this theme is fully developed subsequently in my In Praise of Natural Philosophy (2017b).
- 24.
Brown’s view is that the fact that the different forces do all conform to the same symmetry – Lorentz covariance – is a mystery that requires explanation, and the explanation will stem from the theory that unifies these disparate forces, for example string theory, perhaps (personal communication). The Minkowski space-time view holds, of course, that there is no mystery here: all forces have to conform to Lorentz covariance because this stems from the nature of space-time, within which all forces are obliged to operate.
- 25.
In order to do justice to the point that a specific theory, Newtonian theory say, can be given different interpretations that say slightly different things about the world, we would have to regard a theory as a collection of core propositions plus a family of alternative, additional propositions, each member of the family, when added to the core propositions, providing a specific interpretation (or version) of the theory. What is inside, or outside, the core propositions would depend on what interpretations or versions have been put forward. None of this licences the absurdities of Putnam’s ‘model-theoretic’ so-called argument.
- 26.
- 27.
Much that fundamental physical theory predicts in principle is (a) not predictable in practice, and (b) only predictable on the basis of “approximate derivations” (see notes 16–18, and associated text).
- 28.
- 29.
See, for example, Maxwell (2004a, pp. 45–7).
- 30.
- 31.
As someone who has long criticized (1) orthodox scientific views about quantum theory, (2) orthodox scientific interpretations of Darwinian theory, and (3) orthodox scientific views about the nature of science, I am especially predisposed to endorse the point that scientifically enlightened metaphysics needs to be done in a way that leaves room for, even encourages, criticism of scientific orthodoxy. A basic feature of AOE, of course, is that a major role of the metaphysical theses of AOE physics, at levels 3 and 4, is to subject theories, at level 2, to something like sustained criticism.
- 32.
- 33.
I refer, of course, to Maxwell (1974, 1984, 1993a, 1998, 1999a, 2002b, 2004a, 2005a, b, 2006a, 2011b). For those interested, the best account available of this approach to imaginative and critical metaphysical speculation fruitfully guiding scientific research is to be found in Maxwell (2017b, ch. 5) – not that Ladyman and Ross could have been aware of that reference.
- 34.
- 35.
- 36.
Maxwell (1992).
- 37.
- 38.
See Austin (1962, ch. viii). Austin seeks to dismantle the philosophical problem of the nature of reality by analysis of the ordinary use of the word “real”. But, as I remarked in Maxwell (2012a, note 16), “‘What is the nature of reality?’ is an authentic problem because we are confronted by a number of rival views about the nature of the world, and we want to know which is true – for example, naïve realism, physicalism, phenomenalism and, the one I favour, experiential physicalism”. Nothing that Austin says about the use of the word “real” in any way casts doubt on the authenticity of the fundamental problem “What is the nature of reality?”, even though Austin seeks to give the impression that it does.
- 39.
- 40.
Hence the titles of some of my papers. “What kind of inquiry can best help us create a good world?” (1992); “Are philosophers responsible for global warming?” (2008); and “Does philosophy betray both reason and humanity?”. As it happens, the last title was judged too shocking to be published. Without informing me, the editor of the journal in question, The Philosopher’s Magazine, changed the title to the anodyne “Knowledge or Wisdom”: see Maxwell (2013b). I was furious! The original title was, however, I believe, restored for the internet copy.
- 41.
- 42.
I adopt this name for the conception of philosophy I argue we should adopt and practice somewhat reluctantly; Critical Fundamentalism risks being thought of as a critical branch of religious fundamentalism. I first expounded and defended Critical Fundamentalism in Maxwell (1980), although there Fundamentalism stood as a name for a kind of inquiry as a whole that supports influential thinking about fundamental problems, rather than a name for a kind of philosophy. Since 1980, religious fundamentalism has become increasingly prominent. This has led me to change the name “Fundamentalism” to “Universalism” when I republished my 1980 article as Chap. 9 of Maxwell (2017c). I then discovered that, unfortunately, “Universalism” has religious connotations as well!
- 43.
For a much more detailed account of Newton’s involvement in the demise of natural philosophy and the rise of science see Maxwell (2017b, chs. 1 and 2).
- 44.
- 45.
- 46.
- 47.
- 48.
- 49.
It also deserves to be noted that natural science does not just have problematic metaphysical assumptions inherent in its aims; there are also problematic assumptions concerning values and the social use of science – problematic political assumptions in other words. Aim-oriented empiricism needs to be extended to take these additional problematic assumptions into account. Science needs to be construed so that there are not just two basic domains of discussion – evidence and theory – but three: evidence, theory, and aims. And the last of these, since it involves problems about values and the social uses of science, needs to be thrown open to non-scientists so that they can join with scientists in discussing problematic issues concerning actual and possible aims for research, and priorities for scientific research. Standard empiricism, in holding that the basic intellectual aim of science is truth, misrepresents the real, problematic aims of science, and thus fails to emphasize the need for sustained discussion of scientific aims. Misrepresented in this way, the issues tend to be decided by committees, fund giving bodies, leading scientists, bureaucrats and politicians, without open discussion of the issues and problems. The extended version of aim-oriented empiricism would stress the vital need for sustained rational discussion of the real, problematic aims of science, if science is to be rigorous, and if it is to stand much hope of serving the best interests of humanity. For these points see Maxwell (1984, ch. 5, 2004a).
- 50.
Sellars failed, however, to include, let alone discuss, that aspect of the problem that concerns the flourishing of what is of value in life: how we can best go about tackling problems of living, including global problems, so that we may realize what is of value.
- 51.
- 52.
See Maxwell (1984, pp. 225–230).
- 53.
As I have already mentioned, this argument is spelled out explicitly in Maxwell (1993a).
- 54.
See Williams (1965, pp. 257–269).
- 55.
This passage is an extract from Maxwell (2014c), published after the publication of Friedman’s chapter, and therefore a passage that Friedman would not have been able to consult. I quote the passage nevertheless, for it is very much in the spirit of Friedman’s theme – there are important lessons to be learnt from nineteenth century scientific philosophers. In this case, the lesson is for Friedman, and any other philosophers inclined to take Kuhn on incommensurability seriously.
- 56.
- 57.
Trout ignores, needless to say, my account of what it is for a theory of physics to be explanatory spelled out in Maxwell (1998, chs. 3 and 4). This is all the more remarkable given that my book and Trout’s have the same publisher: Oxford University Press. Indeed, other books I have discussed in connection with their failure to take my work into account are published by OUP: Ladyman et al. (2007), Bird (2007), Maudlin (2007), Mumford and Tugby (2013), Ross et al. (2013), Chakravartty (2017).
- 58.
Trout ignores throughout that those who created modern science, Galileo, Newton and the others, were not scientists, but natural philosophers for whom metaphysics, philosophy, methodology, even epistemology, were vital aspects of the enterprise: see Maxwell (2017b, ch. 1).
- 59.
Maxwell (1974, pp. 123–53).
- 60.
Between 1974 and 2014, six books, four contributions to books, and 14 papers in academic journals: see http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/view/people/ANMAX22.date.html. My The Comprehensibility of the Universe (1998, Oxford University Press), even puts forward an account of explanation as unification which is just what Trout’s story requires without suffering from the defects of his own “ontic” account of explanation.
- 61.
The work of a further nine authors on physical essentialism that fails to take my earlier work into account is discussed briefly near the beginning of Chap. 2.
- 62.
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Maxwell, N. (2018). Chapter 4 Aim-Oriented Empiricism and the Metaphysics of Science: 2000 to 2017. In: The Metaphysics of Science and Aim-Oriented Empiricism. Synthese Library, vol 403. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04143-4_4
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