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The Metaphysics of Science and Aim-Oriented Empiricism pp 83–108Cite as

Chapter 3 Aim-Oriented Empiricism: Exposition, and Implications for Science and the Philosophy of Science

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Abstract

In this chapter I outline the second wave of my work on the metaphysics of science. Physics only ever accepts unified theories. This means, I realized, that physics makes a big, influential, highly problematic metaphysical assumption about the nature of the universe: it has some kind of underlying unity. Precisely because this assumption is influential and problematic – no more than a conjecture – it is vital that it is made explicit and critically assessed as an integral part of physics itself, in an attempt to improve it. We need, I came to realize, a new kind of science which represents the metaphysical presuppositions of physics in the form of a hierarchy of assumptions, and actively seeks to improve the most substantial and problematic of these assumptions, low down in the hierarchy, as an integral part of physics itself. This new conception of science – aim-oriented empiricism – puts physics and metaphysics together to recreate natural philosophy. Major, outstanding problems in the philosophy of science, including the problem of induction, are solved by this new conception of science. It has revolutionary implications for research in the metaphysics of science. I spell out twenty implications this new conception of science has for research in the metaphysics of science.

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Diagram 3.1

Notes

  1. 1.

    Books of mine elaborating the argument for the urgent need to transform academia so that its basic aim becomes to seek and promote wisdom include: Maxwell (1976a, 1984, 2004a, 2014a, 2014b, 2017a, b, c, 2019). For diverse summaries of the argument, published over the years, see Maxwell (1980, 1991, 1992, 1994a, 2000a, 2001c, 2002a, 2003, 2005d, e, 2006b, 2007b, 2008, 2009a, 2010b, c, d, 2011c, 2012a, b, c, d, e, 2013b, 2015b, 2016b, 2017f, 2018b, c, d).

  2. 2.

    In his The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Popper holds that the simplicity of a theory is to be equated with its degree of falsifiability: see Popper (1959, p. 140). But this is obviously false: the falsifiability of a theory can be increased by adding on independently testable hypotheses which would, in general, drastically reduce, or destroy, the simplicity of the theory. Later, Popper in effect recognized this point when he declared that a “new theory should proceed from some simple, new, and powerful, unifying idea about some connection or relation (such as gravitational attraction) between hitherto unconnected things (such as planets and apples) or facts (such as inertial and gravitational mass) or new “theoretical entities” (such as field and particles)”: see Popper (1963, p. 241). Popper acknowledges that this”requirement of simplicity is a bit vague” and threatens to involve one in “an infinite regress” (p. 241). But the real problem is this: if the aim is truth, no presumption being made about the truth, how can it be rational only to accept theories that meet Popper’s “requirement of simplicity”? What grounds can we have for holding that such “simple” theories are more likely to be true than equally empirically successful complex theories?

  3. 3.

    I intended the title to be understood to allude to Popper’s The Logic of Scientific Discovery, in the hope that it would be understood that what I was arguing for was a development and improvement of Popper’s falsificationism.

  4. 4.

    See Maxwell (1974; 1993a; 1999a; 2002a, b; 2005a, b; 2006a; 2009a; 2010b; 2011b; 2012a; 2013a; 2014c; 2015a; 2016a).

  5. 5.

    It may be objected that these horribly disunified rival theories are not really empirically more successful than the accepted theory T. Unified, explanatory theories are inherently more verifiable empirically than disunified, non-explanatory theories. Thus, even though the disunified rivals fit available empirical data better than the accepted theory T, they are not as empirically successful as T, not as well verified. The problem with this argument is that it is only in a certain sort of universe – a universe in which the true theory of everything is unified – that the strategy of regarding unified theories as better verified empirically than disunified ones, other things being equal, will pay off. In a disunified universe, such a strategy would fail: see Maxwell (2015a).

  6. 6.

    Is this thesis metaphysical, in the sense that it is neither empirically verifiable nor falsifiable? Yes, it is. The thesis – call it M – asserts: not (T1 and T2 and … T∞), where T1, T2, … T∞ are all disunified physical theories. M cannot be verified empirically, because that would require that all of T1,…T∞ are falsified, and that cannot be done because there are infinitely many of them. M cannot be falsified either, because that would require that one of T1…T∞ is verified, and that cannot be done because physical theories cannot be verified. Hence M is neither verifiable nor falsifiable; hence it is metaphysical.

  7. 7.

    The falsity of a number of specific metaphysical theses influentially associated with physics in the past does not mean that the much more general metaphysical thesis that nature is uniform or unified is false too. It does indicate, however, that in this domain of the metaphysics of physics, we are quite likely to get things wrong.

  8. 8.

    For a discussion of just how widely scientists and philosophers of science accept standard empiricism, see Maxwell (1998, pp. 38–45).

  9. 9.

    See Maxwell (1998, pp. 104–5) for a list of seven problems concerning unity or simplicity of theory.

  10. 10.

    Richard Feynman has provided the following amusing illustration of this point: Feynman et al. (1965, pp. 25–10 to 25–11). Consider an appallingly disunified, complex theory, made up of 1010 quite different, distinct laws, stuck arbitrarily together. Such a theory can easily be reformulated so that it reduces to the dazzlingly unified, simple form: A = 0. Suppose the 1010 distinct laws of the universe are: (1) F = ma; (2) F = Gm1m2/d2; and so on, for all 1010 laws. Let A1 = (F – ma)2, A2 = (F – Gm1m2/d2)2, and so on. Let A = A1 + A2 + … + A10 10. The theory can now be formulated in the unified, simple form A = 0. (This is true if and only if each Ar = 0, for r = 1, 2, … 1010).

  11. 11.

    See Jeffreys and Wrinch (1921); Einstein (1982, pp. 23–4); Friedman (1974); Kitcher (1981, 1989); Bartelborth (2002); Watkins (1984, pp. 479–99); McAllister (1996); Schurz (1999); Weber (1999); Bartelborth (2002). For a criticism of Jeffreys and Wrinch, Friedman, Kitcher, and Watkins, see Maxwell (1998, pp. 63–8).

  12. 12.

    For a more detailed discussion of these eight facets of disunity and related matters see Maxwell (2017a, ch. 5). For earlier discussion, see Maxwell (1998, chs. 3 and 4; 2004a, appendix, section 2; 2007a, ch. 14, section 2).

  13. 13.

    See Maxwell (2017a, p. 44–5).

  14. 14.

    The electromagnetic and weak forces are only partially unified by the Salem-Weinberg electroweak theory.

  15. 15.

    An empirically successful theory of everything unified in a type (5), (6) or (7) way to degree N = 1 might in practice be regarded as acceptable.

  16. 16.

    This positive feedback process of improving presuppositions and methods, or aims and methods, in the light of what stimulates empirical progress and what does not, has actually gone on in physics, and in natural science more generally – or we would still be stuck with Aristotelian science. But because the scientific community has taken standard empiricism for granted, it has only been possible for this scientifically fruitful, positive feedback process to proceed in a somewhat furtive, constrained manner.

  17. 17.

    In what follows I give only a brief sketch of AOE, and reasons for accepting AOE. The best detailed argument for AOE is given in Maxwell (2017a). See also Maxwell (2017b, especially ch. 5; and 2017c). I must stress, however, that AOE was first expounded and argued for in publications that appeared much earlier: see Maxwell (1974, 1984, 1993a, 1998, 2004a, 2005a, b).

  18. 18.

    This last possibility can of course be interpreted in the way I argued for in Maxwell (1968a).

  19. 19.

    “Physicalism” has been interpreted in a number of ways by various philosophers of science. Here it means simply: the universe is such that the true physical theory of everything is unified, in a type (5) to (8) way with N = 1.

  20. 20.

    For clarification of details and further discussion see Maxwell (1998, pp. 80–89, 131–40, 257–65), and additional works referred to therein. See also Maxwell (2004a, appendix, section 2; 2017a, ch. 5 and appendix 1).

  21. 21.

    As physics has advanced from Galileo to today, fundamental physical theory has become (a) vastly greater in the scope of its predictions while, at the same time, retaining (b) a reasonable degree of overall unity. It is important to apprecieate that (a) and (b) are, on the face of it, at odds with one another. It is easy to have a high degree of unity if one’s theory has very little empirical content, much more difficult if it has vast empirical content, predicting a vast range of diverse phenomena. What is so striking about modern fundamental physical theory is that it has vast empirical content, predicting a vast range of diverse phenomena, and at the same time a reasonable degree of unity at the level of basic theory. It depicts a striking degree of unity throughout a vast diversity of phenomena.

  22. 22.

    See Maxwell (1998, pp. 98–9; or 2017a, pp. 127–8, note 14).

  23. 23.

    Given the account of theory unity sketched here, it is dazzlingly clear that persistent acceptance of unified theories in this sense must inevitably commit physics to making a big metaphysical assumption about the world (the world is such that disunified theories are false whatever their empirical success may be). SE cannot very well acknowledge this account of theory unity for, to do so, destroys SE.

  24. 24.

    See Maxwell (1993a, pp. 275–305; 1998, pp. 219–223; and especially 2017b, ch. 5).

  25. 25.

    For earlier expositions of the argument for AOE see Maxwell (1974, 1984, pp. 94–100 and ch. 9; 1993a, 1998, 1999a, 2002a, b, 2004a, 2005a, b, 2006a, 2011b, 2013a, 2014c, 2015a).

  26. 26.

    For my detailed argument for accepting meta-knowability as an item of scientific knowledge on pragmatic grounds, see Maxwell (2007a, pp. 413–9; 2017a, ch. 9).

  27. 27.

    See See Braithwaite (1953, pp. 255–292); Salmon (1974, pp. 85–87); Mellor (1991, pp. 254–268); McAllister (1996, pp. 100–101).

  28. 28.

    Maxwell (1974, 1984, chs. 5 and 9; 1998, 2004a, 2012a, 2014a, 2017a, b, c, 2019).

  29. 29.

    Maxwell (1993a, pp. 61–79; 1998, ch. 2; 2002a, b; 2017a).

  30. 30.

    Maxwell (1984, pp. 231–2, 235 and 240–42; 2004a, pp. 34–51; 2017a, b).

  31. 31.

    Maxwell (1998, especially pp. 19–20, 26, 98 and ch. 5; 2017a, ch. 9; 2017b, ch. 5).

  32. 32.

    See note 31.

  33. 33.

    Maxwell (1974, 1993a, pp. 275–305; 1998, pp. 29–30; 2004a, pp. 42–7; 2017a, ch. 10).

  34. 34.

    Maxwell (1976b, pp. 276–8; 1988, pp. 2–3; 1998, pp. 231–2).

  35. 35.

    For my own efforts at developing a fully micro-realistic, fundamentally probabilistic version of quantum theory, empirically testable, and free of the defects of orthodox quantum theory, see Maxwell (1972b, 1973, 1976b, 1982, 1988, 1993b, c, 1994b, 2004b, 2011d).

  36. 36.

    Maxwell (1998, pp. 211–2; 2017a, pp. 83–6).

  37. 37.

    For a lucid exposition of this point see Maxwell (2017a, pp. 74–82), See also Maxwell (2017b, ch. 5). See also Maxwell (1974, 1998, 2004a).

  38. 38.

    For my early attempts at solving the problem of induction see Maxwell (1974, 1984, pp. 218–230; 1998, ch. 5). For progressively improved expositions of the solution provided by AOE, see Maxwell (2004a, pp. 205–220; 2007a, pp. 400–430; 2017a, ch. 9).

  39. 39.

    Maxwell (1998, chs. 3 and 4; 2004a, pp. 160–174; 2007a, pp. 373–86; 2017a, ch. 5 and appendix 1).

  40. 40.

    Maxwell (1998, pp. 90–93; 2004a, pp. 161–7).

  41. 41.

    Maxwell (1998, pp. 125–6).

  42. 42.

    See note 38.

  43. 43.

    Maxwell (1998, pp. 211–7; 2007a, pp. 395–400 and 430–432; 2017a, ch. 8).

  44. 44.

    Maxwell (1974, 1984, pp. 235–242; 1993a, pp. 275–305; 1998, pp. 219–223; 2004a, pp. 191–8). See especially Maxwell (2017b, ch. 5).

  45. 45.

    Maxwell (2005a, 2014c).

  46. 46.

    Maxwell (1993a, pp. 81–101; 1993b).

  47. 47.

    Maxwell (1998, pp. 91–2, 94–5, 112–3, 262–4; 2004a, pp. 167–8; 2017a, pp. 38–45).

  48. 48.

    See Maxwell (2004a, pp. 41–7; 2017a, pp. 155–6).

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Maxwell, N. (2018). Chapter 3 Aim-Oriented Empiricism: Exposition, and Implications for Science and the Philosophy of Science. In: The Metaphysics of Science and Aim-Oriented Empiricism. Synthese Library, vol 403. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04143-4_3

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