Abstract
Space has always been an organic, intimate element of Russia’s mentality and politics. The country has indeed a long history of moulding spaces around itself which respond to precise (geo)political, economic, and cultural strategies. Today, it pursues its interests mainly in three spaces: in the post-Soviet space, in a space where relations with the US and the European Union (EU) take place, and in the space that includes the Middle East and North Africa. In this manner it seeks to economise resources and build the desired relations with its relevant counterparts for the sake of re-gaining its previous status in international politics. However, Russia’s ambitions are mired in its parallel identity redefinition process and in the complex, unpredictable dynamics with the West. This fact forces her to confirm its traditional spatial vectors of foreign policy. It does not have the potential to provoke systemic changes in international affairs on its own.
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Notes
- 1.
Some argue that Russia’s identity is an oscillating identity (in Russian kолеблющаяся идентичность) based on a number of dualities such as its intermediate location between Europe and Asia. See Kholodkovskii, K. (2011). “Rossiiskaya identichnost’: Koleblyushchayasya identicnost’’’. Identichnost’ kak predmet politicheskogo analiza. Sbornik statei po itogam Vserossiiskoi nauchno-teoreticheskoi konferentsii, Moskva IMEMO-RAN (21–22 oktiabria 2010): 151. Others admit that ‘Europe and Asia, the West and the East, converge in Russia’. See Arsent’eva, I. (2008). Rossjia mezdu Vostokom i Zapadom: strateghia natzional’noi bezopasnosti. Moskva: Vostok-Zapad, p. 162.
- 2.
‘Geographically, Europe and Russia are overlapping entities. Half of Europe is Russia; half of Russia is in Europe’. See Baranovski, V. (2000). Russia: A part of Europe or apart from Europe? International Affairs, 76(3), 443.
- 3.
‘Russia is part of the West, but it is the West’s Eastern part. … On the other hand, Russia can be regarded as one of the Easts by virtue of its geographic location, similarity of traditions and its poly-ethnicity’. See Malashenko, A. (2017). West and East: Things to discuss and agreements to forge. Russia in Global Affairs, February 13, 2017. Accessed January 1, 2018. http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/West-and-East-Things-to-Discuss-and-Agreements-to-Forge-18593
- 4.
‘Russia as a geopolitical and socio-cultural entity is not reducible to [either West or East] due to its peculiar historical development’. See Arsent’eva, I. (2008). Rossjia mezdu Vostokom i Zapadom: strateghia natzional’noi bezopasnosti. Moskva: Vostok-Zapad, p. 165. The prominent historian Klyuchevskiy asserts instead that ‘historically speaking, Russia is not Asia, but geographically speaking it is not at all Europe. It is a transitional country between two worlds. Culture has indissolubly tied it to Europe, but its nature imposed on her peculiarities and influence which have always drawn her to Asia or attracted Asia into it’. See Klyuchevskiy, V. (1987). Sochineniia. Volume 3. Moskva: Mysl’, p. 65.
- 5.
According to Perevezentsev, Russia had the role of being a barrier dividing the West from the East and safeguarding them from their deadly confrontation. See Perevezentsev, S. (2004). Smysl russkoi istorii. Moskva: Vece, p. 5. On the contrary, Trenin argues that since ‘Culturally and ethnically, Russia is both the east of the West and the west of the East [it] could be the essential geopolitical swing state, but it should strive to be something else: a moderator and stabiliser in the emerging continental system’. See Trenin, D. (2017a). Russia’s evolving grand Eurasia strategy: Will it work?. Carnegie Moscow, July 20, 2017. Accessed January 1, 2018. http://carnegie.ru/2017/07/20/russia-s-evolving-grand-eurasia-strategy-will-it-work-pub-71588
- 6.
As Sakwa points out ‘Many of the tensions in the post-communist era derive from the asymmetrical manner in which the Cold War was transcended: one bloc repudiated its own principles and dissolved while the other bloc declared “victory” and its principles as universal and enlarged to encompass much of the space formerly occupied by the “defeated” power. The asymmetry provoked a permanent crisis in post-communist international affairs as Russia questioned the legitimacy of the new order’. See Sakwa, R. (2011). Russia’s identity: Between the domestic and the international. Europe-Asia Studies, 63(6), 963.
- 7.
The author’s choice to employ this term is explained by the spatial reference to the area of countries once belonging to the former Soviet Union excluding the Baltics.
- 8.
See interview of President Medvedev with Russian TV channels Rossjia, NTV, and First channel, August 31, 2008.
- 9.
See also chapter “Facing a Fragmented Neighbourhood: The EU and Six Eastern Partnership Countries” by Pishchikova in this volume.
- 10.
‘The ENP has found itself locked in EU-centric politics of norm transference rather than the contestability of the political. Consequently, all policy revisions that had taken place to date focused just on that – modification of policy instruments for more effective norm transmission and diffusion’. See Korosteleva, E. (2017). Eastern Partnership: bringing ‘the political’ back in. East European Politics, 33(3), 325.
- 11.
That is a process between a ‘privileged self interacting through conditionality and tutelage with the other’. See Sakwa, R. (2017). Europe and the political: from axiological monism to pluralistic dialogism. East European Politics, 33(3), 412.
- 12.
Similarly Russia feels anxious about EU politics in the Balkans where it has traditional partnerships with countries like Serbia. The expansion of Russia’s investments in the energy, bank, metallurgical and real estate sectors seeks to preserve the Kremlin’s local influence and render it an equal competitor of the EU.
- 13.
Mezhuev interprets Russia’s stance in the conflict in Ukraine is an indicator for ‘Russia’s problem of self-definition in terms of civilisational belonging. Russia seems lacking an identity politics which prevents it from explaining to the West its position towards Ukraine. In fact, since 2004 two opposing ideological stances on Russia’s identity with regard to Ukraine have appeared: the imperialists and the nationalists. The former want Ukraine to enter into some kind of a neo-imperial formation with Russia, whereas the latter want Ukraine to disintegrate along its ethno-cultural lines. Both could not explain why Ukraine had to be conceived as a buffer: what in cultural and political sense is Ukraine supposed to divide, the clash between what and who it should prevent’. See Mezhuev, B. (2017). ‘Ostrov Rossija’ i Rossijskaia politika identicnosti. Russia in Global Affairs, April 6, 2017. Accessed January 1, 2018. http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/Ostrov-Rossiya-i-rossiiskaya-politika-identichnosti-18657
- 14.
See also chapter “China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Eurasia: Space-Shaping as Ordering” by Caffarena and Gabusi in this volume.
- 15.
Analogously, Tsygankov explains that ‘Eurasia has brought together diverse ethnicities and religions, teaching them how to communicate and preserve a measure of cultural openness. Politically, economically and culturally, the region has functioned as a unity in diversity, serving as a hub of various influences and providing stability for European nations to the north and for the nations of Asia and the Middle East to the south’. See Tsygankov, A. (2012). The Heartland no more: Russia’s weakness and Eurasia’s meltdown. Journal of Eurasian Studies 3(1), 2.
- 16.
Excerpts from transcript of the plenary session of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, June 17, 2016. Accessed January 1, 2018. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52178
- 17.
Excerpts from transcript of the plenary session of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, June 17, 2016. Accessed January 1, 2018. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52178
- 18.
Excerpts from transcript of the plenary meeting of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, June 2, 2017. Accessed January 1, 2018. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54667
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Penkova, T. (2019). Russia’s Strategy of Forging Spaces Around Itself. In: Giusti, S., Mirkina, I. (eds) The EU in a Trans-European Space. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03679-9_3
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