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Sarracenia: Enhancing the Performance and Stealthiness of SSH Honeypots Using Virtual Machine Introspection

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Secure IT Systems (NordSec 2018)

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Abstract

Secure Shell (SSH) is a preferred target for attacks, as it is frequently used with password-based authentication, and weak passwords can be easily exploited using brute-force attacks. To learn more about adversaries, we can use a honeypot that provides information about attack and exploitation methods. The problem of current honeypot implementations is that attackers can easily detect that they are interacting with a honeypot and stop their activities immediately. Moreover, there is no freely available high-interaction SSH honeypot that provides in-depth tracing of attacks.

In this paper, we introduce Sarracenia, a virtual high-interaction SSH honeypot which improves the stealthiness of monitoring by using virtual machine introspection (VMI) based tracing. We discuss the design of the system and how to extract valuable information such as user credential, executed commands, and file changes.

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Acknowledgment

This work has been supported by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) in the project DINGFEST-EFoVirt and German Research Foundation (DFG) in the project ARADIA.

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Correspondence to Stewart Sentanoe .

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Sentanoe, S., Taubmann, B., Reiser, H.P. (2018). Sarracenia: Enhancing the Performance and Stealthiness of SSH Honeypots Using Virtual Machine Introspection. In: Gruschka, N. (eds) Secure IT Systems. NordSec 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11252. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03638-6_16

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03638-6_16

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