Abstract
The author shows that the existence of law in a given society requires the presence of a unitary practice of identification of rules (a rule of recognition). It is also argued that the best way of understanding this rule is to see it as a constitutive convention, which allows the autonomous identification of the law of a particular community. According to this author, just as the existence of money requires the belief that it exists, the existence of a legal system depends ultimately on a set of beliefs shared by the relevant persons. After developing this position, a series of recurrent criticisms of conventionalist positions is reviewed with the aim of rejecting them. These criticisms are: if the rule of recognition is understood as a convention then it cannot account for the normative nature of the convention, nor for the presence of principles in legal systems, nor for the disagreements between lawyers; finally, the problem of the arbitrariness of the rule of recognition and its alleged banality is addressed.
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Notes
- 1.
The formulation of these counterfactuals is taken from Narváez (2004), p. 280.
- 2.
Lewis (1969).
- 3.
- 4.
Hart (1961), p. 147.
- 5.
See Hart (1994), p. 256.
- 6.
See Hart (1961), p. 134.
- 7.
The latter is an application of the characterisation of the Lewis convention (1969). His different definition of “convention”, which is even more sophisticated, can be found on p. 42, p. 56, and p. 78.
- 8.
See Kelsen (1960), p. 202.
- 9.
Hart (1961), p. 132.
- 10.
See Searle (1995).
- 11.
- 12.
Nino (1982), p. 60.
- 13.
On this criticism, see Ruiz Manero (1990), pp. 130–132.
- 14.
For example, following the line argued by Lagerspetz (1995), p. 159 ff.
- 15.
- 16.
About the role of efficacy, see Vilajosana (2010b), pp. 103–118.
- 17.
In the sense expressed by Andrei Marmor, who I follow on this point. See Marmor (2001a), p. 200.
- 18.
One of the first to attempt this was Postema (1982), pp. 165–203.
- 19.
In the same sense, see Coleman (2001), p. 95. It should be noted that this author has changed his position on this point, given that in previous work he had aligned himself, together with Postema, with the more mimetic translation of the framework of Lewis in the problem that concerns us.
- 20.
See Marmor (1996), pp. 349–371.
- 21.
- 22.
- 23.
Recall the counterfactual that lies behind every convention I mention at the beginning of this work.
- 24.
- 25.
- 26.
See Lewis (1969). If this element were not present, the problem of coordination at the source of each convention would not be resolved.
- 27.
See Vilajosana (2007), chapter IV.
- 28.
- 29.
Dworkin (1986), p. 225.
- 30.
- 31.
- 32.
For the concept of arbitrariness, see Marmor (2006), pp. 683–704.
- 33.
See Lewis (1969), pp. 76–80.
- 34.
For the identity of legal orders and precisely the relation with these questions of value, I refer to Vilajosana (1997).
- 35.
Celano (2003), p. 353.
- 36.
If we interpret, a sensu contrario, what is said in Celano (2003), p. 347.
- 37.
Celano has himself admitted a non-vicious circularity in relation with his vision of customary norms as social rules. See Celano (1995), pp. 15–77.
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Vilajosana, J.M. (2019). Social Facts and Law: Why the Rule of Recognition is a Convention. In: Ramírez-Ludeña, L., Vilajosana, J. (eds) Legal Conventionalism. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 126. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03571-6_6
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