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Nordic Law in European Context pp 41–60Cite as

Constitutional Mentality

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Part of the book series: Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice ((IUSGENT,volume 73))

Abstract

Nordic Constitutions have both differences and similarities. This chapter explains certain key differences by reflecting legal-cultural and historical dimensions of living Nordic constitutional law. The underlying idea is to offer a thematic and comparative overview. First, the general comparative context of Nordic constitutions is explained shortly. Secondly, chosen key feature of each constitution is thematically highlighted. In Finland’s case, the focus is on the role of the parliament’s Constitutional Committee as the guardian of constitutionality. When it comes to Sweden, the focus is on the exceptionally central position of its parliament. Section for Norway explains the central role of the Supreme Court. Discussion on Denmark centres on national sovereignty. In the case of Iceland, the new creative manner of reforming constitution is addressed. Final section speaks of the Nordic experience—or “Nordicness”—and questions its future in the world of expanding judicial review.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This is a rational choice in the comparative constitutional approach because written constitutional documents are not really power maps. Instead, they may be inaccurate or, as Mark Tushnet puts it, “The realities of power may not be fully reflected in a constitution”, Tushnet (2015), p 11.

  2. 2.

    This part of the chapter draws on Husa (2002), see especially Chap. 6.

  3. 3.

    See also Hautamäki (2007).

  4. 4.

    According to Svein Eng, the Norwegian Supreme Court may become closer to the “discursive English style” in the future, Eng (1997), p 214.

  5. 5.

    For more detailed, though slightly outdated, analysis of Nordic constitutionalism see Scheinin (2001).

  6. 6.

    Cameron (2009), p 72.

  7. 7.

    Cf. Elo Rytter (2000), pp 46–47.

  8. 8.

    See also the conclusions drawn by Italian constitutional comparatist Duranti (2009), pp 243–245.

  9. 9.

    The discussion on fundamental rights in this chapter benefited from the paper provided by Jonas Christoffersen, Director, The Danish Institute for Human Rights—Denmark’s National Human Rights Institution.

  10. 10.

    And yet we may see that Norway and Denmark (west-Nordic) are closer to each other than Sweden and Finland (east-Nordic).

  11. 11.

    Suomen perustuslaki/Finlands grundlag 731/1999.

  12. 12.

    This section is based on Husa (2011).

  13. 13.

    This Article was adopted as an alternative to establishing a Constitutional Court, Government Proposal (Hallituksen esitys 1/1998), pp 53–54.

  14. 14.

    See Husa (2011), pp 186–187.

  15. 15.

    See Ojanen (2009).

  16. 16.

    See Husa (2011), pp 78–88.

  17. 17.

    Nykänen v Finland, no. 11828/11, ECHR 2014; Glantz v Finland, no. 37394/11, ECHR 2014; Kiiveri v Finland, no. 53753/12, ECHR 2015; Rinas v Finland, no. 17039/13; Österlund v Finland, no. 53179/13, ECHR 2015.

  18. 18.

    Lahtonen v Finland, no. 29576/09, ECHR 2012; Ristamäki and Korvola v Finland, no 66456/09, ECHR 2013; Niskasaari and Otavamedia Oy v Finland, no. 32297/10, ECHR 2015; M.P. v Finland, no. 36487/12, ECHR 2016.

  19. 19.

    X v Finland, no. 34806/04 (the case also concerned a violation of Article 5 concerning freedom of liberty), ECHR 2012; Laakso v Finland, no. 7361/05, ECHR 2013; Röman v Finland, no. 13072/05, ECHR 2013.

  20. 20.

    Kungörelse (1974: 152) om beslutad ny regeringsform.

  21. 21.

    Successionsordning (1810: 0926).

  22. 22.

    Tryckfrihetsförordning (1949: 105).

  23. 23.

    Yttrandefrihetsgrundlag (1991: 1469).

  24. 24.

    Riksdagsordning (2014: 801).

  25. 25.

    For a general informative overview see Nergelius (2011).

  26. 26.

    Cf. Bull (2014), p 12.

  27. 27.

    As Ola Zetterquist says “The traditional position in Swedish constitutional law is that courts are not to exercise any political power of significance since such a position is atypical of the Swedish constitution where political power should rest with the Riksdag”, Zetterquist (2008), p 98. See also Bull (2014), p 16, holding basically a similar view.

  28. 28.

    Peczenik and Bergholz (1991), p 328.

  29. 29.

    In Government’s proposal (Regeringens proposition 2009/10: 80, 145–147) it is explained that reform strengthens the constitutional control after the legislative phase and this, in turn, actually secures the key position of the Riksdag. The risk that this would politicize the courts is expressly deemed as ungrounded.

  30. 30.

    F.N. and others v Sweden, no. 28774/09, ECHR 2012; S.F. and others v Sweden, no. 52077/10, ECHR 2012; I v Sweden, no. 61204/09, ECHR 2013; J.K. and others v Sweden, no. 59166/12, ECHR 2016; F.G. v Sweden, no. 43611/11, ECHR 2016.

  31. 31.

    Olsby v Sweden, no. 36124/06, ECHR 2012; Karin Andersson and others v Sweden, no. 29878/09, ECHR 2014; Naku v Lithuania and Sweden, no. 26126/07, ECHR 02016; Arlewin v Sweden, no. 22302/10, ECHR 2016.

  32. 32.

    Strömblad v Sweden, no. 3684/07, ECHR 2012; Rousk v Sweden, no. 27183/04, ECHR 2013; Söderman v Sweden [GC], no. 5786/08, ECHR 2013. There were also three cases dealt with violations of Article 4 of Protocol no. 7 (Lucky Dev v Sweden, no. 7356/10, ECHR 2014), Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 (Rousk v Sweden, no. 27183/04, ECHR 2013), and the right to an effective remedy under Article 13 (Lindstrand Partners Advokatbyrå AB v Sweden, no. 18700/09, ECHR 2016).

  33. 33.

    Kongeriket Norges grunnlov 1814 no 17.

  34. 34.

    According to the leading classic book about Norway’s constitutional law, the role of customary law is characterised as follows: “Not in any other area of law has customary law greater significance than in the area of constitutional law”, Andenæs and Fliflet (1995), p 40.

  35. 35.

    See Slagstad (1995).

  36. 36.

    Kløfta. Norsk Retstidende, 1976, p 1. The precedential outcome of this case is that when the courts are asked to decide on the constitutionality of an Act, the parliament’s view of the matter inevitably plays a crucial role. However, if any doubt arises as to how a statutory provision should be interpreted, the courts have a right and a duty to apply the Act in the manner which best accords with the Constitution.

  37. 37.

    This looks like a significant amendment but, in fact, it merely confirmed an established customary constitutional rule allowing—and expecting—judicial review. Preparatory materials underline the importance of constitutionality by stressing the priority of human rights (Rapport fra Menneskerettighetsutvalget om menneskerettigheter i Grunnloven, avgitt 19. desember 2011, pp 79–81). Preparatory materials also explain that constitutional judicial review has been part of the Norwegian Constitution for 150 years (Innst. 263 S, Innstilling til Stortinget fra kontroll- og konstitusjonskomiteen 2014–2015, p 6).

  38. 38.

    For a more detailed analysis see, e.g., Smith (2011).

  39. 39.

    Butt v Norway, no. 47017/09, ECHR 2012; Kaplan and others v Norway, no. 32504/11, ECHR 2014.

  40. 40.

    Kristiansen and Tyvik As v Norway, no. 25498/08, ECHR 2013 (the case concerned civil proceedings); Hansen v Norway, no. 15319/09, ECHR 2014 (the case concerned civil proceedings); Kristiansen v Norway, no. 1176/10, ECHR 2015 (the case concerned criminal proceedings).

  41. 41.

    Lindheim and others v Norway, nos. 12331/08 and 2139/10, ECHR 2012.

  42. 42.

    Danmarks Riges Grundlov 1953 no 169.

  43. 43.

    Krunke (2014), p 29.

  44. 44.

    See Schaumburg-Müller (2009).

  45. 45.

    Cf. Elo Rytter and Wind (2011).

  46. 46.

    Krunke (2014), p 35.

  47. 47.

    Wind (2009), p 288.

  48. 48.

    Biao v Denmark, no. 38590/10, ECHR 2016.

  49. 49.

    Stjórnarskrá lýðveldisins Ísland 33/1944.

  50. 50.

    See Árnason (2011).

  51. 51.

    Comparison between Icelandic and Irish experiences, see Suteu (2015).

  52. 52.

    See Helgadóttir (2011).

  53. 53.

    Björk Eiðsdóttir v Iceland, no. 46443/09, ECHR 2012; Erla Hlynsdóttir v Iceland, no. 43380/10, ECHR 2012; Erla Hlynsdóttir v Iceland, no. 54125/10, ECHR 2014; Erla Hlynsdóttir v Iceland, no. 54145/10, ECHR 2015; Ólafsson v Iceland, no. 58493/13, ECHR 2017.

  54. 54.

    As pointed out by Markku Suksi, Nordic constitutional identity is under pressure both from the European Court of Justice and the ECtHR. See Suksi (2014), pp 83–84.

  55. 55.

    However, it would be a mistake to assume that this connection would be openly admitted: indeed, quite the contrary. As Thomas Bull says about Sweden, there is “difficulty to acknowledge the close connections between law and politics […] many participants and observers of the system still cling to the idea that law and politics is and should be sharply divided”, Bull (2014), p 17. Yet, in constitutional comparison this connection looks evident.

  56. 56.

    It is a general comparative finding that “judicial activism tends to erode both the parliamentary system and majoritarian democracy”, Holland (1991), p 5.

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  1. Faculty of Law, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland

    Jaakko Husa

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  1. University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland

    Pia Letto-Vanamo

  2. University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark

    Ditlev Tamm

  3. University of Southern Denmark, Odense, Denmark

    Bent Ole Gram Mortensen

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Husa, J. (2019). Constitutional Mentality. In: Letto-Vanamo, P., Tamm, D., Gram Mortensen, B.O. (eds) Nordic Law in European Context. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 73. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03006-3_3

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