An Incentive Compatible Mechanism for Lowest-Cost Routing

  • Donghong QinEmail author
  • Ting Lv
  • Jiahai Yang
  • Lina Ge
  • Zhenkun Lu
Conference paper
Part of the Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing book series (AISC, volume 881)


Routing incentives are the basis for Internet service providers (ISP) to provide efficient, stable, and lasting routing services. Aiming at the least-cost routing model in the User-customized Multipath Inter-domain Routing (UMIR) network, this paper studies and proposes the least-cost routing mechanism (LCRM) that is compatible with incentives from the perspective of mechanism design. The mechanism is mainly composed of two parts:Routing rules are implemented using the least-cost routing algorithm; Payment rules adopt self-developed payment algorithm; Both theory and practice show that LCMP is a trusted mechanism, and it can motivate participants to adopt the “tell the truth” strategy in the inter-domain routing process based on the LCRM mechanism, and it has a low “overpayment”.


UMIR Routing incentive Mechanism design LCRM 



This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 61462009, No. 61432009, No. 61561008), the Natural Science Foundation of Guangxi (No. 2014GXNSFAA11 8358), the Prospective Research Project on Future Networks of Jiangsu Future Networks Innovation Institute (No. BY2013095115), the Specialized Research Fund for the Doctoral Program of Higher Education (No. 20130002110058), the National Basic Research Program of China (863 Program) (No. 2015AA015601), and the Guangxi University for Nationalities Science Foundation (No. 2014MDQD017, 2014MDYB031).


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Donghong Qin
    • 1
    Email author
  • Ting Lv
    • 1
  • Jiahai Yang
    • 2
  • Lina Ge
    • 1
  • Zhenkun Lu
    • 1
  1. 1.School of Information Science and EngineeringGuangxi University for NationalitiesNanningChina
  2. 2.Institute of Cyberspace and Network ScienceTsinghua UniversityBeijingChina

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