Abstract
Routing incentives are the basis for Internet service providers (ISP) to provide efficient, stable, and lasting routing services. Aiming at the least-cost routing model in the User-customized Multipath Inter-domain Routing (UMIR) network, this paper studies and proposes the least-cost routing mechanism (LCRM) that is compatible with incentives from the perspective of mechanism design. The mechanism is mainly composed of two parts:Routing rules are implemented using the least-cost routing algorithm; Payment rules adopt self-developed payment algorithm; Both theory and practice show that LCMP is a trusted mechanism, and it can motivate participants to adopt the “tell the truth” strategy in the inter-domain routing process based on the LCRM mechanism, and it has a low “overpayment”.
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Acknowledgment
This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 61462009, No. 61432009, No. 61561008), the Natural Science Foundation of Guangxi (No. 2014GXNSFAA11 8358), the Prospective Research Project on Future Networks of Jiangsu Future Networks Innovation Institute (No. BY2013095115), the Specialized Research Fund for the Doctoral Program of Higher Education (No. 20130002110058), the National Basic Research Program of China (863 Program) (No. 2015AA015601), and the Guangxi University for Nationalities Science Foundation (No. 2014MDQD017, 2014MDYB031).
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Qin, D., Lv, T., Yang, J., Ge, L., Lu, Z. (2019). An Incentive Compatible Mechanism for Lowest-Cost Routing. In: Arai, K., Bhatia, R., Kapoor, S. (eds) Proceedings of the Future Technologies Conference (FTC) 2018. FTC 2018. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, vol 881. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02683-7_43
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02683-7_43
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