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Borrowing Justification for Proportionality pp 187–232Cite as

A Charter of Rights with Wide Scope

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Part of the book series: Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice ((IUSGENT,volume 72))

Abstract

In this chapter, I address a dispute concerning the structure of fundamental rights. Every legal community has to answer the central question of which approach to rights (and which of their variant forms) provides the best understanding of the constitution. The two main rival approaches reflect the dominant legal practice in the U.S. and in Germany. In attempt to grasp the features of fundamental rights as they appeared in the case law of the German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG), Alexy formulated a theory of rights with wide scope, that is, prima facie, externally limited, and relative rights. A rival approach was suggested by Dworkin, who directed his analysis to the case law of the U.S. Supreme Court and asserted that constitutional rights were rather specific, unrestricted, and possibly absolute. This chapter shall demonstrate that the Supreme Federal Court of Brazil (STF) has interpreted the Federal Constitution as a charter of wide-scope rights, in accordance with Alexy’s principles theory. The court has done so despite the constitutional silence regarding the possibility of legislative limits to the fundamental rights. To demonstrate this, Section 5.1 begins by discussing the interpretative questions posed by fundamental rights and their limits, and how different scholars have approached the problem. Section 5.2 expounds the differences between Alexy’s principles theory and Dworkin’s trump model. Section 5.3 analyses fifteen decisions delivered by the STF on freedom and equality rights. Finally, Sect. 5.4 highlights the principles-theory influence on the STF’s case law, advancing justificatory reasons for the borrowings.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Gardbaum (2011), p. 387.

  2. 2.

    See, for instance: Alexy (2010a), chap. 6; Miller (2008), pp. 93–115; der Schyff (2008), pp. 131–148; Butler (2002), pp. 537–577; Weinrib (2006), pp. 95 ff.

  3. 3.

    Alexy (2010a), p. 223.

  4. 4.

    Ibid., p. 388. See above “Strong thesis” in Chap. 2 and “Proportionality and limitations of rights” in Chap. 3.

  5. 5.

    The term ‘penumbra’ appears in Barak (2012a), pp. 50–51.

  6. 6.

    Supporters of the wide-scope model are, for instance, Klatt and Meister (2012a), pp. 687–708; Gardbaum (2010), pp. 105–106; Kumm (2012), pp. 13–14; and Borowski (2007), pp. 197–240. C.f. Habermas (1996), pp. 258–259; Schauer (1992), pp. 429–431; Tsakyrakis (2009), pp. 487–493; and Webber (2009), p. 67, who are critics to the wide-scope conception of rights.

  7. 7.

    Alexy (2010a), pp. 223–224.

  8. 8.

    McHarg (1999), pp. 61–62. C.f. Gardbaum (2011), p. 389, affirming that these two approaches are mutually exclusive only in constitutional scholars’ view, for “the actual practice of constitutional courts jurisprudence tends not to treat them as alternatives by choosing one or the other but to employ both, to a greater or a lesser degree;” and Pildes (1993); (1998), claiming that neither balancing nor the model of rights as trumps correctly describes how judges actually conduce constitutional adjudication.

  9. 9.

    Hesse (1995), pp. 149–150; Borowski (1998), pp. 227–228.

  10. 10.

    See e.g., da Silva (2008), p. 66; Cittadino (2009), pp. 64–73; Sarmento (2006), pp. 177–179; Sarlet (2009), pp. 63–78. Admittedly, the consensus has always existed towards negative rights, but concerning social rights, the disputes lasted until very recently, and the principles theory played an important role in the STF’s decisions and in the consequent turn in the Brazilian case law. See more in this respect in Chap. 7 below.

  11. 11.

    Schlink (2012), p. 731. See also Schlink (2011), pp. 296–297.

  12. 12.

    Schlink (2012), p. 731.

  13. 13.

    Schlink (1992), pp. 730–734.

  14. 14.

    Dworkin (1999).

  15. 15.

    On the distinction between explicit and implicit constitutional text, and between constitutional text (whether explicit or implicit) and its application, see Barak (2012a), pp. 50–51.

  16. 16.

    Alexy (2012), p. 290.

  17. 17.

    Webber (2009), pp. 60–61. Similarly, Gardbaum (2010), pp. 82–83.

  18. 18.

    Webber (2009), p. 60.

  19. 19.

    Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 52 (1): “Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.” See Borowski (2007), p. 197, for comments.

  20. 20.

    Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, c. 11 (U.K.), Section 1 (Can.): “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”. See Strayer (1989), p. 352, for comments.

  21. 21.

    Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Article 2 (1): “Every person shall have the right to free development of his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral law.”

  22. 22.

    Webber (2009), p. 60.

  23. 23.

    Alexy (2010a), p. 35.

  24. 24.

    Ibid., pp. 71–80; Alexy (2010b), p. 23.

  25. 25.

    Barak (2012a), pp. 144–145.

  26. 26.

    Alexy (1992), p. 146.

  27. 27.

    Alexy (2010a), p. 392.

  28. 28.

    Rivers (2010), xx; Alexy (2010a), pp. 76; (2010b), p. 23; Schlink (1991), p. 1714.

  29. 29.

    For a general view of the two approaches, see: McHarg (1999), pp. 41–42; Borowski (2007); Klatt and Meister (2012a), chap. 2. For an historical perspective, see Borowski (1998), pp. 47–60. Finally, on the reception of these ideas in Portugal: de Andrade (1987), pp. 215–251; and in Brazil: de Barros (1996), pp. 94–98.

  30. 30.

    Häberle (1983), pp. 179–180; Borowski (1998), pp. 100–103.

  31. 31.

    der Schyff (2013), pp. 8–10; (2008), p. 140.

  32. 32.

    Webber (2009), p. 67.

  33. 33.

    Aleinikoff (1987), p. 946.

  34. 34.

    Alexy (2003a), pp. 131–132.

  35. 35.

    Kumm (2007), p. 141. See also Harbo (2010), pp. 166–167, on a “weak rights regime;” and Klatt and Meister (2012a), p. 23, on a “weak trump model.”

  36. 36.

    Tremblay (2014), p. 868.

  37. 37.

    Alexy (2010a), pp. 210–217.

  38. 38.

    Kumm (2012), p. 10.

  39. 39.

    For instance, it is possible to differentiate approaches that argue for balancing between rights, of which Alexy (2010a), p. 181; (2012), p. 293, is a representative, from approaches that admit balancing between interests, of which Beatty (2004), pp. 169–171, is a representative. See Klatt and Meister (2012a), chap. 2, referring to the former approach as the ‘weak trump model,’ and to the latter as the ‘interest model.’

  40. 40.

    Waldron (1993), p. 30.

  41. 41.

    Dworkin (1978), xi; (1981), pp. 199–200.

  42. 42.

    Schauer (1992), pp. 429–431.

  43. 43.

    Nozick (1974), pp. 30–31.

  44. 44.

    Webber (2009), p. 117.

  45. 45.

    Habermas (1996), pp. 258–259.

  46. 46.

    Häberle (1983), p. 179.

  47. 47.

    Müller (1969), p. 41.

  48. 48.

    Häberle (1983), pp. 179–180; Borowski (1998), pp. 99–100.

  49. 49.

    der Schyff (2013), pp. 8–10; (2008), p. 139.

  50. 50.

    Webber (2010), p. 201.

  51. 51.

    Alexy (2010a), pp. 71–80.

  52. 52.

    Klatt and Meister (2012a), p. 15.

  53. 53.

    Alexy (2003a), pp. 131–132.

  54. 54.

    Kumm (2006a). See also Harbo (2010), pp. 167–169, on a ‘strong rights regime;’ and Klatt and Meister (2012a), pp. 17–22, on a ‘strong trump model’ or ‘medium trump model.’

  55. 55.

    Tremblay (2014), p. 866.

  56. 56.

    Alexy (2010a), pp. 202–210.

  57. 57.

    Kumm (2012), p. 10.

  58. 58.

    Tsakyrakis (2009), pp. 468–475.

  59. 59.

    Schlink (1976); (1995); (2011).

  60. 60.

    Here, I attempt to summarize and simplify Alexy’s ideas conform they serve to this study. A complete classification would account for three criteria: (1) type of position within the legal system (whether rights to something, liberties, or powers, between which there is a means-end relation), (2) degree of generality (whether general or specific positions, between which there is a relation of precision), and (3) normative character (whether definitive positions or prima facie positions, between which there is a balancing relation). See: Alexy (2010a), pp. 160–161.

  61. 61.

    For instance, in BVerfG, Elfes Case, 6 BVerfGE 32, Judgment of 16 January 1957: “The individual may invoke Article 2 (1) [which provides for a general right to freedom of action] in the face of an encroachment upon his freedom by public authority to the extent that fundamental rights do not specifically protect such special areas of life.” (Translated in Kommers and Miller [2012], p. 402).

  62. 62.

    Alexy (2010a), pp. 285–286.

  63. 63.

    Alexy (2010a), p. 180; Alexy (2010b), p. 345.

  64. 64.

    Alexy (2010a), pp. 178–181.

  65. 65.

    Gardbaum (2011), p. 388; Borowski (1998), pp. 99–114.

  66. 66.

    Alexy (2003a), pp. 146–147.

  67. 67.

    Ibid., p. 131.

  68. 68.

    Alexy (2010a), pp. 209–210.

  69. 69.

    Ibid., p. 210.

  70. 70.

    See ‘Proportionality and limitations of rights’ in Chap. 3 and also Kumm (2007), p. 141; Borowski (2011), pp. 581–582; Alexy (2010a), p. 181, 225.

  71. 71.

    Kumm (2007), p. 141.

  72. 72.

    Webber (2009), p. 65.

  73. 73.

    Möller (2012), p. 2.

  74. 74.

    Letsas (2007), p. 126; Möller (2014), pp. 155–172.

  75. 75.

    BVerfG, Equestrian Case, 80 BVerfGE 137, Judgment of 6 June 1989, p. 168 (Justice Grimm dissenting), translated in van der Walt (2014), p. 152.

  76. 76.

    Kumm (2006b), pp. 344–345.

  77. 77.

    Webber (2009), p. 68.

  78. 78.

    Ibid., p. 68. See also Schlink (2012), p. 730, affirming that “fundamental rights are in danger of losing their prominence;” and Menéndez (2004), p. 175, that this approach devaluates “the currency of fundamental rights.”

  79. 79.

    Barak (2012b), p. 750.

  80. 80.

    Webber (2009), p. 68.

  81. 81.

    Alexy (2010a), p. 198.

  82. 82.

    Ibid., pp. 217–222.

  83. 83.

    Ibid., p. 200.

  84. 84.

    Ibid., pp. 76–78.

  85. 85.

    See e.g., BVerfG, Hashish Drug Case/Cannabis Judgement, 90 BVerfGE 145, Judgment of 3 September 1994.

  86. 86.

    Hesse (1995), para. 318, translated in Alexy (2010a), p. 76.

  87. 87.

    Alexy (2010a), p. 193.

  88. 88.

    Ibid., p. 193.

  89. 89.

    Ibid., pp. 209–210.

  90. 90.

    Dworkin (1978), pp. 90–94; (1981), p. 200.

  91. 91.

    (1996), pp. 258–259.

  92. 92.

    (1974), p. ix.

  93. 93.

    (1993), p. 30.

  94. 94.

    Jakab (2009), p. 6. See also Poscher (2015), referring to the principles theory as a “theory of a phantom.”

  95. 95.

    Tsakyrakis (2009).

  96. 96.

    Webber (2010), p. 201.

  97. 97.

    Ibid., p. 201.

  98. 98.

    Klatt and Meister (2012b), p. 17.

  99. 99.

    Ibid., pp. 21–22.

  100. 100.

    In this sense, Häberle (1983), pp. 179–180, 327, is not a typical representative of an alternative approach because he supports the internal theory, but connects it to balancing. Indeed, Harbële claims that fundamental rights are non-limitable rights, but also concedes that in determining the content of a right, one is required to balance between the aim pursued, on one hand, and the restrictions its fulfilment would impose upon competing interests, on the other. Borowski (1998), pp. 111–114, criticizes the idea, for it implies that one can derive fundamental rights from balancing between things other than constitutional principles—such as ethical, moral, or religious norms, or other types of norms that in any case should have supra-constitutional character—, which is highly controversial.

  101. 101.

    Dworkin (1978), p. 267.

  102. 102.

    Ibid., p. 271.

  103. 103.

    Ibid., pp. 274–275. The apparent lack of uniformity in the definition of rights through Dwokin’s prolific bibliography has led to conflicting interpretations. Very illustrative is the debate between Waldron (2000) and Pildes (2000) on the matter.

  104. 104.

    Dworkin (1978), p. 93.

  105. 105.

    Gardbaum (2011), p. 388; Borowski (1998), p. 99.

  106. 106.

    Dworkin (1978), p. 91.

  107. 107.

    Alexy (2003a), pp. 131–133.

  108. 108.

    Ibid., p. 131.

  109. 109.

    Dworkin (1986), p. 293.

  110. 110.

    Ibid., p. 293.

  111. 111.

    Alexy (2003a), pp. 146–147.

  112. 112.

    Dworkin (2008), p. 49.

  113. 113.

    Ibid., p. 49.

  114. 114.

    Dworkin (1978), pp. 81–130.

  115. 115.

    Klatt and Meister (2012a), pp. 17–21.

  116. 116.

    Webber (2009), p. 70. In Webber’s view, under this approach, “a rights-claim is not that a claim that a given legislative measure is altogether impermissible—the right is neither a trump, nor a firewall, nor does it benefit from lexical priority.” (Ibid., p. 68).

  117. 117.

    Alexy (2010a), p. 195.

  118. 118.

    Ibid., p. 195.

  119. 119.

    Dworkin (1986), p. 223.

  120. 120.

    O’Regan and Friedman (2011), p. 473.

  121. 121.

    See Bleckmann (1995), p. 51 ff., for more on equality in Germany, including brief comments on the jurisprudence of the BVerfG; Baer (1998), pp. 249–279, on proportionality and equality in German scholarship and case law; and Kirchhof (1992), about equality in German jurisprudence.

  122. 122.

    Whether the legislature was also an addressee of the wording ‘equality before the law’ has been the object of dispute in German jurisprudence in the past, but after the Basic Law was enacted, the question was, in the words of Klein (1975), p. 74, “unexpectedly quickly and clearly” answered by the BVerfG, which “early decided without further discussion that also the legislature is subject to the principle of equality.”

  123. 123.

    Alexy (2010a), p. 261.

  124. 124.

    Ibid., p. 388.

  125. 125.

    Ibid., pp. 271–272, 285.

  126. 126.

    Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Article 33 (1): “Every German shall have in every Land the same political rights and duties.”

  127. 127.

    Grundgesetz, Article 38 (1): “Members of the German Bundestag shall be elected in general, direct, free, equal and secret elections.”

  128. 128.

    Grundgesetz, Article 3 (2): “Men and women shall have equal rights. The state shall promote the actual implementation of equal rights for women and men and take steps to eliminate disadvantages that now exist.”

  129. 129.

    Grundgesetz, Article 6 (5): “Children born outside of marriage shall be provided by legislation with the same opportunities for physical and mental development and for their position in society as are enjoyed by those born within marriage.”

  130. 130.

    Grundgesetz, Article 3 (3): “No person shall be disfavoured because of disability.”

  131. 131.

    Grundgesetz, Article 3 (3): “No person shall be favoured or disfavoured because of sex, parentage, race, language, homeland and origin, faith, or religious or political opinions.”

  132. 132.

    Klein (1975), p. 89. See for instance, BVerfG, Nocturnal Employment Case, 85 BVerfGE 191, Judgment of 28 January 1992; and 88 BVerfGE 87, Judgment of 26 January 1993.

  133. 133.

    Alexy (2010a), p. 247.

  134. 134.

    Ibid., pp. 247–248.

  135. 135.

    Ibid., p. 287.

  136. 136.

    Ibid., p. 281.

  137. 137.

    See, e.g., BVerfG, Southwest State Case, 1 BVerfGE 14, Judgment of 23 October 1951; BVerfG, Fire Fighting Case I, 9 BVerfG 291, Judgment of 20 May 1959. Underlying both decisions was the rationale that, rather than requiring equal, indistinct treatment to all disregarding their inherent features, the equality clause forbids that public officials treat arbitrarily people under government authority.

  138. 138.

    Leibholz (1925). Klein (1975), pp. 75, 110, explained that Leibholz’s thoughts were developed during the 1920s and became especially influential later because of his nomination to a BVerfG’s seat, a place that he occupied from the Court’s establishment in 1951 until 1971. During his tenure, “he was in a unique position to translate his constitutional ideas from the level of philosophical abstractions to operational principles of the evolving West German constitutionalism—from law-in-books to law-in-action,” McWhinney (1986), p. 179, notices. Years later, after being incorporated in Germany’s constitutional case law, these thoughts would be embraced by the principles theory, performing the opposite movement from courts’ benches to Universities’ classrooms.

  139. 139.

    Borowski (1998), pp. 364–374.

  140. 140.

    Alexy (2010a), pp. 265–270.

  141. 141.

    STF, Anencephaly Case, ADPF 54/DF, Judgment of 12 April 2012, Relator: Min. Marco Aurélio, D.J.e. 80, 30 Apr. 2013.

  142. 142.

    STF, Heinous Crimes Act Case I, HC 84862/RS, Judgment of 22 February 2005, Relator: Min. Carlos Velloso, D.J. 15 Apr. 2005; Heinous Crimes Act Case II, HC 82959/SP, Judgment of 23 February 2006, Relator: Min. Marco Aurélio, D.J. 1 Sep. 2006.

  143. 143.

    STF, Journalism Degree Case, RE 511.961/SP, Judgment of 17 June 2009, Relator: Min. Gilmar Mendes, D.J.e. 213, 13 Nov. 2009.

  144. 144.

    See in this respect, Mariano Silva (2016), pp. 277–278.

  145. 145.

    See e.g., STF (First Panel), Senator’s Preventive Detention Case, AC 4327 AgR-terceiro-AgR/DF, Judgment of 26 September 2017, STF, Relator (acórdão): Min. Roberto Barroso, D.J.e. 247, Oct. 27, 2017.

  146. 146.

    STF, Heinous Crimes Act Case I, HC 84862/RS, Judgment of 22 February 2005, Relator: Min. Carlos Velloso, D.J. 15 Apr. 2005; STF, Heinous Crimes Act Case II, HC 82959/SP, Judgment of 23 February 2006, Relator: Min. Marco Aurélio, D.J. 1 Sep. 2006.

  147. 147.

    STF, Journalism Degree Case, RE 511.961/SP, Judgment of 17 June 2009, Relator: Min. Gilmar Mendes, D.J.e. 213, 13 Nov. 2009.

  148. 148.

    STF, Public Pension Reform Case I, ADI 3.105/DF; Public Pension Reform Case II, ADI 3.128/DF, Judgment of 18 August 2004, Relator (acórdão): Min. Cezar Peluso, D.J. 18 Feb. 2005.

  149. 149.

    STF, University Placement Case, ADI 3.324/DF, Judgment of 16 December 2004, Relator: Min. Marco Aurélio, D.J. 5 Aug. 2005.

  150. 150.

    STF (First Panel), Senator’s Preventive Detention Case, AC 4327 AgR-terceiro-AgR/DF, Judgment of 26 September 2017, STF, Relator (acórdão): Min. Roberto Barroso, D.J.e. 247, Oct. 27, 2017.

  151. 151.

    STF, Social Organizations Case, ADI 1.923 MC/DF, Judgment of 1 August 2007, Relator (acórdão): Eros Grau, D.J. 21 Sep. 2007.

  152. 152.

    STF, Ex-Governors’ Pension Case, ADI 3.853/MS, Judgment of 12 September 2007, Relatora: Min. Carmen Lúcia, D.J. 26 Oct. 2007.

  153. 153.

    STF, Opening Ceremony Case, ADI 3.305/DF, Judgment of 13 September 2006, Relator: Min. Eros Grau, D.J. 24 Nov. 2006.

  154. 154.

    STF, RN Bidding Law Case, ADI 3.070/RN, Judgment of 29 November 2007, Relator: Min. Eros Grau, D.J. 19 Dec. 2007.

  155. 155.

    STF, RO Bidding Law Case, ADI 2.716/RO, Judgment of 29 November 2007, Relator: Min. Eros Grau, D.J.e 41, 7 Mar. 2008.

  156. 156.

    STF, Public Pension Reform Case I, ADI 3.105/DF; Public Pension Reform Case II, ADI 3.128/DF, Judgment of 18 August 2004, Relator (acórdão): Min. Cezar Peluso, D.J. 18 Feb. 2005.

  157. 157.

    Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988, Article 150, II: “Without prejudice to any other guarantees ensured to the taxpayers, the Union, the states, the Federal District and the municipalities are forbidden to: … Institute unequal treatment for taxpayers who are in an equivalent situation.”

  158. 158.

    Constituição (1988), Article 5, XXVI: “The law shall not injure the vested right, the perfect juridical act and the res judicata.”

  159. 159.

    Constituição (1988), Article 60, §4, IV: “No proposal of amendment shall be considered which is aimed at abolishing: … Individual rights and guarantees.”

  160. 160.

    Constituição (1988), Article 150, II: “Without prejudice to any other guarantees ensured to the taxpayers, the Union, the states, the Federal District and the municipalities are forbidden to: … Institute unequal treatment for taxpayers who are in an equivalent situation, it being forbidden to establish any distinction by reason of professional occupation or function performed by them, independently of the juridical designation of their incomes, titles or rights.”

  161. 161.

    Alexy (1986), p. 357, paraphrased in: STF, Public Pension Reform Case I, ADI 3.105/DF; Public Pension Reform Case II, ADI 3.128/DF, Judgment of 18 August 2004, Relator (acórdão): Min. Cezar Peluso, D.J. 18 Feb. 2005.

  162. 162.

    Alexy (1986), p. 370, quoted in: STF, Public Pension Reform Case I, ADI 3.105/DF; Public Pension Reform Case II, ADI 3.128/DF, Judgment of 18 August 2004, Relator (acórdão): Min. Cezar Peluso, D.J. 18 Feb. 2005.

  163. 163.

    STF, University Placement Case, ADI 3.324/DF, Judgment of 16 December 2004, Relator: Min. Marco Aurélio, D.J. 5 Aug. 2005.

  164. 164.

    Lei 9.536, de 12 de novembro de 1997, Brazil, D.O.U. 12.12.1997.

  165. 165.

    In the original, Alexy (1993), p. 408, quoted in: STF, University Placement Case, ADI 3.324/DF, Judgment of 16 December 2004, Relator: Min. Marco Aurélio, D.J. 5 Aug. 2005; here, Alexy (2010a), p. 280.

  166. 166.

    STF, University Placement Case, ADI 3.324/DF, Judgment of 16 December 2004, Relator: Min. Marco Aurélio, D.J. 5 Aug. 2005, p. 177.

  167. 167.

    Ibid., pp. 179–180 (my translation).

  168. 168.

    STF, Heinous Crimes Act Case I, HC 84862/RS, Judgment of 22 February 2005, Relator: Min. Carlos Velloso, D.J. 15 Apr. 2005; Heinous Crimes Act Case II, HC 82959/SP, Judgment of 23 February 2006, Relator: Min. Marco Aurélio, D.J. 1 Sep. 2006.

  169. 169.

    Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988, Article 5, XLVI: “The law shall regulate the individualization of punishment.”

  170. 170.

    Lei 8.072, de 25 de julho de 1990, Brazil, D.O.U. 26.07.1990, Article 2, Paragraph 1 (repealed 2007).

  171. 171.

    STF, Heinous Crimes Act Case I, HC 84862/RS, Judgment of 22 February 2005, Relator: Min. Carlos Velloso, D.J. 15 Apr. 2005 (my translation).

  172. 172.

    Alexy (2010a), p. 196, paraphrased in STF, Heinous Crimes Act Case I, HC 84862/RS, Judgment of 22 February 2005, Relator: Min. Carlos Velloso, D.J. 15 Apr. 2005 (my translation).

  173. 173.

    STF, Heinous Crimes Act Case I, HC 84862/RS, Judgment of 22 February 2005, Relator: Min. Carlos Velloso, D.J. 15 Apr. 2005 (my translation).

  174. 174.

    Ibid.

  175. 175.

    STF, Opening Ceremony Case, ADI 3.305/DF, Judgment of 13 September 2006, Relator: Min. Eros Grau, D.J. 24 Nov. 2006.

  176. 176.

    Lei 9.504, de 30 de setembro de 1997, D.O.U., 30.09.1997 (repealed 2009).

  177. 177.

    STF, Social Organizations Case, ADI 1.923 MC/DF, Judgment of 1 August 2007, Relator (acórdão): Eros Grau, D.J. 21 Sep. 2007.

  178. 178.

    Lei 9.637, de 15 de maio de 1998, D.O.U., 18.05.1998.

  179. 179.

    Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988, Article 37, XXI: “With the exception of the cases specified in law, public works, services, purchases and disposals shall be contracted by public bidding proceedings that ensure equal conditions to all bidders, with clauses that establish payment obligations, maintaining the effective conditions of the bid, as the law provides, which shall only allow the requirements of technical and economic qualifications indispensable to guarantee the fulfilling of the obligations.”

  180. 180.

    STF, Ex-Governors’ Pension Case, ADI 3.853/MS, Judgment of 12 September 2007, Relatora: Min. Carmen Lúcia, D.J. 26 Oct. 2007.

  181. 181.

    In the original, Alexy (1993), p. 397, quoted in: STF, Ex-Governors’ Pension Case, ADI 3.853/MS, Judgment of 12 September 2007, Relatora: Min. Carmen Lúcia, D.J. 26 Oct. 2007, p. 721; here, Alexy (2010a), p. 272.

  182. 182.

    STF, RN Bidding Law Case, ADI 3.070/RN; RO Bidding Law Case, ADI 2.716/RO, Judgment of 29 November 2007, Relator: Min. Eros Grau, D.J.e 41, 7 Mar. 2008.

  183. 183.

    Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988, Article 19, III: “The union, the states, the federal district and the municipalities are forbidden to: … create distinctions between Brazilians or preferences favouring some.”

  184. 184.

    Constituição (1988), Article 37, Main Body: “The governmental entities and entities owned by the Government in any of the powers of the union, the states, the Federal District and the Municipalities shall obey the principles of lawfulness, impersonality, morality, publicity, and efficiency.”

  185. 185.

    Constituição (1988), Article 175: “It is incumbent upon the Government, as set forth by law, to provide public utility services, either directly or by concession or permission, which will always be through public bidding.”

  186. 186.

    STF, Journalism Degree Case, RE 511.961/SP, Judgment of 17 June 2009, Relator: Min. Gilmar Mendes, D.J.e. 213, 13 Nov. 2009.

  187. 187.

    Decreto-Lei 972, de 17 de outubro de 1969, D.O.U. 21.10.1969, Article 4, V.

  188. 188.

    Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988, Article 5, XIII: “The practice of any work, trade or profession is free, observing the professional qualifications which the law shall establish.”

  189. 189.

    Alexy (1986), p. 267, paraphrased in STF, Journalism Degree Case, RE 511.961/SP, Judgment of 17 June 2009, Relator: Min. Gilmar Mendes, D.J.e. 213, 13 Nov. 2009.

  190. 190.

    ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression. This right includes freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of one’s choice. … The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means.’ (Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Article 13).

  191. 191.

    STF, Anencephaly Case, ADPF 54/DF, Judgment of 12 April 2012, Relator: Min. Marco Aurélio, D.J.e. 80, 30 Apr. 2013.

  192. 192.

    Ibid.

  193. 193.

    STF, Racial Quotas Case, ADPF 186/DF, Judgment of 26 April 2012, STF, Relator: Min. Ricardo Lewandowski, D.J.e. 205, 20 Oct. 2014.

  194. 194.

    STF (First Panel), Senator’s Preventive Detention Case, AC 4327 AgR-terceiro-AgR/DF, Judgment of 26 September 2017, STF, Relator (acórdão): Min. Roberto Barroso, D.J.e. 247, Oct. 27, 2017.

  195. 195.

    STF, Civil-Service Entrance Examination Case, RE 635739/AL, Judgment of 19 February 2014, STF, Relator: Min. Gilmar Mendes, D.J.e. 193, 3 Oct. 2014.

  196. 196.

    STF, Legal Entity’s Political Donation Case, ADI 4650/DF, Judgment of 17 September 2015, Relator: Min. Luiz Fux, D.J.e. 34, 24 Feb. 2016.

  197. 197.

    See Frankenberg (2010), pp. 574–575, comparing constitutional migrations to the purchase, import, and reassembly of products.

  198. 198.

    Schlink (1995), pp. 1231–1237.

  199. 199.

    Schlink (1992), p. 718.

  200. 200.

    BVerfG (First Senate), Lüth Case, 7 BVerfGE 198, Judgment of 15 January 1958. See Chaps. 2 and 4.

  201. 201.

    BVerfG, Southwest State Case, 1 BVerfGE 14, Judgment of 23 October 1951.

  202. 202.

    See in this respect, Leibholz (1952), pp. 723–731; Klein (1975), pp. 74–75; and Kommers and Miller (2012), pp. 66–67, according to whom, “the case has been compared to Marbury v. Madison.”

  203. 203.

    See e.g., BVerfG, Party Finance Case I, 8 BVerfGE 51, Judgment of 24 June 1958, in which the court held that whether a statute is in accordance with constitutional equality does not depend of its wording being formulated in a manner that gives equal treatment to all the people under its authority; a legislative act “may be contrary to the principle of equality [and thus unconstitutional] if its practical application results in an obvious inequality and if this unequal effect is due to the legal formulation [of the same statute]” (translated in Kommers and Miller [2012], pp. 271–273). The same substantial understanding of equality has been shown in several of its decisions delivered under what Klein (1975), p. 78, called “guidance by the idea of justice.” In fact, the BVerfG’s leitmotif is broader than the idea of social fairness and cannot be reduced to an emphasis on the economic values traditionally related to the welfare state.

  204. 204.

    In BVerfG, Pension Reform Case, 74 BVerfGE 163, Judgment of 28 January 1987, e.g., the court came to the conclusion that allowing women to retire earlier than men does not violate equality, since women generally carry the burden of a double occupation as workers and housewives, and on them lay the heavier onuses of child caring imposed by pregnancy and nursing. See in this respect, Rabe (2001), p. 220.

  205. 205.

    Alexy (2010a), p. 273.

  206. 206.

    Dworkin (1978), pp. 267–275.

  207. 207.

    Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988, Article 5, IV: “The expression of thought is free, and anonymity is forbidden.”

  208. 208.

    Constituição (1988), Article 5, VI: “Freedom of conscience and of belief is inviolable, the free exercise of religious cults being ensured and, under the terms of the law, the protection of places of worship and their rites being guaranteed.”

  209. 209.

    Constituição (1988), Article 5, XVII: “Freedom of association for lawful purposes is fully guaranteed, any paramilitary association being forbidden.”

  210. 210.

    Constituição (1988), Article 5, I: “Men and women have equal rights and duties under the terms of this Constitution.”

  211. 211.

    Constituição (1988), Article 5, XLVIII and L: “The sentence shall be served in separate establishments, according to the nature of the offence, the age and the sex of the convict” and “female prisoners shall be ensured of adequate conditions to stay with their children during the nursing period.”

  212. 212.

    Constituição (1988), Article 12, Paragraph 2: “The law may not establish any distinction between born and naturalized Brazilians, except in the cases stated in this Constitution.”

  213. 213.

    Constituição (1988), Article 37, VIII: “The law shall reserve a percentage of public offices and positions for handicapped persons and shall define the criteria for their admittance.”

  214. 214.

    An example in which promoting factual equality has justified legal inequalities is found in Article 201, Paragraph 7, I and II, of the Federal Constitution. These provisions grant women more favourable conditions of voluntary retirement: “thirty-five years of contribution, if a man, and thirty years of contribution, if a woman,” added to “sixty-five years of age, if a man, and sixty years, if a woman.”

  215. 215.

    Schlink (1992), p. 725; Hofmann (1989), pp. 3177, 3184.

  216. 216.

    (1975), p. 222.

  217. 217.

    Barak (2012a), pp. 134–135.

  218. 218.

    de Tavares (1991), pp. 88–95.

  219. 219.

    Constituição da República Portuguesa, de 2 de Abril de 1976, Article 18 (2), translated in http://www.tribunalconstitucional.pt/tc/en/crpen.html.

  220. 220.

    La Constitución Española de 1978, translated in http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/lang/en/espana/leyfundamental/Paginas/titulo_primero.aspx.

  221. 221.

    de Barros (1996), pp. 94–98.

  222. 222.

    U.S. Const. amend. V: “No person shall be … deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”

  223. 223.

    Mendes (2001); (1994); de Barros (1996), pp. 98–125; da Silva (2006), pp. 23–51.

  224. 224.

    Sarlet (2009), pp. 71–72, 78–90; Bonavides (2008), pp. 434–436.

  225. 225.

    Sarlet (2009), pp. 79, 84–91.

  226. 226.

    Mendes (2012), pp. 54–55, 76–79, 101–112.

  227. 227.

    Sarlet (2009), pp. 78–79.

  228. 228.

    See e.g., STF, MS 21729, Judgment of 5 October 1995, Relator: Min. Sepúlveda Pertence, D.J. 19 Oct. 2001; MS 23452, Judgment of 16 September 1999, Relator: Min. Celso de Mello, D.J. 12 May 2000; HC 79285, Judgment of 31 August 1999, Relator: Min. Moreira Alves, D.J. 12 Nov. 1999; AI 655298, Judgment of 4 September 2007, Relator: Min. Eros Grau, D.J. 28 Sep. 2007; HC 103236, Relator: Min. Gilmar Mendes, D.J.e. 3 Sep. 2010.

  229. 229.

    STF, Political Satire Case, ADI 4451 MC-REF/DF, Judgment of 2 September 2010, Relator: Min. Ayres Britto, D.J.e. 125, 1 Jul. 2011.

  230. 230.

    Alexy (2010a), p. 196.

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Andrade Neto, J. (2018). A Charter of Rights with Wide Scope. In: Borrowing Justification for Proportionality. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 72. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02263-1_5

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