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A System of Rules and Principles

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Part of the Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice book series (IUSGENT,volume 72)

Abstract

In this chapter, I shall demonstrate that the Supreme Federal Court of Brazil (STF) has interpreted the Federal Constitution as a set of norms that are either rules or principles in accordance with the principles theory. My task is not to confront whether the Federal Constitution allows one to conceive it as such a set of rules and principles, as this has not been under dispute in Brazil. I shall show instead that the STF’s understanding on principles is better explained as having derived from Alexy’s principles theory than from competing approaches, the most well-known representative of which is Dworkin’s. Alexy conceives of principles as optimization requirements that collide among each other and require a special method for solving such collisions: the proportionality test. Dworkin supports a narrow conception of principles and claims that, read in their best light, the principles in a constitution do not necessarily collide or require the proportionality test as a method for their application. The collected set of judicial decisions in Sect. 4.3 demonstrates that the STF has incorporated the optimization thesis. This is a nuclear tenet of Alexy’s principles theory one can find neither in the opinions of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany (BVerfG) nor in Dworkin’s alternative approach. To reach this conclusion, I shall begin providing a brief genealogy of the distinction between rules and principles.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Alexy (2010a), pp. 21–22; (2010c), p. 127.

  2. 2.

    See Alexander (2012), pp. 122–123; Alexander and Kress (1996), p. 739; and Poscher (2009a) , p. 438, as examples of scholars that object the very existence of legal principles.

  3. 3.

    See Alexy (2000a), pp. 294–295, on the idea that two main positions regarding principles and rules emerged in the last decades. C.f. Ávila (2012), pp. 27–31, providing for a third position, somehow popular in Brazil, that differentiates between first-degree norms (principles and rules) and second-degree norms (postulates).

  4. 4.

    Alexy (2010a), pp. 44–56.

  5. 5.

    For instance, Klatt (2012); (2004); (2013); da Silva (2011), pp. 277–278; Klatt and Meister (2012a); Kumm (2007); Sieckmann (1994); Pulido (2007a); Sieckmann (1990); Raabe (1998); Borowski (1998); Jansen (1997); (1998); Pulido (2007b). By contrast, many are the authors pointing problems on the concept of optimization and countering the necessary connection between principles and balancing. See, e.g., Möller (2007), pp. 458–462; Poscher (2009a) ; Tsakyrakis (2009); (2010).

  6. 6.

    Kumm (2004), p. 575.

  7. 7.

    Dworkin (1978); (1986); (1999).

  8. 8.

    Schlink (1992), pp. 717–718. See Alexy (2010a), pp. 14–15, 44–45, listing some of the terms used by the BVerfG. Webber (2009), pp. 5–6, 66–67, criticizes the fact that, under the language of principled-oriented theories, some terms are indistinctly taken to be synonymous. Nevertheless, the chaotic use of the terminology precedes the principles theory and, thus, should not be regarded as a consequence of it. Actually, Alexy (2010a), pp. 14–15, diagnosed the problem and pointed out to the necessity of ‘conceptual clarification,’ which he attempted to provide by proposing that the term “principles” be used in legal argumentation instead of “values.” Cf. Jacobsohn (2012), that attempts to differentiate between values and principles within the framework of comparative constitutional law.

  9. 9.

    See Dworkin (1986), pp. 68–70, on institutional identity and Wittgestein’s rope metaphor, which illustrates the historical changes in legal institutions and the variety of interpretations that follow from it.

  10. 10.

    An overview on how the concept of principles has changed since the beginning of the twentieth century can be found in: Manero (IVR Encyclopaedia of Jurisprudence); Bonavides (2008).

  11. 11.

    Del Vècchio (1958).

  12. 12.

    Esser (1964).

  13. 13.

    Bobbio (1957); (1960).

  14. 14.

    Esser (1964), p. 50 (my translation).

  15. 15.

    Bobbio (1960), p. 181 (my translation).

  16. 16.

    Bobbio (2011); Fassò (2000), p. 659. Cf. Dworkin (1986), p. 115; Alexy, p. 41.

  17. 17.

    That is the opinion of Jakab (2009); and Poscher (2009b) , for example. Alexy (1979), p. 67; (2000a), p. 294, also refers to Esser as an influential predecessor.

  18. 18.

    Esser (1964), p. 73.

  19. 19.

    Ibid., pp. 50–52.

  20. 20.

    Ibid., p. 69.

  21. 21.

    See Poscher (2009b) , p. 6, affirming that, “certainly without reference to and almost certainly without any knowledge of Esser’s work, Ronald Dworkin used the argument from principles in a very similar attack on the Anglo-Saxon blend of legal positivism;” and Alexy (1979), pp. 67–68, noticing that there are relevant points of intersection between Esser’s and Dworkin’s thoughts. See e.g., Dworkin (1967), pp. 39, 42. C.f. Esser (1964), pp. 69–70.

  22. 22.

    Alexander and Kress (1996), p. 742. Also according to Alexy (2000a), p. 294, “it was Ronald Dworkin’s major challenge to H.L.A. Hart’s version of legal positivism, initially in ‘The Model of Rules,’ that marked the beginnings of a broad discussion.”

  23. 23.

    Dworkin (1967), p. 31.

  24. 24.

    Ibid., p. 25.

  25. 25.

    Ibid., p. 25.

  26. 26.

    Ibid., p. 27.

  27. 27.

    Ibid., p. 27.

  28. 28.

    Alexy (2010a), p. 50, makes explicit reference to Dworkin (1978), p. 26 f.

  29. 29.

    See Kommers and Miller (2012), p. 67, on the differences between the U.S. Supreme Court’s case law and the BVerfG’s in what respects the concept of legal principles. See also Schlink (2011); and Tsakyrakis (2009) throwing light on what they perceive as a resistance to balancing in the U.S. C.f. Sweet and Mathews (2010), p. 178, arguing that “it is not true that the American system has rejected either balancing or proportionality;” and Beatty (2004), p. 162, affirming that “the U.S. Supreme Court relies on a test very similar to the metric of proportionality when it subjects state action under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to ‘strict scrutiny’.”

  30. 30.

    Larenz (1979a); (1979b).

  31. 31.

    Canaris (1969).

  32. 32.

    Alexy (2010a), p. 5. Schlink (1992), p. 730, voices harsh criticism against this project. In his view, the constitutional theory has been “entirely under the ‘spell’ of the Bundesverfassungsgericht,” as scholars abandoned their important role as critics of the BVerfG and assumed instead the task of only harmonizing the court’s decisions “into a coherent doctrinal corpus.”

  33. 33.

    For an analysis of the Lüth Case, see Schlink (1976), pp. 17–24; Kommers and Miller (2012), p. 442.

  34. 34.

    BVerfG (First Senate), Lüth Case, 7 BVerfGE 198, Judgment of 15 January 1958.

  35. 35.

    Ibid., translated by Tony Weir, in the website of the University of Texas School of Law. All the references below refer to this translation, unless indicated otherwise.

  36. 36.

    Ibid.

  37. 37.

    BVerfG, Southwest State Case, 1 BVerfGE 14, Judgment of 23 October 1951.

  38. 38.

    Kommers and Miller (2012), pp. 448–450. The English names for the cases I mention in this paragraph were taken from Kommers and Miller’s.

  39. 39.

    BVerfG, Schleswig-Holstein Voters’ Association Case, 1 BVerfGE 208, Judgment of 4 May 1952.

  40. 40.

    BVerfG, National Socialist Law Case, 23 BVerfGE 98, Judgment of 14 February 1968.

  41. 41.

    BVerfG, Turnover Tax Record Case, 36 BVerfGE 321, Judgment of 3 May 1974.

  42. 42.

    BVerfG, Abortion Case I, 39 BVerfGE 1, Judgment of 25 February 1975.

  43. 43.

    BVerfG, Lebach Case, 35 BVerfGE 202, Judgment of 6 May 1973.

  44. 44.

    BVerfG, Classroom Crucifix Case, 93 BVerfGE 1, Judgment of 16 May 1995.

  45. 45.

    BVerfG, Hashish Drug Case/Cannabis Judgement, 90 BVerfGE 145, Judgment of 3 September 1994, pp. 399–400.

  46. 46.

    Alexy (2003), p. 133.

  47. 47.

    Alexy (2000a), p. 295.

  48. 48.

    Alexy (2010a), p. 47. C.f. Dworkin (1967), p. 25.

  49. 49.

    Alexy (2010a), p. 45.

  50. 50.

    Alexy (1992), p. 145.

  51. 51.

    Rivers (2010).

  52. 52.

    The separation between prima facie and definitive ought was already present in the works of other scholars, such as Ross (2002); Searle (1978); Hare (1981); Hintikka (1971). Alexy (1993a), pp. 157–170; (2010b), p. 57, also mentions Günther (1988) as a source. Remarkably Searle (1978), pp. 86–87, anticipated three features of prima facie obligations that Alexy would later attribute to legal principles: firstly, that any obligations can conflict in particular cases; secondly, that the conflict is solved when one obligation overrules another according to the their relative moral strength; and finally, that the decision on which obligation is morally stronger and, thus, should overrule the conflicting one is relative and transitive, that is, dependent on the particular features of the case under consideration. Importantly, Searle also put forward the conclusion that norms exist which remain valid regardless of conflicting with other equally valid norms within the same normative system.

  53. 53.

    Alexy (1979), pp. 81–82; (1992), p. 145; (2010b), p. 57.

  54. 54.

    Alexy (2010d) , p. 180.

  55. 55.

    Alexy (2010b), p. 21. Similarly, Dworkin (1967), p. 25.

  56. 56.

    Alexy (1979), pp. 79–82; (1992), p. 147.

  57. 57.

    Alexy (2010a), p. 57. C.f. Dworkin (1967), p. 42, doubting whether the concept of vality really applies to legal principles.

  58. 58.

    Alexy (2010a), p. 60.

  59. 59.

    Ibid.

  60. 60.

    Ibid., p. 49. The treatment given to exceptions is however controversial. See Alexy (2000a), p. 295. C.f. Dworkin (1967), p. 25; (Dworkin 1978), p. 74.

  61. 61.

    Alexy (2000a), p. 296.

  62. 62.

    Alexy (1993a), p. 162.

  63. 63.

    Ibid., p. 162. Interestingly, the solution suggested by Dworkin (1967), p. 26, does not fall into any of these models. Indeed, he agrees on that collisions between principles do not normally raise questions of validity (or existence). Nevertheless, he proposes that the collision itself can be solved once one reaches the best (or correct) understanding of what law really demands in each case.

  64. 64.

    See for instance, Gardbaum (2010), p. 79, saying that “balancing is an inherent part of the near-universal general conception of a constitutional right as an important prima facie claim that nonetheless can, in principle, be limited or overridden by non-constitutional rights claims premised on conflicting public policy objectives.”

  65. 65.

    Klatt and Meister (2012a), p. 23.

  66. 66.

    Alexy (1993a), p. 162.

  67. 67.

    Alexy (2010d), p. 16.

  68. 68.

    Alexy (2000a), p. 297. As the opposite also holds true, the effects that the preceded principle prescribes are not to bring about. Consequently, as Kumm (2006), p. 345, noticed, “the fact that a rights holder has a prima facie right does not imply that he holds a position that gives him any kind of priority over countervailing considerations of policy.”

  69. 69.

    Alexy (2000a), p. 297; (2010b), p. 52.

  70. 70.

    There is an ongoing controversy about whether any abstract order of priority, lexical, weighted, or otherwise, actually exists between principles. See Alexander (2012), pp. 118, 122–123; Klatt and Meister (2012a), p. 26; (2012b), pp. 689, 698; McHarg (1999), pp. 673–674; Möller (2012), p. 720; Rawls (1999), pp. 37–40, 214–220; da Silva (2011), pp. 280–282; Tremblay (2014), pp. 866, 868, 880; Tsakyrakis (2009), p. 473; Waldron (1993), pp. 22, 30.

  71. 71.

    Originally, Alexy (2010b), p. 54, referred to the rule as ‘the Law of Competing Principles’. The name ‘collision law’ appeared in Alexy (2000a), p. 297, where the rule was stated slightly differently from the one I transcribed in the text.

  72. 72.

    Alexy (2000a), p. 297.

  73. 73.

    Klatt (2012), p. 20.

  74. 74.

    Alexy (2010a), p. 47.

  75. 75.

    Alexy (2000a), p. 294.

  76. 76.

    Alexy (2010a), p. 48.

  77. 77.

    Ibid., p. 57.

  78. 78.

    Ibid., pp. 47–48, 57.

  79. 79.

    Alexy and Peczenik (1990), p. 137; Alexy (2010a), p. 47.

  80. 80.

    Alexy (2010a), p. 48.

  81. 81.

    Ibid., pp. 66–69.

  82. 82.

    Alexy and Peczenik (1990), p. 137.

  83. 83.

    Webber (2009), p. 68.

  84. 84.

    Alexy (2010c), p. 70.

  85. 85.

    Alexy (2010a), pp. 47, 66–69.

  86. 86.

    Alexy (2012), p. 329.

  87. 87.

    Ibid., p. 329.

  88. 88.

    Alexy (2010b), p. 28.

  89. 89.

    Alexy (2010a), p. 54. Alexy (2000a), p. 297, also refers to this rule as the ‘balancing law’.

  90. 90.

    Alexy (2010a), p. 50, makes explicit reference to Dworkin (1978), p. 26 f.

  91. 91.

    There is no consensus in the literature about how different Dworkin’s approach and the principles theory (or even the BVerfG’s practice) actually are. For instance, Yowell (2007), p. 96, claims that “Dworkin’s approach to rights under the shielded-interest theory is similar to balancing tests,” and according to Hall (2008), p. 772, Dworkin’s theory shares similarities with the BVerfG’s analytical approach as well. C.f. Schlink (2003), pp. 614–617; Tuori (2004), pp. 55–76.

  92. 92.

    Alexy (2010a), pp. 48 (footnote 27), 57–58, 66, 385.

  93. 93.

    Alexy (1979).

  94. 94.

    Dworkin (1967), p. 25.

  95. 95.

    Alexy (2010a), pp. 57–58.

  96. 96.

    Alexy (1979).

  97. 97.

    Alexy (2010a), p. 48.”

  98. 98.

    Dworkin (1985), p. 11. Some criticism over Dworkin’s ‘division of labour’ and account of principles and policies can be found in Miller (2008).

  99. 99.

    Dworkin (1967), pp. 27, 36; (1986), p. 293.

  100. 100.

    Alexy (2010a), pp. 48, footnote 27.

  101. 101.

    Dworkin (1978), p. 27; (1985), p. 77.

  102. 102.

    Dworkin (2006); (2008), p. 27.

  103. 103.

    Dworkin (2011), p. 265.

  104. 104.

    Dworkin (1999).

  105. 105.

    Ibid., pp. 7–11; (1986).

  106. 106.

    Cornell and Friedman (2010), p. 154.

  107. 107.

    STF, Additional Pay Case, RE 146.331 EDv/SP, Judgment of 23 November 2006, Relator: Min. Cezar Peluso, D.J. 20 Apr. 2007.

  108. 108.

    STF, Judicature Act Case, ADI 3.976 MC/SP, Judgment of 14 November 2007, Relator: Min. Ricardo Lewandowski, D.J. 15 Feb. 2008.

  109. 109.

    STF, São Francisco River Case, ACO 876 MC-AgR, Judgment of 19 December 2007, Relator: Min. Menezes Direito, D.J.e. 1 Aug. 2008.

  110. 110.

    STF, Judges Recruitment Case I, MS 28.594/DF, Judgment of 6 October 2011, Relatora: Min. Cármen Lúcia, D.J.e. 205, 19 Oct. 2012; STF, Judges Recruitment Case II, MS 28.603/DF, Judgment of 6 October 2011, Relatora: Min. Cármen Lúcia, D.J.e. 110, 11 Jun. 2012.

  111. 111.

    STF, Political Donors Case, ADI 5394 MC/DF, Judgment of 12 November 2015, STF, Relator: Min. Teori Zavascki, D.J.e. 239, 11 Oct. 2016.

  112. 112.

    STF, Dantas Case, HC 126292/SP, Judgment of 17 February 2016, STF, Relator: Min. Teori Zavascki, D.J.e. 100, 17 May 2016.

  113. 113.

    STF, New Municipalities Case I, ADI 2.240/BA, Judgment of 9 May 2007, Relator: Min. Eros Grau, D.J. 3 Aug. 2007.

  114. 114.

    STF, Chico Mendes Institute Case, ADI 4029/AM, Judgment of 8 March 2012, Relator: Min. Luiz Fux, D.J.e. 125, 27 Jun. 2012.

  115. 115.

    STF, New Municipalities Case II, ADI 3.316/MT, Judgment of 9 May 2007, Relator: Min. Eros Grau, D.J. 29 Jun. 2007; STF, New Municipalities Case III, ADI 3.489/SC, Judgment of 9 May 2007, Relator: Min. Eros Grau, D.J. 3 Aug. 2007; STF, New Municipalities Case IV, ADI 3.689/PA, Judgment of 10 May 2007, Relator: Min. Eros Grau, D.J. 29 Jun. 2007.

  116. 116.

    STF, Unauthorized Biographies Case, ADI 4815/DF, Judgment of 10 June 2015, STF, Relatora: Min. Cármen Lúcia, D.J.e. 18, 1 Feb. 2016.

  117. 117.

    STF, Bull-Toppling Competition Case, ADI 4983/CE, Judgment of 6 October 2016, STF, Relator: Min. Marco Aurélio, D.J.e. 87, Apr. 27, 2017.

  118. 118.

    STF, Criminal Forfeiture Case, RE 638491/PR, Judgment of 17 May 2017, STF, Relator: Min. Luiz Fux, D.J.e. 186, Aug. 23, 2017.

  119. 119.

    STF, Additional Pay Case, RE 146.331 EDv/SP, Judgment of 23 November 2006, Relator: Min. Cezar Peluso, D.J. 20 Apr. 2007.

  120. 120.

    Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988, Article 5, XXXVI: “The law shall not injure the vested right, the perfect juridical act and the res judicata.”

  121. 121.

    Ato das Disposições Constitucionais Transitórias, Article 17: “Earnings, compensation, advantages and additional pay, as well as retirement pensions which are being received in disagreement with this constitution, shall be reduced immediately to the limits arising therefrom, not being allowed, in this case, to invoke a vested right or receipt of excess on any account.”

  122. 122.

    In the original, Alexy (2002), p. 86, quoted in STF, Additional Pay Case, RE 146.331 EDv/SP, Judgment of 23 November 2006, Relator: Min. Cezar Peluso, D.J. 20 Apr. 2007; here, Alexy (2010a), p. 47.

  123. 123.

    STF, Additional Pay Case, RE 146.331 EDv/SP, Judgment of 23 November 2006, Relator: Min. Cezar Peluso, D.J. 20 Apr. 2007 (my translation).

  124. 124.

    Ibid.

  125. 125.

    STF, Judicature Act Case, ADI 3.976 MC/SP, Judgment of 14 November 2007, Relator: Min. Ricardo Lewandowski, D.J. 15 Feb. 2008.

  126. 126.

    Lei Complementar 35, de 14 de março de 1979, D.O.U. 14.03.1979.

  127. 127.

    Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988, Article 93, Main Body: “A supplementary law, proposed by the Supreme Federal Court, shall provide for the Statute of the Judicature.”

  128. 128.

    Constituição (1988), Article 96, I, a: “It is of the exclusive competence of: … the courts: … to elect their directive bodies and to draw up their internal regulations, in compliance with the rules of proceedings and the procedural guarantees of the parties, and regulating the competence and the operation of the respective jurisdictional and administrative bodies.”

  129. 129.

    STF, Judicature Act Case, ADI 3.976 MC/SP, Judgment of 14 November 2007, Relator: Min. Ricardo Lewandowski, D.J. 15 Feb. 2008.

  130. 130.

    STF, New Municipalities Case I, ADI 2.240/BA, Judgment of 9 May 2007, Relator: Min. Eros Grau, D.J. 3 Aug. 2007.

  131. 131.

    Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988, Article 18, paragraph 4 (repealed 1996) (my translation): “The establishment, merger, fusion and dismemberment of municipalities shall preserve the continuity and historic-cultural unity of the urban environment, shall be effected through state law, within the period set forth by supplementary state law, and shall depend on prior consultation by means of a plebiscite with the population of the municipalities directly concerned.”

  132. 132.

    Constituição (1988), Article 18, paragraph 4, with the new wording given by the Constitutional Amendment 15, of 1996: “The establishment, merger, fusion and dismemberment of municipalities shall be effected through state law, within the period set forth by supplementary federal law, and shall depend on prior consultation, by means of a plebiscite, of the population of the municipalities concerned, after the publication of Municipal feasibility studies, presented and published as set forth by law.”

  133. 133.

    STF, New Municipalities Case I, ADI 2.240/BA, Judgment of 9 May 2007, Relator: Min. Eros Grau, D.J. 3 Aug. 2007. In spite of being largely recognized in civil law countries as a sub-principle derived from the rule of law, legal certainty has acquired peculiar features in Brazilian case law. The most important of them is that the principle has been used as an argument for decisions contrary the standard—or most obvious—interpretation of legal rules. Widely shared among Brazilian judges is the belief that legal certainty poses two demands—that law provide enough certainty about what is expected from those commanded by it, and that governmental acts and decisions be enacted according to law—and these demands may conflict under certain circumstances. In cases of conflict, it is common that judges give precedence to the former demand. In other words, they normally treat the principle of legal certainty as a requirement for the maintenance of the status quo, preserving citizens from the consequences of nullifying a governmental act, regardless of its lawlessness. In this sense, legal certainty has been understood as a principle of no surprise.

  134. 134.

    Jurisprudence/Selected Decisions. In: Portal STF Internacional. Accessed 2 April 2013.

  135. 135.

    STF, New Municipalities Case I, ADI 2.240/BA, Judgment of 9 May 2007, Relator: Min. Eros Grau, D.J. 3 Aug. 2007.

  136. 136.

    Alexy (1993b), pp. 86–88, paraphrased in: STF, New Municipalities Case I, ADI 2.240/BA, Judgment of 9 May 2007, Relator: Min. Eros Grau, D.J. 3 Aug. 2007 (my translation).

  137. 137.

    STF, New Municipalities Case I, ADI 2.240/BA, Judgment of 9 May 2007, Relator: Min. Eros Grau, D.J. 3 Aug. 2007 (my translation).

  138. 138.

    Ibid.

  139. 139.

    Jurisprudence/Selected Decisions. In: Portal STF Internacional.

  140. 140.

    STF, New Municipalities Case II, ADI 3.316/MT, Judgment of Mai 2007, Relator: Min. Eros Grau, D.J. 29 Jun. 2007; STF, New Municipalities Case III, ADI 3.489/SC, Judgment of 9 May 2007, Relator: Min. Eros Grau, D.J. 3 Aug. 2007; STF, New Municipalities Case IV, ADI 3.689/PA, Judgment of 10 May 2007, Relator: Min. Eros Grau, D.J. 29 Jun. 2007.

  141. 141.

    STF, São Francisco River Case, ACO 876 MC-AgR, Judgment of 19 December 2007, Relator: Min. Menezes Direito, D.J.e. 1 Aug. 2008.

  142. 142.

    See Castañeda and Webb (2018); Romano and Garcia (1999); Ponce (1995).

  143. 143.

    STF, Rcl 3074/MG, Judgment of 8 April 2005, Relator: Min. Sepúlveda Pertence, D.J. Sep. 9, 2005.

  144. 144.

    Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988, Article 49, XVI: “It is exclusively the competence of the National Congress: … to authorize, in Indigenous lands, the exploitation and use of hydric resources;” and Article 231, Paragraph 3: “hydric resources, including energetic potentials, may only be exploited, and mineral riches in Indigenous land may only be prospected and mined with the authorization of the National Congress, after hearing the communities involved.” (my translation).

  145. 145.

    Schwabe (2005), pp. 859–865, cited in STF, São Francisco River Case, ACO 876 MC-AgR, Judgment of 19 December 2007, Relator: Min. Menezes Direito, D.J.e. 1 Aug. 2008, pp. 105–106 (Justice Mendes’s vote) (my translation). The Kalkar Case I (BVerfG, 49 BVerfGE 89, Judgment of 8 August 1978) was about the license required by the German Atomic Energy Act to construct or operate installations for the production or fission of nuclear fuel.

  146. 146.

    Alexy (1999), pp. 67–69, cited with approval in STF, São Francisco River Case, ACO 876 MC-AgR, Judgment of 19 December 2007, Relator: Min. Menezes Direito, D.J.e. 1 Aug. 2008.

  147. 147.

    STF, São Francisco River Case, ACO 876 MC-AgR, Judgment of 19 December 2007, Relator: Min. Menezes Direito, D.J.e. 1 Aug. 2008 (my translation).

  148. 148.

    Ibid.

  149. 149.

    STF, Judges Recruitment Case I, MS 28.594/DF, Judgment of 6 October 2011, Relatora: Min. Cármen Lúcia, D.J.e. 205, 19 Oct. 2012; STF, Judges Recruitment Case II, MS 28.603/DF, Judgment of 6 October 2011, Relatora: Min. Cármen Lúcia, D.J.e. 110, 11 Jun. 2012.

  150. 150.

    Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988, Article 37, II: “Investiture in a public office or position depends on previously passing an entrance examination consisting of tests or tests and presentation of academic and professional credentials, according to the nature and the complexity of the office or position, as provided by law, except for appointment to a commission office declared by law as being of free appointment and discharge.”

  151. 151.

    Constituição (1988), Article 93, Main Body and I: “A supplementary law … shall provide for the Statute of the Judicature, observing the following principles: … admission into the career, with the initial post of substitute judge, by means of a civil service entrance examination of tests and presentation of academic and professional credentials, with the participation of the Brazilian Bar Association in all phases, at least three years of legal practice being required of holders of a B.A. in law, and obeying the order of classification for appointments.”

  152. 152.

    The notice of examination should provide for qualification requirements and admission procedures in detail, describing the tests and criteria for correction, informing about the positions available, admitted applicants, and so forth. While public authorities in charge have certain discretion as to how they frame the notice of examination, they carry a duty of conducting the procedures rigorously along the lines as drawn in that document. This practice conforms to the largely accepted understanding on the matter, as a very influential author put it, that the notice of examination is “the law governing the competition” and therefore binding all parties, not only applicants, but also the recruitment commission. See in this respect, Meirelles (2010), pp. 369–370.

  153. 153.

    STF, Judges Recruitment Case I, MS 28.594/DF, Judgment of 6 October 2011, Relatora: Min. Cármen Lúcia, D.J.e. 205, 19 Oct. 2012.

  154. 154.

    C.N.J., Procedimento de Controle Administrativo 6090-39.2009.2.00.0000, Judgment of 17 December 2009, Relator: Con. Sílvio Luis Fererira da Rocha, D.J.e. 218, Dec. 12, 2009, 5–28.

  155. 155.

    Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988, Article 5, LV: “Litigants, in judicial or administrative processes, as well as defendants in general, are ensured of the adversary system and of full defence, with the means and resources inherent to it.”

  156. 156.

    STF, Judges Recruitment Case I, MS 28.594/DF, Judgment of 6 October 2011, Relatora: Min. Cármen Lúcia, D.J.e. 205, 19 Oct. 2012 (Justice Fux’s vote) (my translation).

  157. 157.

    Alexy (2008), p. 141, quoted in STF, Judges Recruitment Case I, MS 28.594/DF, Judgment of 6 October 2011, Relatora: Min. Cármen Lúcia, D.J.e. 205, 19 Oct. 2012.

  158. 158.

    STF, Chico Mendes Institute Case, ADI 4029/AM, Judgment of 8 March 2012, Relator: Min. Luiz Fux, D.J.e. 125, 27 Jun. 2012.

  159. 159.

    Häberle (1997), cited in STF, Chico Mendes Institute Case, ADI 4029/AM, Judgment of 8 March 2012, Relator: Min. Luiz Fux, D.J.e. 125, 27 Jun. 2012.

  160. 160.

    Alexy (2008), cited in STF, Chico Mendes Institute Case, ADI 4029/AM, Judgment of 8 March 2012, Relator: Min. Luiz Fux, D.J.e. 125, 27 Jun. 2012 (my translation).

  161. 161.

    STF, Chico Mendes Institute Case, ADI 4029/AM, Judgment of 8 March 2012, Relator: Min. Luiz Fux, D.J.e. 125, 27 Jun. 2012 (my translation).

  162. 162.

    STF, Political Donors Case, ADI 5394 MC/DF, Judgment of 12 November 2015, STF, Relator: Min. Teori Zavascki, D.J.e. 239, 11 Oct. 2016.

  163. 163.

    STF, Dantas Case, HC 126292/SP, Judgment of 17 February 2016, STF, Relator: Min. Teori Zavascki, D.J.e. 100, 17 May 2016.

  164. 164.

    STF, Dantas Case, HC 126292/SP, Judgment of 17 February 2016, STF, Relator: Min. Teori Zavascki, D.J.e. 100, 17 May 2016 (my translation).

  165. 165.

    STF, Unauthorized Biographies Case, ADI 4815/DF, Judgment of 10 June 2015, STF, Relatora: Min. Cármen Lúcia, D.J.e. 18, 1 Feb. 2016.

  166. 166.

    STF, Bull-Toppling Competition Case, ADI 4983/CE, Judgment of 6 October 2016, STF, Relator: Min. Marco Aurélio, D.J.e. 87, Apr. 27, 2017.

  167. 167.

    Ibid. (my translation).

  168. 168.

    STF, Criminal Forfeiture Case, RE 638491/PR, Judgment of 17 May 2017, STF, Relator: Min. Luiz Fux, D.J.e. 186, Aug. 23, 2017.

  169. 169.

    Ibid. (my translation).

  170. 170.

    Alexy (2010a), pp. 82, 416.

  171. 171.

    See e.g., Jestaedt (1999), p. 246; Allan (2012), pp. 135–136.

  172. 172.

    See e.g., Borowski (2010), pp. 31–35; (2013); Sieckmann (1990), pp. 147–148, 152. Other authors suggested that the weight formula should be reviewed as to accommodate a correct account of formal principles. See Klatt and Schmidt (2012), pp. 94–105; Klatt and Meister (2012a), pp. 135–148; Badenhop (2010), pp. 366–367.

  173. 173.

    Compare, for instance, what Alexy (2010b) says at p. 423, with what he says at page 417. Alexy (2012), p. 331, attempted to revise his first ideas about formal principles, but only later, in Alexy (2014a), pp. 19–35, could he succeed in accommodating the two apparently inconsistent models within the principles theory.

  174. 174.

    Borowski (2010), p. 34.

  175. 175.

    Alexy (2010b), p. 82. The combination model is endorsed still nowadays by authors like Borowski (2010), pp. 34–35, notwithstanding a word of warning: “there are instance of formal principles that are not dependent on the balancing of other principles, and to these cases the ‘Law of Combination’ has no application.”

  176. 176.

    Alexy (2010a), p. 417.

  177. 177.

    Alexy (2014b), p. 518, actually speaks of a ‘pure substantive-formal model,’ but I use ‘pure model’ instead for the sake of simplicity. See, e.g., Alexy (2010d) , pp. 175–177, saying that Gustav Radbruch’s formula, which reads, “extreme injustice is not law,” is the outcome of balancing a formal principle (legal certainty) against a substantive one (justice). See also Alexy (2001), p. 428; and Radbruch (2006), p. 7. Borowski (2010), pp. 31–33, accepts the model as well, but only with regard to what he calls independent or first-order formal principles.

  178. 178.

    Alexy (2014a), p. 25; (2014b), p. 520.

  179. 179.

    Alexy (2014a), pp. 33–35.

  180. 180.

    Klatt (2015), p. 17.

  181. 181.

    Alexy (2010a), p. 189.

  182. 182.

    Alexy (2000b), p. 33.

  183. 183.

    BVerfG, 49 BVerfGE 168, Judgment of 26 September 1978, at p. 184.

  184. 184.

    BVerfG (First Senate), Lüth Case, 7 BVerfGE 198, Judgment of 15 January 1958.

  185. 185.

    Schlink (1992), p. 718.

  186. 186.

    Reference is made here to the idea of a vanishing mediator, in Jameson (1988).

  187. 187.

    Dworkin (1999), p. 2 ff.

  188. 188.

    Dworkin (1986), pp. 95–96.

  189. 189.

    Stem-Cells Case (2008); Pretrial-Detention Case I (2009); Press-Law Case (2009); Same-Sex-Union Case I (2011); Same-Sex-Union Case II (2011); Anencephaly Case (2012); Unauthorized Biographies Case (2015); Dantas Case (2016); Criminal Forfeiture Case (2017); Racial Quotas Case (2012); Legal Entity’s Political Donation Case (2015).

  190. 190.

    STF, Same-Sex-Union Case I, ADI 4277/DF, Same-Sex-Union Case II, ADPF 132/DF, Judgment of 5 May 2011, Relator: Min. Ayres Britto, D.J.e. 198, 14 Oct. 2011.

  191. 191.

    STF, Racial Quotas Case, ADPF 186/DF, Judgment of 26 April 2012, Relator: Min. Ricardo Lewandowski, D.J.e. 205, 20 Oct. 2014.

  192. 192.

    STF, HC 84025/RJ, Judgment of 4 March 2004, Relator: Min. Joaquim Barbosa, D.J. 25 Jun. 2004; Stem-Cells Case, ADI 3510/DF, Judgment of 29 May 2008, Relator: Min. Ayres Britto, D.J.e. 28 May 2010; Anencephaly Case, ADPF 54/DF, Judgment of 12 April 2012, Relator: Min. Marco Aurélio, D.J.e. 80, 30 Apr. 2013.

  193. 193.

    STF, Legal Entity’s Political Donation Case, ADI 4650/DF, Judgment of 17 September 2015, Relator: Min. Luiz Fux, D.J.e. 34, 24 Feb. 2016.

  194. 194.

    STF, Press-Law Case, ADPF 130/DF, Judgment of 30 April 2009, Relator: Min. Carlos Britto, D.J.e. 208, 6 Nov. 2009.

  195. 195.

    STF, Same-Sex-Union Case I, ADI 4277/DF; Same-Sex-Union Case II, ADPF 132/DF, Judgment of 5 May 2011, Relator: Min. Ayres Britto, D.J.e. 198, 14 Oct. 2011; Party-Switching Case I, MS 26602/DF, Judgment of 4 October 2007, Relator: Min. Eros Grau, D.J.e. 197, 17 Oct. 2008; Party-Switching Case II, MS 26603/DF, Judgment of 4 October 2007, Relator: Min. Celso de Mello, D.J.e. 241, 19 Oct. 2008; Party-Switching Case III, MS 26604/DF, Judgment of 4 October 2007, Relatora: Min. Cármen Lúcia, D.J.e. 187, 3 Oct. 2008.

  196. 196.

    Alexy (1995), p. 183.

  197. 197.

    Alexy (1991), pp. 75–78.

  198. 198.

    Dworkin (1986), pp. 355–357.

  199. 199.

    Dworkin (1999), pp. 291–305. C.f. Beatty (2004), p. 4, affirming: “constitutional exhortations proclaiming the inviolability of life, liberty, and equality … tell judges very little about how to solve the hard, real-life disputes they are called upon to decide;” and Schlink (1991), p. 1715: “what were once problems of justice, as opposed to problems of legality, have penetrated the legal system.”

  200. 200.

    Bonavides (2008).

  201. 201.

    Cittadino (2009), p. 46.

  202. 202.

    Sarlet (2009).

  203. 203.

    See, e.g., Barros (1996); (2006); Castro (2003); Grau (1990); da Silva (2010).

  204. 204.

    Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988, Article 5, XXIII: “Property shall observe its social function.”

  205. 205.

    Constituição (1988), Article 5, XXXII: “The state shall provide, as set forth by law, for the defense of consumers.”

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Andrade Neto, J. (2018). A System of Rules and Principles. In: Borrowing Justification for Proportionality. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 72. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02263-1_4

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