Abstract
Autonomy and responsibility are interrelated concepts particularly important to moral analysis of professional persons, organizations and institutions. The complementary ideals of these concepts allow for a basic groundwork for understanding professional capabilities, and for laying moral praise and blame. Since much of the work of ethics, particularly professional ethics, hinges on (a) a person or organization’s ability to function well, and (b) the placement of praise and blame on moral agents or organizations, it is evident why a substantial exploration of these concepts within the sphere of professionalism is crucial to this book. This chapter will begin by reviewing the conceptual basis of each term – autonomy and responsibility. It will follow by applying these concepts to individual agents and professional organizations, focusing on traditional individual and organizational moral issues in journalism. Ultimately, this chapter will discuss the difficulties journalistic bureaucracies raise for evaluating moral responsibility of journalists, largely because institutional corruptors compromise other journalists’ autonomy in crucial ways.
Much of this chapter appeared as an article in International Journal of Applied Philosophy titled “Autonomy and Responsibility in the Practice of Journalism” in 2008. Many thanks to the editors and publisher for permission to include it in this work.
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Notes
- 1.
Avoidability and foreseeability comprise the two conditions of a widely-accepted account of moral responsibility. “That is, I am morally responsible for consequences C if and only if they are among the foreseeable results of what I could have reasonably avoided doing” (Oakley and Cocking 1994, p.205–206). For further support of the foreseeability and avoidability conditions of moral responsibility, see: Audi, Robert (1974). Moral Responsibility, Freedom, and Compulsion, American Philosophical Quarterly. Barnes, W.H.F. (1945). Intention, Motive and Responsibility. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, pp.230–248. Brand, Myles (1970). Ability, Possibility and Power. The Nature of Human Action, Myles Brand (ed.). Glenview, Illinois. pp. 130–131. Buckley, F.B. (1956). Analysis of ‘X could have acted otherwise’. Philosophical Studies, Vol. 2, pp. 69–74.
- 2.
A vast literature has developed in this area since the mid-1980s. Among them, some of the most influential are: Bagdikian, Ben (2000). The Media Monopoly, Sixth ed. Beacon Press. Bagdikian, Ben (2004). The New Media Monopoly. Boston: Beacon Press. Edward, Herman & Chomsky, Noam (1988). Manufacturing Consent. Pantheon Books. McChesney, Robert W. & Nichols, John (2002). Our Media Not Theirs. New York: Seven Stories Press. McChesney, Robert. (1999). Rich Media, Poor Democracy. University of Illinois Press.
- 3.
Though a variety of standards exist for determining who is a legitimate candidate for euthanasia, I take here recent standards in the Netherlands for euthanasia. Roughly, what are called “due-care standards” include that all evaluations and procedures must be carried out by a doctor; the patient must have made a voluntary, well-considered and persistent request, and must be experiencing unbearable suffering with no prospect of improvement. The patient’s doctor must also have consulted at least one other independent doctor (Netherlands Minister of Health, Welfare and Sport 2003).
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Quinn, A. (2018). Autonomy and Moral Responsibility in Journalism. In: Virtue Ethics and Professional Journalism . Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01428-5_4
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