Abstract
Resource sharing while preserving privacy is an increasingly important problem due to a wide-scale adoption of cloud computing. Under multitenancy, it is common to have multiple mutually distrustful “processes” (e.g. cores, threads, etc.) running on the same system simultaneously. This paper explores a new approach for automatically identifying and quantifying the information leakage in protocols that arbitrate utilization of shared resources between processes. Our approach is based on symbolic execution of arbiter protocols to extract constraints relating adversary observations to victim requests, then using model counting constraint solvers to quantify the information leaked. We present enumerative and optimized methods of exact model counting, and apply our methods to a set of nine different arbiter protocols, quantifying their leakage under different scenarios and allowing for informed comparison.
This material is based on research sponsored by DARPA under the agreement number FA8750-15-2-0087 and the National Science Foundation under Grants No. 1740352, 1730309, 1717779, 1563935. The U.S. Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for Governmental purposes notwithstanding any copyright notation thereon. The views and conclusions contained herein are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied, of DARPA or the U.S. Government.
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Tsiskaridze, N., Bang, L., McMahan, J., Bultan, T., Sherwood, T. (2018). Information Leakage in Arbiter Protocols. In: Lahiri, S., Wang, C. (eds) Automated Technology for Verification and Analysis. ATVA 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11138. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01090-4_24
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01090-4_24
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