Advertisement

Bank Regulation Today

Chapter
  • 151 Downloads
Part of the Palgrave Studies in Economic History book series (PEHS)

Abstract

Having reviewed the approach to bank regulation taken in the period from 1946 to the early 1970s, this chapter reflects upon the nature of bank regulation and supervision since the global financial crisis. The response to the crisis has tended to be technocratic, reflecting a preference—which began to emerge in the 1970s—for codified, detailed and often highly technical rules, evident, for example, in the revised requirements for bank capital. These rules have emanated from national legislation, EU directives and regulations, and Basel III, and have been accompanied by the further development of complex regulatory and supervisory structures. This raises the question as to whether the very strong focus on codified rules has been at the expense of regulation in other forms.

Keywords

Basel III Capital Requirements Directive IV package Legitimacy Codified regulation Global financial crisis Deposit insurance 

References

Secondary Sources

  1. Books and ArticlesGoogle Scholar
  2. Admati, Anat, and Martin Hellwig. The Bankers’ New Clothes: What’s Wrong with Banking and What to Do About It. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013.Google Scholar
  3. Barth, James R., Gerard Caprio Jr., and Ross Levine. “Bank Regulation and Supervision: What Works Best?” Journal of Financial Intermediation 13, (2004): 205–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems. Bank for International Settlements, December 2010, revised June 2011. Accessed 31 July 2018. http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf.
  5. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and Liquidity Risk Monitoring Tools. Bank for International Settlements, January 2013. Accessed 20 August 2018. http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.pdf.
  6. Beck, Thorsten, Olivier De Jonghe, and Glenn Schepens. “Bank Competition and Stability: Cross-Country Heterogeneity.” Journal of Financial Intermediation 22, no. 2 (2013): 218–44. Accessed 24 March 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2012.07.001.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Billings, Mark, and Forrest Capie. “Capital in British Banking, 1920–1970.” Business History 49, no. 2 (March 2007): 139–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Calomiris, Charles W., and Stephen H. Haber. Fragile by Design: The Political Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014. Reprint, 2016.Google Scholar
  9. Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli, and Enrica Detragiache. “Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability? An Empirical Investigation.” Journal of Monetary Economics 49, (2002): 1373–1406.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Jordà, Òscar, Björn Richter, Moritz Schularick, and Alan M. Taylor. “Bank Capital Redux: Solvency, Liquidity, and Crisis, Working Paper 23287.” NBER Working Paper Series, National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2017. 1–37.Google Scholar
  11. Kobrak, Christopher, and Michael Troege. “From Basel to Bailouts: Forty Years of International Attempts to Bolster Bank Safety.” Financial History Review 22, no. 2 (2015): 133–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Navajas, Matias Costa, and Aaron Thegeya. “Financial Soundness Indicators and Banking Crises.” IMF Working Papers, IMF, 2013. 1–38.Google Scholar
  13. Schaeck, Klaus, and Martin Čihák. “Banking Competition and Capital Ratios, WP/07/216.” IMF Working Papers, International Monetary Fund, September 2007. 1–40.Google Scholar
  14. Schenk, Catherine. “Bank Regulation and Supervision.” In The Oxford Handbook of Banking and Financial History, edited by Youssef Cassis, Catherine Schenk, and Richard Grossman. Oxford: Oxford University Press, July 2016. Accessed 6 January 2017. http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199658626.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199658626-e-19.
  15. Searle, John R. “What Is an Institution?” Journal of Institutional Economics 1, no. 1 (2005): 1–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Tyler, Tom R. “Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: The Benefits of Self-Regulation.” Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 7 (2009): 307–59.Google Scholar
  17. Vogel, Steven K. Freer Markets, More Rules: Regulatory Reform in Advanced Industrial Countries. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of ReadingReadingUK

Personalised recommendations