Abstract
In this paper, we try to confront Robert Audis moral epistemology, namely his intuitionism, based on the concept of a self-evident moral proposition, with two main problems: disagreement and dogmatism within moral discourse. Although Audi can meet those classical objections in his theory, we think that some problems remain. We proceed – after an introduction – in five sections in order to pursue this end. After a short introductory section, we first reconstruct the classical intuitionist moral epistemology (Sect. 6.2). We then discuss the dogmatism and the disagreement objection and, in doing so, introduce Audi’s own version of a moral epistemology (Sect. 6.3.1). After having proposed that the disagreement objection concerns an explanatory problem (Sect. 6.3.2), we discuss a second version, namely disagreement as a problem of rationality (Sect. 6.4). In the fourth section we present a third version, disagreement as a problem of moral discourse, understood as an intersubjective enterprise (Sect. 6.5). In the fifth section we propose a solution to disagreement situations of this kind (Sect. 6.6).
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Notes
- 1.
“Some contemporary moral intuitionists, e.g., Huemer and Enoch, reject talk of self-evident moral propositions, but nonetheless regard moral intuitions as basic sources of evidence.” (Stratton-Lake 2016, 39).
- 2.
Such pluralism is not held by all intuitionists. For this reason Stratton-Lake only discusses the ontological and epistemological claims of intuitionism (Stratton-Lake 2016). While defending pluralism, Audi himself does not take it as a necessary element for some account to be intuitionistic (see Audi 2004, 25 and 205, note 21).
- 3.
For many intuitionists their ontology consists in the claim “that moral properties are non-natural properties” (Stratton-Lake 2016, 1). Audi does not hold a non-naturalist view on the ontic grounding of moral propositions but, as it seems, a consequentialist view on moral properties (Audi 2015b, 68). But he takes his position to be neutral concerning questions of natural/non-natural properties (see Audi 2004, 21): “I do not take non-naturalism as basic in an intuitionist ethics as such, and it will become clear in this and later chapters how few distinctively intuitionist […] claims depend on it. But the major intuitionists have denied naturalism; and in part because of Moore’s influential case against it, intuitionism is typically considered a non-naturalist view, and the main points in this book will be compatible with so interpreting it.”
- 4.
S.Th.I-II 94, art. 2, Resp.
- 5.
Let’s call this the discourse-rule of dogmatism-avoidance (DA). Given that discourse and therefore moral discourse aims at searching for truth and finding consensus concerning controversial matters, DA can be made plausible by showing that non-DA, the allowance of dogmatism, is counter the aim of moral discourse. As long as one accepts this aim one seems to be committed to accept DA as well.
- 6.
Strictly speaking: One should not hold (A1).
- 7.
Same as Fn 6.
- 8.
For Crisp’s critique see Crisp 2007.
- 9.
Audi mentions this proposition in Audi 2008, 477, although he is using its negative form “that capital punishment is wrong”.
- 10.
Audi 2008, 490.
- 11.
Huemer draws a different threefold distinction: “One [problem] is that the occurrence of disagreement entails that morality is not objective. Another is that intuitionists cannot plausibly explain disagreement or error. The last is that intuitionists have no method of resolving disagreements.” (Huemer 2005, 128). Our second and third versions are a more fine-grained differentiation of Huemer’s third one.
- 12.
Apel’s “philosophical approach of a Transcendental Pragmatics of Communication” (Kettner 2017, 325).
References
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Meyer, T., Rojek, T. (2018). Ethical Intuitionism and the Problem of Dogmatism. In: Müller-Salo, J. (eds) Robert Audi: Critical Engagements. Münster Lectures in Philosophy, vol 5. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00482-8_6
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