Abstract
Transparency is crucial in security-critical applications that rely on authoritative information, as it provides a robust mechanism for holding these authorities accountable for their actions. A number of solutions have emerged in recent years that provide transparency in the setting of certificate issuance, and Bitcoin provides an example of how to enforce transparency in a financial setting. In this work we shift to a new setting, the distribution of software package binaries, and present a system for so-called “binary transparency.” Our solution, Contour, uses proactive methods for providing transparency, privacy, and availability, even in the face of persistent man-in-the-middle attacks. We also demonstrate, via benchmarks and a test deployment for the Debian software repository, that Contour is the only system for binary transparency that satisfies the efficiency and coordination requirements that would make it possible to deploy today.
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Acknowledgements
Mustafa Al-Bassam is supported by a scholarship from the Alan Turing Institute, and Sarah Meiklejohn is supported by EPSRC grant EP/N028104/1.
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Al-Bassam, M., Meiklejohn, S. (2018). Contour: A Practical System for Binary Transparency. In: Garcia-Alfaro, J., Herrera-Joancomartí, J., Livraga, G., Rios, R. (eds) Data Privacy Management, Cryptocurrencies and Blockchain Technology. DPM CBT 2018 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11025. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00305-0_8
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