Abstract
Accurate risk assessment of safety-related systems involving software is a hard engineering problem for well-known reasons. We present two case studies in the use of Ontological Hazard Analysis (OHA), a semi-formal method for hazard identification and analysis aiding Correct-by-Construction (CbC) approaches to developing such systems. OHA controls very carefully the means of expression of safety requirements, starting with a simple semi-formal language and proceeding to more expressive requirements through formal refinement, a decades-old technique for CbC program development developed in the computerscience theory community. In the case studies, the use of OHA allows the risk assessment of the systems through known techniques, avoiding the general problems posed by non-continuity which are inherent in attempting to assess the risk of systems based on software.
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© 2009 Springer-Verlag London Limited
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Stuphorn, J., Sieker, B., Ladkin, P.B. (2009). Dependable Risk Analysis for Systems with E/E/PE Components: Two Case Studies. In: Dale, C., Anderson, T. (eds) Safety-Critical Systems: Problems, Process and Practice. Springer, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-84882-349-5_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-84882-349-5_6
Publisher Name: Springer, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-84882-348-8
Online ISBN: 978-1-84882-349-5
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