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Abstract

“Game theory is a branch of mathematics that is concerned with the actions of individuals who are conscious that their actions affect each other”. As such, game theory (hereafter GT) deals with interactive optimisation problems. While many economists in the past few centuries have worked on what can be considered game-theoretical (hereafter G-T) models, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern are formally credited as the fathers of modern game theory. Their classic book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior [1] summarises the basic concepts existing at that time. GT has since enjoyed an explosion of developments, including the concept of equilibrium [2], games with imperfect information [3], cooperative games [4, 5], and auctions [6], to name just a few. Citing Shubik [7], “In the 50s ... game theory was looked upon as a curiosum not to be taken seriously by any behavioural scientist. By the late 1980s, game theory in the new industrial organisation has taken over: game theory has proved its success in many disciplines.”

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(2008). Game Theory: an Overview. In: Argoneto, P., Perrone, G., Renna, P., Lo Nigro, G., Bruccoleri, M., La Diega, S.N. (eds) Production Planning in Production Networks. Springer, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-84800-058-2_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-84800-058-2_2

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