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Neural Simulation and Social Cognition

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Mirror Neuron Systems

Part of the book series: Contemporary Neuroscience ((CNEURO))

Abstract

This article reviews the claim that mirror neurons are simulating neurons and the basis of an implicit simulation theory in regard to how we understand other persons. I claim that the equation of mirror system activation with an implicit simulation is unjustified, and I offer an alternative interpretation of the scientific data. The alternative considers mirror system activation as underlying part of an enactive perception in the social context.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Elsewhere, however, Iacoboni does invoke mindreading: “Mirror neurons suggest that we pretend to be in another person's mental shoes. In fact, with mirror neurons we do not have to pretend, we practically are in another person's mind. … You either simulate with mirror neurons, or the mental states of others are completely precluded to you” (quoted in Than 2005).

  2. 2.

    See Gallagher (2007) for this and other objections to explicit ST.

  3. 3.

    The requirement that the simulation has to be concretely similar also raises problems for the instrumental and pretense conditions even for the explicit version of ST. If our simulation has to be concretely similar to the simulated state for it to be considered a simulation, assuming explicit instrumental control of our simulation process, how will we know how to run or control our simulation unless we already know in some detail what the other’s state is like. And how do we come by that knowledge? If the answer is through simulation, then we have an infinite regress. In regard to explicit pretense, Fisher (2006), who models simulation as a reasoning process, rejects this aspect as inconsistent with simulation being concretely similar, for if we simulate a reasoning process, we are really reasoning, and not just pretending to.

  4. 4.

    Csibra concludes: “With strongly unequal distribution of types of action or types of grip, one could find a relatively high proportion of good match between the [observed action vs executed action] domains even if there were no causal relation between them. Without such a statistical analysis, it remains uncertain whether the cells that satisfy the definition of ‘mirror neurons' (i.e., the ones that discharge both with execution and observation of actions) do indeed have 'mirror properties' in the everyday use of this term (i.e., are generally activated by the same action in both domains)” (2005, 3).

  5. 5.

    In the phenomenological tradition, this idea of kinaesthetic coordination was expressed by Husserl as early as 1908 (see Husserl 1973). See Berthoz and Petit (2006).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Philosophy and Cognitive Sciences, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL, USA

    Shaun Gallagher

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  1. Shaun Gallagher
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Correspondence to Shaun Gallagher .

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  1. University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA, USA

    Jaime A. Pineda

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Gallagher, S. (2008). Neural Simulation and Social Cognition. In: Pineda, J.A. (eds) Mirror Neuron Systems. Contemporary Neuroscience. Humana Press. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-59745-479-7_16

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