Fixations on the Moral Status of the Embryo

Abstract

In the field of regenerative medicine, embryonic stem cell research holds far-reaching promise in alleviating and preventing an array of debilitating diseases and conditions. Yet the biggest ethical stumbling block continues to be conflicting beliefs about the moral status of the human embryo. This has in turn produced heated debate concerning what constitutes the justifiable sourcing of stem cells, leading to the distinction between use and derivation. This essay addresses a wide range of these conflicting perspectives on the moral status of the embryo and asserts that resolving the controversy is notably hampered due to harmful fixations on aspects of the dispute. The study highlights four distinct fixations. These fixations consist of the following: adhering to an inflexible notion of moral status; seeking a single developmental determinant that warrants moral status either during or after gestation; exaggerating the significance of the embryo at the expense of other morally relevant considerations; and deliberating the issue solely within the contours of Western philosophical principles and values. Although there will most likely be no consensus on the embryo’s moral status, discussion can only generate possible dialogue if we free ourselves from these fixations. Doing so would require at minimum cultivating a flexible notion of moral status as well as multiple standards for moral status eligibility. In the final analysis, the real practical concern is one of policy. This concern must carefully consider what constitutes responsible use of excess embryos, embryos that, in the author’s opinion, lack sufficient moral status that would entitle them to full protection from manipulation.