Abstract
In “Abortion and Fathers’ Rights,”1 Steven Hales argues that there is a prima facie inconsistency in asserting that:
-
1.
Women have a moral right to abortion on demand, at their discretion, i.e., a right that cannot be vetoed by the father or any other person;
-
2.
Men and women have equal moral rights and duties and should have equal legal rights and duties; and
-
3.
Parents have a moral duty to provide support for their children once they are born, and legal duties of support should supervene on this moral duty.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes and References
Steven D. Hales, Abortion and Fathers ’ Rights,in this volume, pp. 325 (Hereafter, AFR).
Ordinarily, we do not think that men possess the right to abort. Thus it might appear that Hales could drop all reference to principle (3) and simply argue that the conjunction of (1), and (2) is inconsistent. However, Hales does not take this tack because he allows that this inconsistency could be avoided by either: (a) declaring (trivially) that men have the right to abort, or (b) by saying that principle (2) applies only when biological differences do not make it absurd to ascribe the same rights to men and women (AFR, 5).
This is one possible interpretation of what Hales means when he says: “The mother does not especially have the right to kill the fetus: rather, what she has is a right not to have to deal with it any more in the future. Abortion itself might be looked at as [a] means, or a mechanism, of avoiding certain future duties.” (AFR, 3).
Stating Hales’ position in this way assumes that Hales is operating with some sort of ascriptive theory of rights. However, the tenor of Hales’ essay is such that this assumption seems justified.
Although Hales clearly wants to claim that possession of the right to abort gives women a right to avoid future duties and that this creates an inconsistency among principles (1), (2), and (3), there are times when he intimates that he would be willing to accept the above reformulation of his argument. For example, he says that abortion is a right that makes it “morally permissible [for women] to avoid future hardships...” (AFR, 6), thus suggesting that it is a right that does nothing more than allow (or permit) women to avoid the duties of (3). Moreover, when Hales conceives of abortion as simply the right to end one’s pregnancy, i.e., as not entailing a supposed “right” to avoid future duties, he asserts that “the father still lacks something that the mother possesses: a legitimate mechanism for avoiding future duties.” He then assumes that this state of affairs needs to be “rectified,” thus implying that it is unjust (AFR, 7).
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics,Book V.
Hales seems to assume that men and women are equally responsible for conception, and here I simply accept this presupposition as true. It is worth noting, however, that the assumption of equal responsibility is very often false, and that there are many cases where men are more responsible than women for the onset of pregnancy. For example, women are sometimes tricked into having intercourse by lies and deception; there also are numerous cases where women use birth control mechanisms that just happen to fail, while their male partners show a total lack of responsibility in this regard. In all such cases it is possible to argue that allowing women to abort is fair because it provides them with a mechanism for avoiding the deleterious consequences of their lovers’ coercive and/or negligent actions.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1996 Springer Science+Business Media New York
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Humber, J.M. (1996). Maternity, Paternity, and Equality. In: Humber, J.M., Almeder, R.F. (eds) Reproduction, Technology, and Rights. Biomedical Ethics Reviews. Humana Press, Totowa, NJ. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-59259-450-4_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-59259-450-4_2
Publisher Name: Humana Press, Totowa, NJ
Print ISBN: 978-1-4757-6403-1
Online ISBN: 978-1-59259-450-4
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive