Abstract
Professor Samuel Gorovitz contends that Congress should pass legisla-tion prohibiting the commercial brokering of human organs.1 The fact that he holds such a view is significant, for Gorovitz believes “the government should exercise great caution in enacting prohibitions on behavior,” and that restrictive legislation ought to be enacted only when the government “can sustain a persuasive justification” for doing so.1 It is only because Gorovitz believes there is a persuasive justification for prohibiting the buying and selling of human body parts that he advocates proscriptive legislation, and in his testimony before the House Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight he goes to some pains to develop that justification. Like Gorovitz, I believe our government needs a compelling justification if it is to properly impose legislative restrictions upon the behavior of its citizens. On the other hand, I do not believe that Gorovitz’s testimony before the House Sub-committee provides that justification; indeed, I believe there are good reasons that a commercial market in human body parts should not be legislated out of existence. In what follows, I am going to support both of these views. I shall begin by critically evaluating Gorovitz’s argu-ments against the establishment of a commercial market in human body parts. Once the deficiencies in these arguments have been noted, I will explain why I think it would be wrong to prohibit the buying and selling of human organs.
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Notes and References
Samuel Gorovitz (11/9/83) “Testimony: House Subcommittee on Investi-gation and Oversight,” in this volume, pp. 3–12.
For Gorovitz, the ideal solution to the present shortage of transplant or-gans would be to bring about “a massive shift in national sentiment about transplantation—a shift that would greatly increase participation in donation plans, and would also greatly diminish the barriers, psychological and eco-nomic, to participation by the medical profession in efficient collection and distribution of organs.. ”
Of course, it is always possible that a dishonest broker could break the law, turn off the videotape recorder, and secretly tell a prospective kidney donor that the risk of donation was much lower than the government’s “official” estimate. This being so, one might be tempted to argue that kidney brokerage firms ought to be legislatively prohibited because it is only in this way that potential donors can be completely protected against fraud and mis-representation. However, there are two reasons this argument must be re-jected. First, proscriptive legislation does not provide a complete protection against fraud, for if kidney brokerage firms were outlawed, underground transaction might still occur. And second, Gorovitz claims—quite rightly, I think— that the government has no business prohibiting actions merely be-cause they could conceivably lead to abuses. Thus, the fact that some brokers might be dishonest does not justify prohibiting kidney brokerage firms from doing business. Rather, the proper course of action would seem to be to allow such firms to exist, and then close those that were found to be run dishonestly.
Gorovitz does not argue that the poor and oppressed in our society are in-capable of understanding the risks involved in organ donation when they are correctly informed regarding those risks; however, others may want to ad-vance such an argument. I deal briefly with this issue later in this chapter.
Robert Arrington (1983) Advertising and Behavior Control in Business Ethics (M. Snoeyenbos, R. Almeder, and J. Humber) Prometheus Books, Buffalo, NY.
If this is what Gorovitz means, his argument as a whole is contradictory. That is to say, one cannot claim that the poor will be coerced into selling their organs by excessive financial inducements, and then argue that human organs are invaluable.
Franz Ingelfinger (1979) Informed (But Uneducated) Consent in Biomedical Ethics and the Law (J. Humber and R. Almeder) 2nd Ed., Plenum, New York.
John Fletcher (1979) Realities of Patient to Consent to Medical Research in Biomedical Ethics and the Law (J. Humber and R. Almeder,) 2nd Ed., Plenum, New York.
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Humber, J. (1985). Coercion, Paternalism, and the Buying and Selling of Human Organs. In: Humber, J.M., Almeder, R.F. (eds) Biomedical Ethics Reviews · 1985. Biomedical Ethics Reviews. Humana Press, Totowa, NJ. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-59259-441-2_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-59259-441-2_2
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