Abstract
There are two major types of adversaries against low-latency anonymity systems: (1) passive; and (2) active. The passive adversary is assumed to be able to observe part or all communication traffic between network nodes without changing anything of the observed traffic. The active adversary, on the other hand, is assumed to be able to change or perturb, in addition to observing, traffic between network nodes. Since the active adversary is more powerful than the passive adversary, the two types of adversaries may lead to fundamentally different limitations of low-latency anonymity systems. Therefore, we will examine the impact of two types of adversaries separately.
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Notes
- 1.
In case there are packets dropped, we only consider those packets received and the corresponding packets sent.
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Wang, X., Reeves, D. (2015). Fundamental Limitations in Low-Latency Anonymity Systems. In: Traceback and Anonymity. SpringerBriefs in Computer Science. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4939-3441-6_6
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