Abstract
In this chapter, we introduce and sketch central themes in the contemporary political philosophy of justice. We restrict ourselves to one particular tradition, namely the one that can loosely be called “analytical political philosophy,” and for reasons we explain in the chapter, we take the work of John Rawls as the starting point of our interpretation. Even with this restriction, it is not possible to take into account all important modern developments within this tradition. Therefore, we further restrict our focus to some specific questions and areas. In particular, we first discuss the Rawlsian claim that the basic structure is the first or primary subject of justice. Discussions of the basic structure and the implications of this Rawlsian view have been central and agenda-setting in the modern development of analytical political philosophy. Consequently, we examine prominent and differing interpretations of both (a) how the basic structure is to be understood and (b) what it means for the basic structure to be the primary subject of justice. On this basis, we then discuss different claims regarding the scope of principles of justice, in particular distributive justice. This then leads to a discussion of the extensions of justice in space and time, of whether and, if so, how principles of justice developed to apply within single societies could apply to relations between people who are not members of the same state or who belong to non-overlapping generations. In recent years, these two areas of international (or global) and intergenerational justice have seen a comparatively large increase in interest. We conclude by outlining a few additional research questions that we think are, and ought to be, of central importance in thinking philosophically about justice, in particular when the research is meant to contribute to an understanding of the relevance of ideals of justice in addressing the reality of a less-than-just status quo.
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Notes
- 1.
We describe some of these developments later in this essay.
- 2.
Rawls himself uses the term “peoples” and peoples are not the same as states.
- 3.
- 4.
See the next section for extensive discussion of this idea.
- 5.
One of the central issues in the debate has been to work out what the relevant goods are for principles of distributive justice. This is the so-called “equality-of-what” question (Sen, 1980). Some of the important candidates that have been proposed as the currency of distributive justice are equality of opportunity (for resources, or welfare, or both, with the latter construed as equality of access to advantage), equality of resources directly, capabilities and basic needs. See also Braybrooke (1987), Cohen (1989), Dworkin (1981), Nussbaum (1992), Nussbaum (2000), Sen (1992).
- 6.
Rawls does not ignore the importance of immigration (see Rawls, 1993, p. 136, fn. 4). But he considers that it is appropriate to “abstract from it to get an uncluttered view of the fundamental question of political philosophy” (Rawls, 1993), namely what principles of justice should govern a society that “is to be conceived as a fair system of cooperation over time between generations” (Rawls, 1993, p. 18). The question of immigration is to be dealt with a later stage, when “discussing the appropriate relations between peoples, or the law of peoples” (Rawls, 1993, p. 136, fn. 4).
- 7.
This issue was famously the site of one of the important feminist objections to Rawls’s theory, which argued that the family, despite being what Rawls would call an affectional association, is an institution that does belong to the basic structure and is subject to the principles of justice (see Kittay, 1999; Okin, 1989).
- 8.
Rawls justifies the idea of the basic structure as the first subject of justice coherently in terms of his method of the reflective equilibrium (see e.g., Rawls, 1993; fn. 8, and see Sect. 2.1, above): The main ideas justify each other; the justification of the idea of the basic structure is based on identifying a systematic connection with the other main ideas. Thus many of the considerations that Rawls presents in favor of the idea of the basic structure are connected with the other main ideas of his conception of justice as fairness.
- 9.
As Ryan (2012) shows in his excellent account of the history of political philosophy.
- 10.
Our claim is not that these subjects were new. There is a history of thinking about international justice (see e.g., Coulmas, 1990; Held, 1995; Beitz, 2005; Höffe, 2007) and intergenerational justice (see e.g., Birnbacher, 1988, Chapter 1; Jonas, 1984; Muniz-Fraticelly, 2009). Our claim is rather that in the last 30 years there has been a significant amount of work done on these issues (see e.g., Meyer & Roser, 2010 (on intergenerational justice); Blake & Smith, 2013 (on international distributive justice)).
- 11.
There are important other debates in the field of trans- and international justice that, owing to limitations of space, we do not discuss. For example questions of justice as related to issues such as immigration, just war theory, humanitarian intervention and assistance, territorial rights, colonialism, international trade.
- 12.
Another seminal work of Rawlsian cosmopolitanism is Pogge (1989).
- 13.
As we saw in the previous sections, this has also been a very important issue in the context of domestic justice. It is fair to say that some of the motivation for this work is owed precisely to the importance of the issue for discussions of global justice.
- 14.
His arguments are not entirely clear, nor is it entirely clear why his paper has had the influence it has had, but nonetheless, it has, and it will therefore be necessary to sketch his position a little.
- 15.
- 16.
- 17.
- 18.
There are many different understandings of what it is for a situation to be non-ideal; the classical contemporary formulation is found by Rawls, but since then there have been many different accounts. See Rawls (1999a, 2001), Murphy (2000), Buchanan (2004), Sen (2009), Simmons (2010), Meyer and Sanklecha (2009, 2011).
- 19.
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Meyer, L.H., Sanklecha, P. (2016). Philosophy of Justice: Extending Liberal Justice in Space and Time. In: Sabbagh, C., Schmitt, M. (eds) Handbook of Social Justice Theory and Research. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4939-3216-0_2
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