Comparison of Approaches for Adversary Modeling Decision Support for Counterterrorism

Part of the Understanding Complex Systems book series (UCS)

Abstract

Intelligent adversaries are a fundamental component of terrorism risk analysis. Unlike natural and engineering hazards, intelligent adversaries adapt their behavior to the actions of the defender. They adapt to observed, perceived, and imputed likely future actions by those defending the system they are attempting to influence. Risk assessment models need to consider these potential adaptive behaviors to be able to provide accurate estimates of future risk from intelligent adversaries and appropriately support risk management decision making.

Keywords

Explosive Nash Defend Metaphor 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Old Dominion University’s, Virginia Modeling, Analysis and Simulation CenterSuffolkUSA
  2. 2.Department of Industrial EngineeringUniversity of ArkansasFayettevilleUSA

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