Skip to main content

Estimating Consumer Surplus in eBay Computer Monitor Auctions

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
  • 1798 Accesses

Abstract

Our paper utilizes semi-nonparametric and nonparametric methods to directly estimate consumer surplus in eBay computer monitor sales. We compare these with parametric estimates. We also develop a new measure of how competitive an auction is—the consumer share of surplus—and a new method to calculate these statistics. This distribution free methodology requires the assumption that the pool of potential bidders is constant across auctions, but it is not sensitive to the upper tail and does not require estimating the underlying distribution of values.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Specifically, Lucking-Reiley et al. (2007) focused on U.S. Indian Head pennies minted between 1859 and 1909, auctions in which only one coin was for sale, and the coin was in mint state (MS) with grades of between 60 and 66 on a 70-point scale.

  2. 2.

    See, for example, the website at http://www.baywotch.de/. We thank Rouwen Hahn from the University of Münster, Germany for this information.

References

  • Adams CP (2007) Estimating demand from eBay prices. Int J Ind Organ 25:1213–1232

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Athey S, Haile PA (2002) Identification of standard auction models. Econometrica 65:1097–1128

    Google Scholar 

  • Athey S, Haile PA (2005) Nonparametric approaches to auctions. In: Heckman JJ, Leamer E (eds) Handbook of econometrics, vol 6. Elsevier, Amsterdam

    Google Scholar 

  • Bajari P, Hortaçsu A (2003) Winner’s curse, reserve prices and endogenous entry: empirical insights from eBay auctions. RAND J Econ 34:329–355

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bapna R, Goes P, Gupta A (2003a) Analysis and design of business-to-consumer online auctions. Manag Sci 49:85–101

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bapna R, Goes P, Gupta A (2003b) Replicating online yankee auctions to analyze auctioneers’ and bidders’ strategies. Inf Syst Res 14:244–268

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bapna R, Goes P, Gupta A, Jin Y (2004) User heterogeneity and its impact on electronic auction market design: an empirical exploration. MIS Q 28:21–43

    Google Scholar 

  • Bapna R, Jank W, Shmueli G (2008) Consumer surplus in online auctions. Inf Syst Res 19:400–416

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bulbul Toklu S (2010) Methodology: structural parametric and nonparametric methods for online auctions. Mimeo. Available at http://www.owlnet.rice.edu/~seda.bulbul/

  • Carare O (2001) Need for speed: demand estimation using auction data. Economics Working Paper, Rutgers University. Available at http://econweb.rutgers.edu/carare/ns.pdf

  • Coppejans M, Gallant AR (2002) Cross-validated snp density estimates. J Econ 110:27–65

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ely JC, Hossain T (2009) Sniping and squatting in auction markets. Am Econ J Microecon 1:68–94

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fenton V, Gallant AR (1996) Qualitative and asymptotic performance of SNP density estimators. Journal of Econometrics, 74:77–118

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gallant AR, Nychka DW (1987) Semi-nonparametric maximum likelihood estimation. Econometrica 55:363–390

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gonzalez R (2002) Essays in structural parametric and semi-parametric estimation of auction and agency models. Unpublished dissertation, Rice University

    Google Scholar 

  • Gonzalez R, Hasker K, Sickles RC (2009) An analysis of strategic behavior in eBay auctions. Singap Econ Rev 54:441–472

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Haile PA, Tamer ET (2003) Inference with an incomplete model of English auctions. J Political Econ 111:1–51

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hasker K, Sickles RC (2010) eBay in the economic literature: analysis of an auction marketplace. Rev Ind Organ 37:3–42

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Laffont JJ, Ossard H, Vuong Q (1995) Econometrics of first-price auctions. Econometrica 63:953–980

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lucking-Reiley D, Bryan D, Prasad N, Reeves D (2007) Pennies from eBay: the determinants of price in online auctions. J Ind Econ 55:223–233

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nekipelov D (2007) Entry deterrence and learning prevention on eBay. Working paper. University of California, Berkeley, webpage https://www.econ.berkeley.edu/faculty/837

  • Roth AE, Ockenfels A (2002) Last-minute bidding and the rules for ending second-price auctions: evidence from eBay and Amazon auctions on the internet. Am Econ Rev 92:1093–1103

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sailer K (2006) Searching the eBay marketplace. University of Munich, Department of Economics Discussion Papers, Number 1234

    Google Scholar 

  • Song U (2004) Nonparametric estimation of an eBay auction model with an unknown number of bidders. Mimeo. Available at http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/usong/eBay.pdf

Download references

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Sandra Campo and participants at the Conference on Auctions and Games, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA, October 12–14, 2007 as well as Ravi Bapna and participants of the FTC Roundtable: Economics of Internet Auctions, October 27th, 2005, Washington, DC for insightful and needed criticism on earlier drafts of this paper. The usual caveat applies.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Kevin Hasker .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Appendices

Appendix 1

4.1.1 Tables and Descriptive Statistics

Table 4.8 Descriptive statistics of key variables

Appendix 2

4.2.1 Tables of Semi-nonparametric Estimation

Table 4.9 Relations between CVH and k
Table 4.10 Relations between CVH and window size, k*  = 2

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2014 Springer Science+Business Media New York

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Hasker, K., Jiang, B., Sickles, R.C. (2014). Estimating Consumer Surplus in eBay Computer Monitor Auctions. In: Sickles, R., Horrace, W. (eds) Festschrift in Honor of Peter Schmidt. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-8008-3_4

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics