The Economics and Sociology of Organization

Promoting a Dialogue
  • Oliver E. Williamson
Part of the Springer Studies in Work and Industry book series (SSWI)


The intellectual appeal of a single, unified theory of organization notwithstanding, we are at present operating in a preunified stage of development. Even if a comprehensive, integrated theory were in prospect, which it is not, our understanding of some complex organizational phenomena might be better served by working out of several well-focused perspectives. Exposing the powers and limits of each of the leading approaches and the tensions and complementarities between them can be, and often is, a productive enterprise.


Corporate Governance Transaction Cost Vertical Integration Bounded Rationality Economic Organization 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1988

Authors and Affiliations

  • Oliver E. Williamson
    • 1
  1. 1.Yale University Law SchoolNew HavenUSA

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