Representations of Internal States

Abstract

Although the standard theory of social action relies explicitly on certain mentalistic assumptions, these assumptions are so well grounded in our intuitions and daily practices, they are so close to truisms, that the tendency among sociologists of action has been to accept them uncritically. On the evidence of the preceding chapter, though, common sense and intuition are far from reliable indicators of internal states and processes. Our self-insight is severely limited, and, it follows, so is our empathetic insight into the mentality of others. We must reconsider our efforts to interpret human social behavior within a motivational-rationalistic framework. We must reduce our reliance on introspection and informant explanation as a source of our theoretical constructs. We must, I think, abstain from the use of mentalistic notions, such as intention, motivation, emotion, and even belief, as theoretical resources. We cannot, to be sure, and should not avoid the use of such notions—they are the stuff of interaction. But we must find a way to use them that does not involve us in making unfounded psychological assumptions. One way to do this is to refuse to make attributions of mental states and events, while recognizing and taking account of the fact that members do make such attributions. Motive and intention, under this approach, are sociological topics but are rejected as theoretical resources.

Words plainly force and overrule the understanding, and throw all into confusion, and lead men away into numberless empty controversies and idle fancies.... For men believe that their reason governs words; but it is also true that words react on the understanding; and this it is that has rendered philosophy and the sciences sophistical and inactive.

Francis Bacon, Novum Organum