Abstract
Substantial scientific evidence exists which indicates man’s genetic inheritance acts as a major influence not only upon his behavior but on his health.1 In the United States, for example, it is estimated that one out of every 20 babies is born with a discernible genetic deficiency;2 of all chronic diseases, between 20 and 25% are predominantly genetic in origin.3 At least half of the hospital beds in America are occupied by patients whose incapacities are known to be of a genetic origin.4 Since modern medicine can alleviate the symptoms of some genetic disease syndromes through sophisticated treatment, many who are afflicted with genetic disease and who in the past would not have survived, are now maintained for extended periods. Medicine is unable to do much by way of curing genetic defects,5 however, and those afflicted with genetic diseases who are kept alive by modern technologies can reproduce and thus may increase the number of defective genes in the genetic profile of the human population.6
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Notes
See S. Stanley, The New Evolutionary Timetable (1981): T. Dobzhansky, Genetic Diversity and Human Equality (1973); Muller, The Human Future in The Humanist Frame 401 (J. Huxley ed. 1961).
Muller, Human Values in Relation to Evolution, 127 Science 625–629 (Mar. 21, 1958).
Gorney, The New Biology and The Future of Man, 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 273, 291 (1968).
Robinson, Genetics and Society, 1971 Utah L. Rev. 487 Approximately 30,000 severely defective infants are born each year and afflicted with grave handicapping conditions that range from spina bifida to anencephaly. Ellis, Letting Defective Babies Die: Who Decides? 7 Am. J. L. & Med. 393, n. 1 (1981).
Supra note 1.
Waltz & Thigpen, Genetic Screening and Counseling: The Legal and Ethical Issues, 68 Nw. U. L. Rev. 696–698 (1973).
Id. at 698.
Kass, The New Biology: What Price Relieving Man’s Estate? 174 Science 779, 780 (1971). See also C. Heintze, Genetic Engineering: Man and Nature in Transition (1973). See R. Blank, The Political Implications of Human Genetic Technology 66 passim (1983).
See generally Symposium—Reflections on the New Biology, 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 267 (1968). Creative, scientific impulses for research and investigation should be neither systemized nor controlled. “Some part of life—perhaps the most important part—must be left to the spontaneous action of individual impulse, for where all is system, there will be mental and spiritual death.” B. Russell, The Impact of Science on Society 89 (1952). See R. Blank, The Political Implications of Human Genetic Technology 66 passim (1983).
Waltz & Thigpen, supra note 5, at 696. See also M. Frankel, Genetic Technology: Promises and Problems (1973). Fletcher, Ethics and Recombinant DNA Research, 51 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1311 (1978).
See Vukowich, Ch. 3, The Dawning of the Brave New World-Legal, Ethical and Social Issues of Eugenics, in 2 Ethical, Legal and Social Challenges to a Brave New World (G. Smith ed. 1982).
Frankel, The Spector of Eugenics, 57 Commentary 25, 30 (1974).
Id. To be justifiable, the acceptance or rejection of eugenic policies should be based upon more than one criterion. The following requisites should be a part of every eugenic program: scientific validity (e.g., a demonstration of sufficient genetic variation to allow for selection of the attribute in question); moral acceptability (i.e., a demonstration that the attributes chosen for selection are properly considered socially desirable); and ethical acceptability (i.e., a demonstration that the programs needed to institute a eugenic program do not compromise individual rights and liberties presently sanctioned by both public policy and the law). Lappe, Why Shouldn’t We Have Eugenic Policy?, in Genetics and the Law 421 at 425 (A. Milunsky & G. Annas eds. 1976). See also Osborn, Qualitative Aspects of Population Control: Eugenics and Euthenics, 25 Law & Contemp. Probs. 406 (1960).
Smith, Through a Test Tube Darkly: Artificial Insemination and the Law, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 127, 147 (1968).
T. Dobshanzky, Mankind Evolving 245 (1962); M. Haller, Eugenics 3 (1963). See also Green, Genetic Technology: Law and Policy for the Brave New World, 48 IND. L. J. 4559 (1973): Dobzhansky, Comments on Genetic Evolution, 90 DAEDALUS 451, 470-473 (1961); Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide, 2 J. Philosophy & Pub. Affairs 37 (1972).
See generally, Hafen, Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy—Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 463 (1983); Symposium, The Family in Legal Transition, 1983 U. Ill. L. Rev. 99.
Plato, The Republic, bk. 5 at 166-70 (J. Davies & D. Vaughn trans. 1891).
C. Darwin, Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex 402-403 (1871).
Comment, Eugenic Artificial Insemination: A Cure for Mediocrity?, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1850, 1852 (1981).
F. Galton, Heredity Genius 1 (1869).
Supra note 18, 1852.
Cynkar, Buck v. Bell: Felt Necessities v. Fundamental Values?, 81 Colum L. Rev. 1416, 1420 (1981).
Id. See generally G. Stine, Biosocial Genetics: Human Heredity and Social Issues (1977).
Id. at 1421. See generally V. McKusick, Mendelian Inheritance in Man (1978).
Id. at 1422-1425. See also J. Fletcher, Coping with Genetic Disorders 3-32 (1982).
Id.
Id. at 1428.
Id.. Beckwith, Social and Political Uses of Genetics in the United States: Past and Present, 265 Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 46 (1976).
H. Laughlin, The Legal Status of Eugenical Sterilizations 65 (1929).
Id. at 60.
See Lappe, Moral Obligations and the Fallacies of Genetic Control, 33 Theological Studies 411 (1972).
Supra note 21, at 1433.
Id. at 1434.
Id. at 1454.
Id. at 1455.
Id. at 1456.
Davis, Ethical and Technical Aspects of Genetic Intervention, 285 New Eng. J. Med. 799 (1977).
Supra note 5, at 700.
Id.
See also Kobrin, Confidentiality of Genetic Information, 30 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1283 (1983).
Robinson, Genetics and Society, 1971 Utah L. Rev. 487 at 488 n. 24.
Id. at 48.
Id. See Ramsey, Screening: An Ethicist’s View, in Ethical Issues in Human Genetics 147 at 154 (B. Hilton, D. Callahan, M. Harris, P. Condliffe & B. Berkley, eds. 1973); Lappe et al, Ethical and Social Issues in Screening for Genetic Disease, 286 New Eng. J. Med. 1129 (1972).
See Note, A Cause of Action for Wrongful Life, 55 Minn. L. Rev. 58 (1970); Annot., 22 A. L. R. 3d 1441 (1968).
Rivers, Grave New World, Sat. Rev., April 8, 1972, at 23, 26 There are four areas in which genetic disease may be classified: single gene effects; chromosomal abnormalities; congenital malformation; and serious constitutional disorders. The incident of single gene effects—of which the most commonly known are phenlketonuria (P.K.U.), Tay-Sachs disease and X-linked mental retardation—is 11.2 affected births per 1000 births. Chromosomal abnormalities—which would include Down’s syndrome and Turner’s syndrome—account for 5.4 per 1000 births. The incidence of congenital malformation is 14.1 per 1000 births and the serious constitutional disorders—which include diabetes and epilepsy—occur in 14.8 per 1000 births. S. Hayes & R. Hayes, Mental Retardation: Law, Policy and Administration 28, 29 (1982). See also, G. Roderick, Man and Heredity 225 (1968); H. Papazian, Modern Genetics 77 (1967); S. Scheinfeld, Your Heredity and Environment 189 (1965).
Walters, Introduction to Genetic Intervention and Reproduction Technologies, in Contemporary Issues in Bioethics at 567 (T. Beauchamp & L. Walters eds. 1978).
See Nelson, Swint & Caskey, An Economic Evaluation of a Genetic Screening Program for Tay-Sachs Disease, 30 Am. J. Human Genetics 160 (1978).
National Sickle Cell Anemia Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3306 et seq. (Supp. III, 1973). A Cerami, E. Washington, Sickle-Cell Anemia (1974). See also A. Etzioni, Genetic Fix 132 (1973).
See Reilly, Government Support of Genetic Services 25 SOCIAL BIOLOGY 23 (1978).
Culliton, Cooley’s Anemia: Special Treatment for Another Ethnic Disease, 178 Science 593 (1972).
National Cooley’s Anemia Control Act (Public Law 92-414 (1972)). There has also been special congressional concern over the study and regulation of Huntington’s chorea (89 Stat. 349 (1975)) and hemophilia (90 Stat. 350 (1975)).
See, e.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 122 § 27–28 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979) (exception for refusal of physical examination on constitutional grounds); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 76 § 15A (Supp. 1979) (mandatory only if child susceptible); N.Y. EDUC. § 904 (McKinney Supp. 1978-79) (exception for refusal based on religious beliefs). See also Va. Code Ann. §§ 32-112.20 to 112.23 (Supp. 1979) (voluntary screening program). Dr. Linus Pauling has suggested that sickle-cell anemia carriers be identified by tattooing the forehead of every carrier. Other recessive genes, such as hemophilia and phynylketonuria, could be similarly identified.
See Pauling, Foreword, Symposium—Reflections on the New Biology, 15 U.L.A. L. Rev. 267, 270 (1968).
Today, some 43 states have PKU screening laws; another 14 test neonatally for a variety of screening problems other than PKU. Reilly, State Supported Mass Genetic Screening Programs, in Genetics and the haw 159, 164 (A. Milunsky & G. Annas eds. 1976).
N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 13-aa (McKinney 1977). Other states provide for voluntary premarital testing for sickle cell anemia. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 325-331 (West Supp. Pamp. 1978); Ga. Code Ann. § 53-216 (1974).
See Va. Code Ann. §32-122.22 (Supp. 1979).
See Antley, Variables in the Outcome of Genetic Counseling, 23 Soc. Biology 108 (1976). A genetic counselor “has freedom to persuade, according to his personal convictions, but he does not have freedom to coerce, based upon his inherent power in the counseling milieu. He must accept the counselee as the ultimate decision maker.” Shaw, Genetic Counseling in Human Genetics: Readings on the Implications of Genetic Engineering 199 at 200 (T. Mertens ed. 1975).
Waltz & Thigpen, Genetic Screening and Counseling: The Legal and Ethical Issues, 68 Nw. U. L. Rev. 696 at 701-702, nn. 28, 29 (1973). See also Screening and Counseling for Genetic Conditions: A Report on the Ethical, Social and Legal Implications of Genetic Screening, Counseling, and Education Programs, President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Behavioral Research (Feb. 1983); J. Fletcher, Coping with Genetic Disorders 50-74 (1982).
Waltz & Thigpen, supra, at 702-702, nn. 30-31. Confusion as to the significance of possessing the defective gene not only renders screening programs less effective in discouraging reproduction, but the failure to differentiate between the disease and the trait also increase the sitmatization to which carriers are subjected. Id..
Supra note 11, at 30.
Id.
Id. While the United States Air Force ended its ban on maintaining cadets at the Academy who were carriers of sickle-cell anemia in 1981, it has been reported that some six or more major American corporations endeavor to screen prospective employees for genetic deficiencies (and particularly their sensitivity to toxic substances). In 1982, nearly five dozen other Fortune 500 firms reported that within five years they too expected to follow a similar policy. Kevles, Annals of Eugenics, The New Yorker 116, 117 (Oct. 29, 1984).
Supra note 48, at 712.
See Isaacs, The Law of Fertility Regulation in the United States: A 1980 Review, 19 J. Fam. L. 65 (1980-1981).
Id. at 711-712.
Id.
Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966) (compulsory blood test to determine intoxication of automobile driver not unreasonable search).
Vukowich, supra note 10, at 208.
Pauling, supra note 45, at 270-271.
See Vukowich, supra note 10, at 215-216.
Id. at 216.
Id.
See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 452-455 (1972) (forbidding—on morality grounds—sale or gift of contraceptives to unmarried persons conflicts with fundamental constitutional rights); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 12 (1967) (state may not infringe freedom to marry person of another race); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-486 (1965) (statute forbidding use of contraceptives violates constitutionally protected right of marital privacy).
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1941). Concurring in Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Goldberg commented that a compulsory birth control law unjustifiably would abridge the constitutional rights of marital privacy. 281 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (with Warren, C.J. & Brennan, J. concurring).
See Roe v. Wade, 419 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
Golding & Golding, Ethical and Value Issues in Population Limitation and Distribution in the United States, 24 Vand. L. Rev. 495, 511 (1971).
Id. at 512. The authors conclude, however, that the unrestricted freedom to procreate should be abridged only for “good of momentous order.” Id..
274 U.S. 200 (1927).
Id. at 207. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court, stated: “We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call on those who already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.” Id. See also In re Sterilization of Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 221 S.E. 2d 307 (1976).
The present eugenic sterilization statutes are: Cal. Penal Code § 645 (West 1970); Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 5701 (1983); Idaho Code §§ 39-3901-3910 (1985); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 34B §§ 7001-7017 (Supp. 1985); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 252A.13 (1982); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 41-45-1-41-45-19 (1981 & Supp. 1985); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 50-5-501-50-5-505 (1985); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 35-36-35-50 (1984); Or. Rev. Stat. § 436.205-436.335 (1983); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 44-47-10-44-47-100 (1985); Utah Code Ann. §§ 64-10-1-64-10-16 (1986); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, §§ 8701-8716 (1968 & Supp. 1985); Va. Code §§ 27-16-1-27-16-5 (1976). It has been estimated that over 70,000 people have been sterilized under such statutes. Statistics from Human Betterment Ass’n of America, Summary of U.S. Sterilization Laws 2 (1958). One should distinguish these eugenic sterilization statutes from those sterilization statutes which are wholly voluntary in nature. Among the voluntary statutes are: Or. Rev. Stat. § 435.305 (1983); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-1-14, 24-9-1 (1984); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 84-932 (1985); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 90-271-90-275 (1985). These statutes are essentially contraceptive and therapeutic and not eugenic in nature.
See, e.g., Oregon v. Cook, 9 Ore. App. 224, 230, 495 P.2d 768, 771-772 (1972) (equal protection challenge based on indigency rejected); In re Cavitt, 182 Neb. 712-721, 157 N.W. 2d 171, 178 (1968), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 996 (1970).
See also Dunn, “Eugenic Sterilization Statutes: A Constitutional Re-evaluation,” 14 J. Fam. L. 280 (1975).
See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
See Oregon v. Cook, 9 Oreg. App. 224, 230, 495 P.2d 768, 771-727 (1972).
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). The Court’s rationale acquires additional significance because it became the basis for distinguishing Buck in the case of Skinner v. Oklahoma—where the High Court invalidated a statute providing for the sterilization of habitual criminals. The Skinner Court concluded that the questioned statute violated the fourteenth amendment’s equal protection clause. See 316 U.S. 535, 542 (1941).
The statute challenged in Buck required only that experience demonstrate heredity plays an important role in the transmission of the mental defect. See 274 U.S. at 206. The inmate involved, however, was the daughter of a feebleminded mother. Id. at 205.
See generally Murray, “Marriage Contracts for the Mentally Retarded,” 21 Cath. Law. 182 (1975).
Ferster, Eliminating the Unfit—Is Sterilization the Answer? 27 Ohio St. L. J. 591 (1966).
See Waltz & Thigpen, supra note 48, at 721, n. 131.
Supra note 57. See also Baron, Voluntary Sterilization of the Mentally Retarded, in Genetics and the Law 267 (A. Milunsky & G. Annas eds. 1976).
274 U.S. at 207. Unrestricted genetic transmission forces a heavy burden upon society. The Juke and Kallikak family histories reveal clearly this point. Max Juke resided in Ulster County, New York. He had two sons who married two of six sisters of a local feebleminded family. One other sister left the area; the other three married mental defectives. From these five sisters, 2094 direct descendants and 726 consortium descendants were traced by 1915 into 14 states. All of them were feebleminded and the cost to society from their welfare payments, illicit enterprises, jail terms, and prostitution brothels was $2,516,685. Martin Kallikak, Sr., fostered a son, Martin Jr., by a feebleminded girl during the Revolutionary War. Martin Jr. married a feebleminded girl and they in turn had seven children, five of whom were similarly afflicted. From these progeny sprung 480 descendants, 143 feebleminded, 46 normals, and 291 of unknown mental stature. J. Wallin, Mental Deficiency 43-44 (1956). Various estimates have been made relative to the lifetime costs of various genetic diseases—often with rather astonishing results. For example, it has been calculated that the lifetime costs of maintaining a seriously defective individual is $250,000; this assumes, of course, institutionalization. Conservative estimates place the number of new cases of Down’s syndrome in the United States at 5000 each year, or one in every 700 live births. Using the $250,000 figure for the cost of maintenance, the lifetime committed expenditure for new cases of Down’s syndrome alone comes to at least $1.25 billion yearly, admittedly a staggering figure for but one disease entity. Another way of calculating the toll of genetic disease is to estimate the future life years’ cost. One widely cited estimate indicates that some 36 million future life years are lost in the United States by birth defects, putting the figure for recognized genetic disease (80% of birth defects being genetic in whole or in part) at 29 million future life years lost, or several times as much as from heart disease, cancer, and stroke. WHAT ARE THE FACTS ABOUT GENETIC DISEASE? at 27, 29, U.S. Dept. of H.E.W., Public Health Service, N.I.H., DHEW Pub. No. (NIH) 75-370 (1978). See also M. Frankel, Genetic Technology: Promises and Problems 46-77 (1973).
S. Hayes & R. Hayes, Mental Retardation: Law, Policy and Administration 73 (1982).
Id.
Id. at 76.
Id.
Id. at 31.
Id.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 30.
Id.
Id. In Victoria, there are 43 notifiable diseases under the Health Act—but these do not include genetic abnormalities identifiable in newborns and there is, furthermore no compulsion for treatment. Id..
Id. at 33.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 48-49.
Smith, Through A Test-Tube Darkly: Artificial Insemination and the Law, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 127, at 148 (1968). It is generally agreed that it is best for any AID baby not to know of its origins. The donor should not be told if his donation of semen resulted in a successful impregnation and birth. Attalah, Report from A Test Tube Baby, N. Y. Times Mag., April 18, 1976, 16 and 17, 51.
Smith, supra, at 145, 146. The Repository for Germinal Choice became operational in 1979 in Escondido, California, and is designed to make available the sperm of Nobel Prize winners and other “creative, intelligent people.” See Playboy Interview: William Schockley, 27 Playboy 69 (Aug. 1980).
See also Broad, A Bank for Nobel Sperm, 207 Science 1326 (Mar. 1980).
Id.
Id. See generally S. Pickens, Eugenics and the Progressive (1968).
Medawar, The Genetic Improvement of Man, 4 Australasian Annals of Med. 317 (1969).
Brewer, Eutelegenesis, 27 Eugenics Rev. 121, 123, 126 (1935).
See generally Smith, The Razor’s Edge of Human Bonding: Artificial Fathers and Surrogate Mothers, 4 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 639 (1983).
Vukowich, supra note 10, at 230-231.
Smith, Sexuality, Privacy and the New Biology, 67 Marq. L. Rev. 263 (1984).
Rovrik, The Embryo Sweepstakes, N.Y. Times Mag., Sept. 15, 1974, at 17.
Id.
Id.
Time, July 24, 1978, at 47.
See Test-Tube Babies: A Guide to Moral Questions, Present Techniques and Future Possibilities (W. Walters & P. Singer eds. 1982); Edwards & Steptoe, Current Statutes of In Vitro Fertilization and Implantation of Human Embryos, The Lancet 1265 (Dec. 3, 1983); Biggers, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer in Human Beings, 304 New Eng. J. Med. 336 (1981).
Making Babies: The Test Tube and Christian Ethics (A. Nichols & T. Hogan eds. 1984); Symposium, In Vitro Fertilization: The Major Issues, 9 J. Med. Ethics 192 (1983).
See also Annas & Elias, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer: Medico Legal Aspects of a New Technique to Create a Family, 17 Fam. L. Q. 199 (1983).
Gaylin, We Have the Awful Knowledge to Make Exact Copies of Human Beings, N.Y. Times Mag., Mar. 5, 1972, 11 at 48.
See Gaylin, supra, at 48; cf. Rorvik, supra note 101 at 50 (eggs from one cow can be implanted in the womb of another).
Gaylin, supra note 107, at 48 See also R. Scott, The Body as Property, Ch. 8 (1981).
Id.
D. Rorvik, Brave New Baby 109 (1971).
G. Taylor, The Biological Time Bomb 23-25 (1968).
G. Leach, The Biocrats 94 (1970).
J. Watson, Potential Consequences of Experimentation with Human Eggs, Jan. 28, 1971 (Papers 1, 3, 4, Harv. Univ. Biological Labs).
Lederberg, Experimental Genetics and Human Evolution, 100 AM. Naturalist 549, 562 (1966); Watson, Moving Toward the Clonal Man, Atlantic Monthly 50, 51 (May, 1971).
Comment, Asexual Reproduction and Genetic Engineering: A Constitutional Assessment of the Technology of Cloning, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 476 (1974).
Supra note 112, at 29.
Id. at 30.
Supra note 111, at 95.
Id. at 94.
Lederberg, Genetic Engineering or the Amelioration of Genetic Defect, 34 Pharos 9, 12 (1971).
Id. at 12.
Fletcher, Ethical Aspects of Genetic Controls, 285 New Eng. J. Med. 776, 779 (1971).
Id.
Supra note 116, at 561.
Id. at 550, 556.
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
Supra note 115, at 550-552.
Id. at 556 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 399 U.S. 618, 638, n. 20.
Supra note 127, at 581-582; U.S. Const., Art. I. 9, cl. 8; Amend, XIII.
Supra note 127, at 556.
Id. at 579 See R. Blank, The Political Implications of Human Genetic Technology 93-109, 117-122 (1983).
Vukowich, The Dawning of the Brave New World—Legal, Ethical and Social Issues of Eugenics, 1971 U. Ill. L. F. 189, 222. If the challenged legislation incorporated negative, rather than positive, eugenic concepts so that it only restricted carriers of recessive debilitating defects from cloning, the constitutional problems would be minimized. The legitimacy of the state interest could not be challenged on the ground that it creates an elite group and therefore violates the nobility clause of the United States Constitution. A court could find readily that such a statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest—specifically, diminishing the propagation of inferior traits. Scientific evidence more readily can provide a rational basis for the classification of those carrying debilitating defects than for those possessing superior genetic traits. Whether the state’s interest in a negative eugenics program is sufficiently compelling to sustain the validity of the statute under a strict scrutiny test, however, is undertain. Id. at 198-201, 208.
Wilson, Foreword, The Sociobiology Debate at xi (A. Caplan ed. 1978).
E. Wilson, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis 578 (1975).
Id.
Peterson, Sociobiology and Ideas Become Real: Case Study and Assessment, 4 J. Social Biol. Struct. 125 (1981).
Supra note 135, at 575.
Id. at xiii, xiv.
Gould, Biological Potential vs. Biological Determinism in The Sociobiology Debate 343 (A. Caplan ed. 1978).
Dobzhansky, Anthropology and the Natural Sciences—The Problem of Human Evolution, 4 Current Antrhopology 146 (No. 138, 1963).
K. Boulding, Ecodynamics: A New Theory of Social Evolution (1978).
Caplan, Introduction, The Sociobiology Debate at 5 (A. Caplan ed. 1978).
Boulding, Sociobiology or Biosociology? Society 28 (Sept.–Oct. 1978). See also P. Singer, The Expanding Circle 27, 28 (1981); Frankel, Sociobiology and its Critics, Commentary 39 (July 1979).
Sociobiology Study Group of Science for the People, Sociobiology—Another Biological Determinism, in The Sociobiology Debate 280 at 287 (A. Caplan ed. 1978).
Supra note 143, at 3 See Gustafson, Sociobiology: A Secular Theology, Hastings Center Rep. 44 (Feb. 1979).
Singer, supra note 144, at 11.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id. at 128.
Id. at 11.
J. Beckstrom, Sociobiology and the Law 13 (1985) See also D. Barash, Sociobiology and Behavior (1977).
Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 38 (1985).
Id. at 71.
O. Holmes, The Common Law 5 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
Id. at 32.
See Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 443 (1899).
Beckstrom, Behavioral Research in Aid-Giving That Can Assist Lawmakers While Testing Scientific Theory, 1 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y 25 (1985).
Beckstrom, Sociobiology and Intestate Wealth Transfers, 76 Nw. U. L. Rev. 216 (1981).
Rodgers, Bringing People Back: Toward A. Comprehensive Theory of Taking in Natural Resources Law, 10 Ecology L.Q. 205 (1982).
Hirshleifer, Privacy: Its Origins, Functions and Future, 9 J. Legal Stud. 649 (1980).
Rodgers, supra note 159, Ecology L.Q. at 219.
Id. at 221.
See, e.g.
Epstein, A Taste for Privacy: Evolution and the Emergence of a Naturalistic Ethic, 9 J. Legal Stud. 665, 670 (1980).
See Nossal, “The Impact of Genetic Engineering on Modern Medicine,” Quadrant, (Nov. 1983).
McGarity & Bayer, Federal Regulation of Emerging Genetic Technologies, 36 Vand. L. Rev. 461 (1983).
Smith, Quality of Life, Sanctity of Creation: Palliative or Apotheosis?, 63 Neb. L. Rev. 707 (1984).
G. Smith, Genetics, Ethics and the Law 164, 165 (1981).
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Smith, G.P. (1989). The Contemporary Influence of Genetics and Eugenics in Family Planning. In: The New Biology. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-0803-2_4
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