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Unary Probabilistic Semantics

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Abstract

Writers in Popper’s debt generally use binary probability functions when doing probabilistic semantics. I recount here results lately obtained when unary functions are used instead. I first describe the formal language (call it L) that I work with, provide a probabilistic semantics for it, and attend to such matters as strong soundness and strong completeness. This done I consider the relationship between unary probability functions and truth-value ones, and I demonstrate that and why unary probability theory is but a generalization of truth-value-theory. Lastly I study what Charles G. Morgan and I call assumption sets, here the assumption sets of unary probability functions. The unary probability functions in this text are in good standing: they are the probability functions in Chapter I of Kolmogorov (1933), with statements substituting for sets and provision made for the probabilities of quantifications.

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© 1985 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Leblanc, H. (1985). Unary Probabilistic Semantics. In: Dorn, G., Weingartner, P. (eds) Foundations of Logic and Linguistics. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-0548-2_15

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-0548-2_15

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4899-0550-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4899-0548-2

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