On Reasons and Causes
Having defended the distinction between reasons and causes often and having argued that psychological explanations cannot ignore the former (Robinson, 1976, 1978, 1979), I can only commend Rychlak for recognizing the distinction and for developing certain theoretical implications arising from it. Before examining his version of the distinction and the theoretical uses to which he puts it, however, a few words must be devoted to the historical passages in his essay.
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- Robinson, D. N. An intellectual history of psychology. New York: Macmillan, 1976.Google Scholar
- Robinson, D. N. Psychological explanation: Reasons or causes? Paper presented at the annual convention of the American Psychological Association, Toronto, 1978.Google Scholar
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