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Abstract

Except for a couple of rigorous software certification schemes that are required for certain safety-critical software applications (e.g., RTCA DO178-B), there are no generally trusted software certification schemes. While there is no theoretical reason why these safety-critical standards could not be applied to all applications, there is a practical reason: cost. Estimates vary, but it is generally accepted that a line of safety-critical software costs between $500-$5,000 to design, write, test, and certify. Such levels of rigor and quality are excessive for most nonsafety—critical applications.

Nonetheless, a ubiquitously accepted process which provides guarantees about software quality is still needed. These guarantees must be product-based and trustworthy. This paper presents a certification process we believe satisfies this need. Our process collects appropriate data that can then be used to stamp limited warranties onto commercial software.

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© 1999 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Voas, J. (1999). User Participation-Based Software Certification. In: Vermesan, A., Coenen, F. (eds) Validation and Verification of Knowledge Based Systems. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-6916-6_18

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-6916-6_18

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-5107-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4757-6916-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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