Risk Management of Complex, Technology-Based Systems: Observations on Similarities and Differences

Abstract

There are great variations among the specific aspects of safety assurance for nuclear power plants, aircraft and space vehicles, large public projects, and industrial processes. Yet, each case is characterized by complexity, high technology content, concomitant hazards and risks, and public concern. The question that this paper addresses is: In light of the above, are there some significant, generic similarities in safety assurance, such that one system could benefit from the experience of others? Through informal discussions and review of such systems with representatives of the vendors, users, and regulators, the authors have highlighted similarities and differences in the various approaches to safety assurance.

Some preliminary findings show that there is much in risk management that could provide helpful insights among industries; both technical merit/validity and public acceptance are necessary but, by themselves, insufficient conditions for assuring acceptable levels of safety; it is becoming increasingly difficult to meet this dual requirement for large technology-based systems due to concurrent technical, operations, institutional, and political uncertainties and complexities; and it is not constructive to resolve issues of safety assurance primarily through adversarial processes. An adequate understanding of what goes into safety assurance should be fostered among all concerned parties. In this manner, decisions could be based on what is possible and acceptable, as opposed to what is desirable and legally mandated—but perhaps not feasible.