On the Probabilistic Relationship Between the Public Good Index and the Normalized Banzhaf Index

  • Mika Widgrén
Chapter

Abstract

In this paper we develop a probabilistic interpretation for the normalized Banzhaf index and the public good index. We then derive a way to decompose the normalized Banzhaf index into two parts. The first of them relates the Banzhaf index with the public good index and the other one on special type of luck. Similarities and differences of the two indices are then discussed.

Keywords

Entropy Laru 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mika Widgrén
    • 1
  1. 1.Turku School of Economics and Business AdministrationYrjö Jahnsson Foundation and CEPRHelsinkiFinland

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