In 1953, Shapley proposed a solution concept for cooperative games with transferable utility. The Shapley value is a unique function which obeys three axioms — symmetry, efficiency and additivity. The aim of our article is to provide a new axiomatic approach which classifies the existing values (indices). Shapley’s efficiency and symmetry conditions are kept whereas the additivity axiom is replaced by the axiom of global monotonicity. The Shapley value satisfies the new set of axioms. Some other values (indices) also satisfy the new set of axioms. However, our extension of the set of acceptable values (indices) excludes the Banzhaf-Coleman and Holler-Packel indices.
Cooperative Game Power Index Coalition Formation Simple Game Winning Coalition
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