Abstract
In this paper we develop six values for side payments games when a cooperation description of the players is a priori given. This cooperation description, called a level structure, is made of a sequence of coalition structures. Those values are extensions of values such as the Shapley value (1953), Owen’s value (1977) and Winter’s level structure value (1989).
I thank Guillermo Owen and Jean-François Laslier for helpful discussions and comments, and Dirk van de Gaer for his valuable remarks. The usual disclaimer applies.
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References
Hart, S., and M. Kurz (1983), “Endogenous formation of coalitions”, Econometrica, 57, 589–614.
Owen, G. (1977), “Values of games with a priori unions”, in: R. Hein, and O. Moeschlin (eds.), Essays in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory, New York: Springer Verlag, 76–88.
Shapley, L.S. (1953), “A value for n-person games”, in: H.W. Kuhn, and A.W. Tucker (eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games II, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 307–317.
Winter, E. (1989), “A value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation”, International Journal of Game Theory, 18, 227–240.
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© 2001 Springer Science+Business Media New York
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Chantreuil, F. (2001). Axiomatics of Level Structure Values. In: Holler, M.J., Owen, G. (eds) Power Indices and Coalition Formation. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-6221-1_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-6221-1_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
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