Voting Power in the European Central Bank
This paper investigates the power distribution in the actual and in an enlarged European Central Bank. By applying two different power indices (PI) it is shown that none of the voting rules described in the ECB statute yields a fair distribution of power. Moreover, it is demonstrated how the voting weights have to be reallocated in order to achieve a fair distribution of power. For that purpose a simple search algorithm is presented.
KeywordsEuropean Union Monetary Policy Power Distribution Power Index European Central Bank
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