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Voting Power in a Sequence of Cooperative Games:The Case of EU Procedures

  • Annick Laruelle
  • Mika Widgrén
Chapter

Abstract

Probabilistic measures of a priori voting power are useful tools to assess actors’ influence on collective decision-making either for the purpose of designing a voting organ or to model particular policy cases. This paper makes an attempt to reduce a dynamic voting process into a cooperative voting game and uses the EU as an example. By a subsequent specialization of power indices we are able to quantify, for instance, to what extent the development of the decision-making procedures on the EU has changed the division of power among its main organs.

Keywords

European Union Cooperative Game Power Index Coalition Formation Vote Rule 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Annick Laruelle
    • 1
  • Mika Widgrén
    • 2
  1. 1.Departamento de Economía Aplicada IVUniversidad del País VascoBilbaoSpain
  2. 2.Turku School of Economics and Business AdministrationYrjö Jahnsson Foundation and CEPRHelsinkiFinland

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