In this paper a new type of cooperative games in characteristic function form (called set games) is introduced. In a set game the worth of a coalition is expressed by a set instead of a real number. For this class of games we will define the notion of value, being a solution concept and also several axioms. Furthermore we will study values for set games that satisfy the so-called additivity axiom which is the analog of the additivity axiom of the Shapley value.
KeywordsCooperative Game Solution Concept Power Index Coalition Formation Grand Coalition
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