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Abstract

In this final chapter a summary and evaluation of the monograph are given. Section 7.1 provides a brief, yet comprehensive survey of the main results obtained. Subsequently, Section 7.2 evaluates these results and the method(s) employed to derive them, and advances some ideas for future research.

Keywords

Interest Group Public Choice Game Model Electoral Competition Campaign Contribution 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Randolph Sloof
    • 1
  1. 1.University of AmsterdamThe Netherlands

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