Summary and Evaluation
In this final chapter a summary and evaluation of the monograph are given. Section 7.1 provides a brief, yet comprehensive survey of the main results obtained. Subsequently, Section 7.2 evaluates these results and the method(s) employed to derive them, and advances some ideas for future research.
KeywordsInterest Group Public Choice Game Model Electoral Competition Campaign Contribution
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