Lobbying Politicians or Bureaucrats?
According to Laffont and Tirole (1991, p. 1090) one methodological limitation of the theoretical literature on interest groups is that most models mainly focus “...on the ‘demand side’ in their study of political and regulatory decision-making, in that all the action takes place on the side of interest groups. By ‘blackboxing’ the ‘supply side’ (the political and regulatory institutions), they have ignored a crucial agency relationship between politicians and their delegates in the bureaucracy.”2 In this chapter the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats is explicitly taken into account when studying the choice an interest group has between lobbying politicians or lobbying bureaucrats. On the one hand, the internal organization of government has an impact on the way in which interest groups may try to influence political decision-making On the other hand, when deciding on whether to delegate policy authority to bureaucrats or not, politicians may take the potential influence of interest groups on bureaucrats into account. From this perspective the internal organization of government and (the potential for) interest group influence are interrelated. This chapter presents a model that analyzes this latter relationship.
KeywordsInterest Group Distributional Loss Signaling Game Revolving Door Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
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