Comments on “The Subsidy Provided by the Federal Safety Net: Theory and Measurement”
Encouraging excessive risk taking behavior by banks with resulting losses to the FDIC and ultimately the taxpayer.
Providing recipient banks with an unfair competitive advantage by reducing their cost of funds.
KeywordsFederal Reserve Cost Curve Deposit Insurance Bank Activity Finance Company
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