Using Experimental Data to Model Bargaining Behavior in Ultimatum Games

  • Haijin Lin
  • Shyam Sunder


In ultimatum games two players bargain anonymously to divide a fixed amount between them, using a computer or human intermediary for communication. One player (proposer) proposes a division of the “pie” and the other player (responder) decides whether to accept the proposal. If accepted, the proposal is implemented so both players receive their agreed upon shares; if rejected, players receive nothing.


Maximum Likelihood Estimate American Economic Review Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Ultimatum Game Bargaining Game 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Haijin Lin
    • 1
  • Shyam Sunder
    • 2
  1. 1.Carnegie Mellon UniversityUSA
  2. 2.Yale UniversityUSA

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