Trust, Reciprocity, and Other-Regarding Preferences: Groups Vs. Individuals and Males Vs. Females

  • James C. Cox


Trust and reciprocity have attracted increasing attention as topics of research. Arrow (1974) explained that, because of asymmetric information, incomplete contracts, and the prohibitive transaction costs of perfect monitoring, much economic activity may require trust and reciprocity in order for mutual gains from exchange to be realized. And reciprocity may be essential to development of a modern economy in which much effort of highly-skilled labor cannot be effectively monitored.


Decision Task Group Task Ultimatum Game Public Good Game Dictator Game 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. Arrow, K. (1974). The Limits of Organization. NY: Norton.Google Scholar
  2. Berg, J., J. Dickhaut, and Kevin McCabe (1995). “Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History.” Games and Economic Behavior 10, 122–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Bolton, G. E., and E. Katoc (1995). “An Experimental Test for Gender Differences in Beneficient Behavior.” Economics Letters 48, 287–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Bone, J., J. Hey, and J. Suckling (1997). “Are Groups More Consistent than Individuals?” Discussion Paper, University of York.Google Scholar
  5. Bornstein G., and I. Yaniv (1998). “Individual and Group Behavior in the Ultimatum Game: Are Groups More `Rational’ Players?” Experimental Economics 1, 109–18.Google Scholar
  6. Brown-Kruse, J. L., and D. Hummels (1993). “Gender Effects in Laboratory Public Goods Contribution.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 22, 255–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Cadsby, C. B., and E. Maynes (1998). “Gender and Free-Riding in a Threshold Public Goods Game: Experimental Evidence.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 34, 603–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Coleman, J. (1990). Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Cosmides, L., and J. Tooby (1992). “Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange.” In The Adapted Mind, edited by J. Barkow, L. Cosmides, and J. Tooby. NY: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  9. Cox, J. C. (2000). “Trust and Reciprocity: Implications of Game Triads and Social Contexts.” Discussion Paper, University of Arizona.Google Scholar
  10. Croson, R., and N. Buchan (1999). “Gender and Culture: International Experimental Evidence from Trust Games.” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 89, 386–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Davis, J. H. (1992). “Some Compelling Intuitions about Group Consensus Decisions: Theoretical and Empirical Research, and Interpersonal Aggregation Phenomena: Selected Examples, 1950–1990.” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 52, 3–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Eckel, C. C., and P. J. Grossman (1997). “Chivalry and Solidarity in Ultimatum Games.” Discussion Paper, Virginia Polytechnic and State University.Google Scholar
  13. Eckel, C. C., and P. J. Grossman (1998). “Are Women Less Selfish than Men? Evidence from Dictator Experiments.” Economic Journal 108, 726–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Fehr, E., and A. Falk (1999). “Wage Rigidity in a Competitive Incomplete Contract Market.” Journal of Political Economy 107, 106–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Fehr, E., and S. Gächter (2000a). “Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14, 159–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Fehr, E., and S. Gächter (2000b). “Do Incentive Contracts Crowd out Voluntary Cooperation?” University of Zurich.Google Scholar
  17. Fehr, E., S. Gächter, and G. Kirchsteiger (1996). “Reciprocal Fairness and Noncompensating Wage Differentials.” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 152, 608–40.Google Scholar
  18. Fehr, E., S. Gächter, and G. Kirchsteiger (1997). “Reciprocity as a Contract EnforcementGoogle Scholar
  19. Device: Experimental Evidence.“ Econometrica 65, 833–60.Google Scholar
  20. Fehr, E., G. Kirchsteiger, and A. Riedl (1993). “Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? AnGoogle Scholar
  21. Experimental Investigation.“ Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, 437–60.Google Scholar
  22. Frank, R. H., T. Gilovich, and T. Regan (1993). “Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 7, 159–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Fukuyama, F. (1995). Trust. NY: Free Press.Google Scholar
  24. Gambetta, D., ed. (1988) Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations. Cambridge: Blackwell.Google Scholar
  25. Hoffman, E., K. A. McCabe, K. Shachat, and V. L. Smith (1994). “Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games.” Games and Economic Behavior 7, 346–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. Hoffinan, E., K. A. McCabe, and V. L. Smith (1998). “Behavioral Foundations of Reciprocity: Experimental Economics and Evolutionary Psychology.” Economic Inquiry 36, 335–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Knack, S., and P. Keefer (1996). “Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation.” Discussion Paper, College Park, University of Maryland, ML.Google Scholar
  28. Kuon, B., B. Mathauschek, and A. Sadrieh (1998). “Teams Take the Better Risks.” Discussion Paper, University of Bonn.Google Scholar
  29. La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Salanes, A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny (1997). “Trust in Large Organizations.” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 87, 333–8.Google Scholar
  30. McCabe, K. A., S. J. Rassenti, and V. L. Smith (1996). “Game Theory and Reciprocity in Some Extensive Form Bargaining Games.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 93, 13421–8.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  31. McCabe, K. A., S. J. Rassenti, and V. L. Smith (1998). “Reciprocity, Trust, and Payoff Privacy in Extensive Form Bargaining Games.” Games and Economic Behavior 24, 10–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  32. Norwell, C., and S. Tinckler (1994). “The Influence of Gender on the Provision of a Public Good.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 25, 25–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. Ortmann, A., and L. K. Tichy (1999). “Gender Differences in the Laboratory.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 39, 327–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. Putnam, R. (1993). Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  35. Rapoport, A., and A. M. Chanunah (1965). “The Differences in Factors Contributing to the Level of Cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 2, 831–8.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  36. Smith, V. L. (1998). “Distinguished Guest Lecture: The Two Faces of Adam Smith.” Southern Economic Journal 65, 1–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  37. Solnick, S. J. (1997). “Gender Differences in the Ultimatum Game?’ Discussion Paper, University of Miami.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • James C. Cox
    • 1
  1. 1.University of ArizonaUSA

Personalised recommendations